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ABSTRACT 
 This Article describes and explains the influence of global change 
on American public interest law over the past quarter-century. It 
suggests that contemporary public interest lawyers, unlike their civil 
rights–era predecessors, operate in a professional environment 
integrated into the global political economy in ways that have 
profound implications for whom they represent, where they advocate, 
and what sources of law they invoke. The Article provides a 
preliminary map of this professional environment by tracing the 
impact of three defining transnational processes on the development 
of the modern public interest law system: the increasing magnitude 
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and changing composition of immigration, the development and 
expansion of free market policies and institutions, and the rise of the 
international human rights movement. It then suggests how each of 
these processes has contributed to institutional revisions within the 
U.S. public interest system: the rise of immigrant rights as a distinctive 
category of public interest practice, the emergence of transnational 
advocacy as a response to the impact of free market policies abroad, 
and the movement to promote domestic human rights both as a way 
to resist free market policies at home and to defend civil rights and 
civil liberties in the face of domestic conservatism and antiterrorism. 
After mapping the institutional scope and texture of these trends, the 
Article appraises their influence on the goals public interest lawyers 
pursue, the tactics they deploy, and the professional roles they assume 
in the modern era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Yale Law Journal heralded the arrival of the “new” 
public interest lawyers in 1970, it presented a distinctively American 
profile of legal practice.1 The new activist lawyers were notable not 
simply for their commitment to social change, but also for the 
parochial nature of their project, which was defined by the use of 
domestic legal institutions to advance domestic causes.2 The unique 
terrain of the civil rights political landscape shaped this insularity, as 
liberal public interest lawyers, buoyed by their litigation success in 
federal court,3 sought to claim the power of American law as a force 
for vindicating the rights of politically marginalized domestic groups.4 
 
 1. Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970). 
 2. Id. at 1072–1105. Even when profiled lawyers took cases with international 
dimensions—like California Rural Legal Assistance lawyers who served migrant farm workers, 
id. at 1088, or Law Commune lawyers who represented clients resisting the Vietnam War draft, 
id. at 1095—their work was presented in domestic terms: serving the “poor” or supporting 
“political dissidents.” Id. at 1072, 1091. 
 3. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH & HOWARD S. 
ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 24–44 (1978); SUSAN E. 
LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT 
DECISION MAKING 99–101 (1990). 
 4. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic 
Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 4, 22 (Burton 
A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978). Although the test-case approach was the dominant motif of the 
early public interest law period, it had many critics inside the movement; indeed, well-known 
public interest lawyers of the time expressed dissatisfaction with the limits of test-case reform 
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The isolationalist impulse of the early public interest movement 
stands in contrast to the increasingly cosmopolitan scope of 
contemporary practice. This shift is symbolized by the most 
prominent test-case litigation of the post-9/11 era: the contest over the 
detention of so-called “enemy combatants” at Guantánamo Bay, 
which has seen high-profile U.S. public interest law organizations 
representing detained foreign nationals,5 advocating both in U.S. 
courts and international venues like the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the United Nations,6 and asserting claims that 
detention violates both U.S. and international human rights law.7 
Yet, as this Article suggests, the Guantánamo litigation is but the 
most dramatic expression of a broader pattern of internationalization 
that has disrupted the insularity of the American public interest law 
project.8 Unlike their civil rights–era predecessors, contemporary 
public interest lawyers operate in a professional environment 
integrated into the global political economy in ways that have 
 
and argued instead for a model of social change that combined law and organizing. See 
Comment, supra note 1, at 1077–78 (quoting Gary Bellow’s critique of test-case litigation). 
 5. The Center for Constitutional Rights represented petitioners in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004), and Al Odah v. United States. See Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al., Al Odah v. 
United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. filed Aug. 24, 2007). 
 6. In 2002, the Center for Constitutional Rights “filed a petition with the Inter-American 
Commission for Human Rights seeking the Commission’s intervention and requesting the 
issuance of Precautionary Measures to protect the rights of persons detained at Guantanamo.” 
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: ONE YEAR LATER: 
EROSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE POST 9/11 ERA 16, available at http://www.cala-
online.org/Civil_Lib/Civil_Liberities.pdf. In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union submitted 
a Written Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights condemning the torture of 
Guantánamo detainees. See ACLU, Written Statement on Torture and Detention to UN 
Comm’n on Human Rights (2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_ 
file810_24799.pdf. 
 7. See Complaint at ¶ 164, Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (alleging that 
“acts described herein constitute prolonged arbitrary detention in violation of the law of nations 
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary international 
law prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention as reflected, expressed, and defined in 
multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial 
decisions, and other authorities”). 
 8. For the seminal research on the internationalization of domestic legal fields, see YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, 
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002), and David 
M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal 
Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); see also 
Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 343–44 
(calling for law and social science researchers “to develop a ‘bottom-up’ approach appropriate 
to the era of globalization and to explore the institutions and decision-makers who are calling 
the shots”). 
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profound implications for whom they represent, where they advocate, 
and what sources of law they invoke. Although global 
interdependence has by no means spelled the demise of the classic 
public interest law model of domestic rights enforcement,9 it has 
generated new stories of innovation that foreground international 
themes.10 Thus, the literature on public interest practice has drawn 
attention to lawyers who mobilize law to protect the workplace rights 
of undocumented immigrants,11 challenge U.S. actions in front of 
human rights and free trade bodies,12 sue transnational corporations 
in U.S. courts for abuses committed in developing countries,13 and 
promote human rights as a strategy to advance domestic social 
justice.14 These stories, though only partial accounts of public interest 
practice, point to new directions of global engagement by lawyers on 
the ground and suggest the rough outlines of an evolving frontier of 
transnational justice. 
This Article describes and explains the influence of global 
change on American public interest law over the past quarter century. 
It does not offer a systematic measurement of the degree to which 
U.S. public interest practice has been transformed by globalization, 
but rather a preliminary map of the public interest field that overlays 
 
 9. See Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the 
“New Public Interest Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 457–60 (discussing the history of the 
“classic” public interest law model). In fact, a 2006 empirical study of the public interest field 
suggests that traditional domestic legal advocacy remains a core element of what U.S. public 
interest law organizations do. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The 
Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1611 (2006). 
 10. See Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the 
Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A 
GLOBAL ERA 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); see also Timothy K. Kuhner, 
International Poverty Law: A Response to Economic Globalization, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 75 
(2003–2004). 
 11. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS (2005). 
 12. See FORD FOUND., CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2004) (describing a petition filed with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to challenge U.S. welfare reform); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and 
the Domestic Enforcement of International Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 547–53 
(2001–2002) (discussing the use of the side labor agreement of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement to enforce international labor norms). 
 13. See Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation As a 
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2328 (2004). 
 14. See Catherine Albisa & Sharda Sekaran, Foreword to Symposium, Realizing Domestic 
Social Justice Through International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 
(2006). 
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currents of global change onto the terrain of domestic institutions, 
revealing the texture of U.S. lawyering in the international arena. Its 
goals are threefold. 
First, it provides a historical framework for understanding what 
is distinctive about the interaction between global change and 
domestic public interest practice since the 1980s. Part I thus suggests 
that, although transnational processes influenced the development of 
legal aid in the first half of the twentieth century and the public 
interest law movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Reagan years 
constituted a political disjuncture associated with two fundamental 
policy shifts: from global anticommunism to free markets and from 
domestic political liberalism to conservatism. Although these shifts 
impacted domestic practice in complex ways, one may view them 
schematically as operating to both push and pull public interest 
lawyers into the international arena: shrinking the sphere of market 
regulation at home while expanding the scope of market integration 
abroad; narrowing the opportunities for liberal advocacy at home, 
while fueling the movement for international human rights abroad. 
From this vantage point, U.S. policy can be viewed as constricting the 
avenues of domestic legal redress forged by liberal public interest 
lawyers, while simultaneously igniting transnational processes that 
opened new pathways of global legal engagement. 
The goal of Part II is to identify and chart the impact of these 
processes on the development of contemporary public interest law. 
Toward this end, it identifies three defining transnational processes of 
the modern public interest era: (1) the increasing magnitude and 
changing composition of immigration (bringing in new clients), (2) the 
development and expansion of free market policies and institutions 
(extending transnational economic arenas within which advocacy 
takes place), and (3) the rise of the international human rights 
movement (stimulating the importation of new norms). It then 
suggests how each of these processes has contributed to institutional 
revisions within the U.S. public interest system: the rise of immigrant 
rights as a distinctive category of public interest practice, the 
emergence of transnational advocacy as a response to the impact of 
free market policies abroad, and the movement to promote domestic 
human rights both as a way to resist free market policies at home and 
to defend civil rights and civil liberties in the face of domestic 
conservatism and antiterrorism. In this way, the Article provides an 
initial account of how global change has influenced what public 
interest lawyers do inside the U.S. legal system (which clients they 
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represent and which causes they pursue) as well as what types of 
activities they undertake outside of American borders (which 
international venues they enter and which networks they support). 
The final goal of the Article is to move beyond a description of 
institutional change toward an evaluation of what this change means 
for conceptions of U.S. public interest law, its relevance as a tool for 
social change, and its role in the legal profession. Does the 
international turn in public interest law represent the extension of 
familiar American legal objectives and methods into the international 
sphere or has global engagement altered public interest law’s basic 
terms and fundamental values? 
This Article can only offer tentative answers to this question, 
which it does in Part III by shifting the lens from discrete practices to 
synthetic themes. Looking across the range of lawyering activity 
described in the Article, it examines how global engagement has 
influenced the goals U.S. public interest lawyers pursue, the tactics 
they deploy, and the professional roles they assume. With respect to 
the definition of goals, the evidence from practice suggests that 
internationalization has refocused the traditional public interest 
objectives of market regulation, public participation, and political 
resistance. The project of market regulation in the global era 
encompasses efforts by American lawyers to hold transnational 
corporations outside the United States accountable to international 
standards, while also enforcing the labor rights of undocumented 
immigrants within U.S. borders. Efforts to promote public 
participation are channeled into attempts to correct the “democracy 
deficit” in international institutions. And, in perhaps the most striking 
turn, some public interest lawyers are moving away from the old civil 
rights model of enlisting federal power to protect minority rights 
toward a new human rights model of resisting federal power—
particularly after 9/11—through the domestic application of 
international standards. Tactically, these shifts have been associated 
with an approach that both encompasses and moves beyond court-
centered litigation strategies. Lawyering within the international 
arena is thus notable for its tactical pluralism, embracing a broad 
range of nontraditional techniques such as lobbying, reporting, and 
organizing; its polycentrism, evident in the movement by lawyers into 
advocacy venues outside of the U.S.; and its connection to 
transnational alliances that operate to mobilize law across borders. 
Finally, internationalization has reframed issues of professional 
accountability, as public interest lawyers increasingly operate in 
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international venues where the rules of lawyer-client relations are not 
well defined and the geographic scope of legal advocacy strains even 
the best attempts by lawyers to remain responsive to their clients’ 
interests. 
I.  AMERICAN LEGAL ACTIVISM IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE:  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIELD 
Although this Article focuses on what has happened within 
American public interest law since the early 1980s—a period roughly 
identified with the rise of globalization15—the penetration of global 
influences into the domestic field has a longer history. To understand 
what is distinctive about the contemporary period, it is therefore 
instructive to compare the influence of international forces across 
three phases of public interest law’s development. 
A. Legal Aid 
The first phase, from roughly 1900 to 1950, was dominated by the 
rise of legal aid: a system of local direct services offices defined by a 
commitment to equal access to justice for the poor.16 The project of 
legal aid was heavily influenced by the racial exclusivity of U.S. 
immigration policy, which meant that legal aid services were directed 
to “white” southern and eastern European immigrants living in major 
urban “ghettos.”17 Rather than emphasizing the distinctiveness of 
immigrant grievances, the early legal aid project was defined by the 
 
 15. Researchers have used the concept of globalization as a way of framing changes in the 
form and tempo of global interdependence across dimensions of economic exchange, political 
governance, and social exchange. See ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
MODERNITY (1990); SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998); JOSEPH 
E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY (Michael Walzer ed., 1995); Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Introduction: 
Case Studies and Common Trends in Globalizations, in GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE 
STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION 9, 11 (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
eds., 2000); Francis Snyder, Economic Globalization and the Law in the Twenty-First Century, in 
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 624, 625–26 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
 16. See HANDLER, HOLLINGSWORTH & ERLANGER, supra note 3, at 19 (1978); EARL 
JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES 
PROGRAM 14 (1974); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 40 (1982); 
Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. 
REV. 474, 487 (1985). 
 17. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 58–60 (1976). 
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goal of promoting individual assimilation: immigrant clients received 
free services as a means of counteracting notions of class-divided 
justice and facilitating the process of Americanization.18 
This project of Americanization had little room for Asian 
immigrants, however, who were targeted for exclusion.19 Immigrant 
groups who had already established themselves in urban areas, such 
as the Chinese, gained limited access to legal aid, while private 
attorneys stepped in to provide additional services, notably helping 
Chinese clients to challenge racial exclusion.20 For Mexican 
Americans, in contrast, advocacy efforts reflected their distinctive 
status: legally resident and legally white.21 Living largely outside the 
urban legal aid hubs, Mexican Americans looked to mutual aid 
groups for representation on issues of systemic abuse,22 such as the 
educational segregation of Mexican-American children,23 with early 
challenges premised on the theory that segregation violated their 
right to be treated the same as other whites.24 
B. Public Interest Law 
The efforts of Mexican-American groups to attack systemic 
segregation reflected the emerging model of public interest law 
reform that would come to be identified with the civil rights period. 
This law reform strain, in addition to responding to the dynamics of 
U.S. immigration, was also notably influenced by U.S. foreign 
relations. In particular, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
 
 18. See id. at 60–61. 
 19. Asian immigrants were barred under the National Origins Act of 1924, which 
prohibited entrants ineligible for citizenship, thereby excluding all “non-white” Asians. See 
James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United 
States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 232 (1995). The 1924 act 
effectively targeted Japanese immigrants, see RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A 
DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 209 (1989), because Chinese and other 
Asians had already been excluded, see KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: 
IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2004). 
 20. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 70 (1995). 
 21. See Steven H. Wilson, Brown over “Other White”: Mexican Americans’ Legal 
Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145, 
152 (2003). See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF RACE (1996). 
 22. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 154. 
 23. See id. at 155–56. 
 24. See id. at 155–60. 
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which was formed in 1920, took on early cases defending radical labor 
leaders against the charge of Communism.25 During World War II, the 
ACLU gained notoriety for its effort to challenge Japanese-American 
internment;26 and after the war, the organization became heavily 
involved in the McCarthy-era fight against Communism, filing a 
number of lawsuits challenging governmental efforts to investigate 
political dissidents.27 
The pivotal moment for the law reform movement, however, 
came in Brown v. Board of Education,28 which validated the test-case 
strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(NAACP LDF) with the Supreme Court’s sweeping repudiation of 
school segregation. The LDF model of law reform defined the second 
phase of legal activism, which lasted through the 1970s and—because 
of its association with efforts to promote the interests of politically 
vulnerable social groups—came to be identified with the concept of 
“public interest law.” The success of liberal lawyers in using the 
courts as a fulcrum to leverage political change brought resources and 
status to a new sector of legal organizations promising to use federal 
court litigation to promote progressive reform.29 Yet, while the public 
interest law movement developed as a distinctively American project, 
its evolution was framed by the emergence of a human rights system 
outside U.S. borders and the changing stream of immigrants within. 
The United States was a primary architect of human rights in the 
postwar era, contributing to the formation of the United Nations 
(UN),30 whose Charter proclaimed “respect for human rights,”31 and 
 
 25. See HANDLER, HOLLINGSWORTH & ERLANGER, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
 26. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 27. For example, the ACLU represented Communist party leaders charged with sedition, 
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1956), and challenged the power of the House Un-
American Activities Committee, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See generally 
Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 207, 211 (1976). 
 28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 29. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF 
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1 (1978); Trubek, supra note 9, at 457–60; Weisbrod, supra 
note 4, at 22. 
 30. See Lisa Hajjar, Human Rights, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND 
SOCIETY, supra note 15, at 589, 592; see also Martha Minow, Instituting Universal Human Rights 
Law: The Invention of Tradition in the Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S 
CENTURY 58, 62–63 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002). 
 31. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 85–86 (1998). 
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helping to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.32 While 
the United States sought to use human rights to cultivate 
anticommunist allies abroad, the creation of the human rights system 
emboldened activist groups at home, who saw it as a way to force the 
U.S. government to put its principles into practice. The NAACP, 
sensitive to the dynamics of Cold War politics, brought its civil rights 
agenda to the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s in an effort to 
internationalize the civil rights struggle,33 submitting a petition to the 
newly formed UN Commission on Human Rights challenging the 
“barbaric” practice of U.S. discrimination against blacks.34 Additional 
human rights efforts ensued, as lawyers from the NAACP LDF, the 
ACLU, and other groups attempted to draw international attention 
to racial discrimination through the inclusion of human rights claims 
in civil rights cases during the 1940s and 1950s.35 But this human rights 
approach was de-emphasized in the 1950s in part to avoid the red-
baiting that destroyed other civil rights groups, but also because of 
the building momentum for domestic legalism, dramatized by Brown, 
and cultivated by U.S. policymakers eager to avoid international 
embarrassment.36 Successive legal victories and the passage of the civil 
rights laws bolstered the domestic trend, which—though never 
exclusive—became the defining mode of legal engagement during the 
public interest period. 
Yet as the civil rights ethos reinforced parochialism in public 
interest practice, it also stimulated revisions in immigration policy 
that had the opposite effect: opening the domestic public interest 
system to a more cosmopolitan client base. From a policy perspective, 
the watershed was the 1965 passage of the Immigration and 
 
 32. See Minow, supra note 30, at 63. 
 33. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 93–112 (2003). 
 34. Petition, reprinted in W.E.B. DuBois, Three Centuries of Discrimination, 54 THE CRISIS 
362, 380 (1947) (containing a “condensed version” of DuBois’s introduction to “A Statement on 
the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the 
United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress”); see also MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44–
45 (2000); Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An 
Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 17 (1996). 
 35. See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United Nations Civil Rights 
Litigation: 1946–1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 931–48 (1984); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Paul Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and 
United Nations Law, 34 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1948). 
 36. See DUDZIAK, supra note 34, at 11–12. 
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Nationality Act amendments, which eliminated the racially 
discriminatory national origin quota system that had operated to 
block immigration from Asia, while imposing new limits on Latin 
American entry.37 This produced two major effects: igniting the 
transformation of Mexican immigration from a legal to a 
predominately illegal stream, while dramatically expanding legal 
Asian immigration. In responding to the legal needs of the new 
immigrants, lawyers fashioned advocacy tools out of the resources 
provided by the public interest law movement, developing a law 
reform agenda to address systemic grievances, while also extending 
individual legal services to immigrant clients. In both cases, however, 
advocacy in the public interest period was driven not by a 
commitment to “immigrant rights” as a distinct mode of practice; 
rather, immigrant representation was viewed in terms of traditional 
concepts of civil rights and access to justice. 
On the law reform side, the emphasis on civil rights over 
immigrant rights reflected demographic realities and political 
priorities. For Mexican Americans, the rubric of civil rights gave voice 
to their struggle for political and social integration, and reflected the 
fact that undocumented immigration, though growing,38 still did not 
occupy a central place on the political agenda. The Mexican-
American community, defined by its predominately legal status,39 
sought to emphasize its entitlement to legal equality as part of the 
broader polity, rather than assert the rights of immigrants as a special 
class.40 Accordingly, the litigation agenda of the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) followed the 
 
 37. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). Also, 
1965 marked the first year that Mexican immigration was not governed by the massive Bracero 
program, which permitted the legal entry of nearly five million migrant farmworkers from 1942 
to 1964. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE 
AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 39–40 
(2002). 
 38. Although the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act imposed a 
quota on immigration from México, see THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. 
MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 162 
(5th ed. 2003), it did not take effect until 1968, and its full impact on undocumented immigration 
was not felt until the 1970s, see MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 43–44. 
 39. In the late 1960s, most Mexican Americans were born in the United States. See 
Antonia Hernandez, American Citizenship Post 9-11, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 289, 294 (2005). 
 40. See Telephone Interview with Antonia Hernandez, Former President, Mexican-
American Legal Def. Fund (MALDEF), President, Cal. Cmty. Found. (June 30, 2006). 
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NAACP LDF’s lead,41 departing from earlier efforts emphasizing 
Mexican-American “whiteness,” and instead challenging the 
disparate treatment of Mexican Americans on the ground of racial 
discrimination.42 Yet as the imbalance between the demand for entry 
and the availability of visas for Mexicans immigrants grew worse in 
the 1970s, undocumented immigration surged,43 elevating the 
importance of immigrant issues on MALDEF’s docket—and 
prompting its high-profile challenge of a Texas law denying public 
school admission to the children of undocumented immigrants in 
Plyler v. Doe.44 Even though it struck at a critical issue for the 
undocumented community, MALDEF, however, defined Plyler as an 
education case, not an immigration case45—reflecting the continuing 
political sensitivity of the undocumented issue throughout the 1970s. 
Indeed, it was not until the early 1980s—when MALDEF’s board 
approved a controversial proposal to establish an Immigrant and 
Alien Rights project—that the organization began to invest 
substantial resources to explicitly support the struggle of Mexican 
immigrants.46 
For Asian-American legal groups during this period, 
undocumented immigration was not a major concern; instead, as the 
1965 immigration reforms repealed a virtual bar to Asian immigration 
and thus dramatically increased legal entry,47 the main question 
became how to provide basic services to the diverse newcomers. For 
the lawyers who founded the first Asian-American organizations, 
 
 41. See Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, A Legal Voice for the Chicano Community: The 
Activities of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1968–82, in THE 
MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 281, 284 (Rodolfo 
O. de la Garza et al. eds., 1985); Joe Ortega, The Privately Funded Legal Aid Office: The 
MALDEF Experience, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 80, 82 (1972). 
 42. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 181–92. 
 43. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 43–44. Between 1970 and 1980, 
the Mexican population in the United States almost tripled, growing by over 1.4 million (from 
760,000 to nearly 2,200,000). JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 37 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic. 
org/files/reports/46.pdf [hereinafter PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS]. Of the Mexican 
immigrants who entered during the 1970s, an estimated 900,000 were undocumented. See 
Jeffrey S. Passel, Undocumented Immigration, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 
1986, at 181, 190. 
 44. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206 (1982). 
 45. See Telephone Interview with Antonia Hernandez, supra note 40. 
 46. See id.; Telephone Interview with Vilma Martinez, Former President & Gen. Counsel, 
MALDEF, Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olsen LLP (July 11, 2006). 
 47. See TAKAKI, supra note 19, at 420–71. 
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though they drew inspiration from the civil rights model of social 
reform, their efforts were guided primarily by a commitment to 
expanding access to justice for monolingual clients.48 For example, 
although New York’s Asian American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund was conceived as a national “reform” organization along the 
lines of the NAACP LDF when it began in 1974—and did engage in 
impact litigation on employment and voting discrimination—its early 
work concentrated on the provision of individual legal services in the 
areas of labor, housing, immigration, and family law to poor 
Chinatown residents.49 
The individual service approach of early Asian-American public 
interest groups underscored the inability of the new federal legal 
services program, begun in 1965, to effectively respond to the legal 
needs of immigrant communities.50 Despite its limitations, however, 
the federal legal services program emerged as an important forum for 
immigrant advocacy, though—like its civil rights counterparts—its 
early development downplayed immigrant rights in favor of broader 
themes. In rural areas, the emphasis was on migrant farmworker 
rights, which were deeply influenced by immigration, but not defined 
by it. In the Southwest, migrant farmworker projects became the 
contact point between the legal services program and the growing 
stream of Mexican immigrants, who filled the fields in California and 
other important farming areas.51 Groups like the California Rural 
Legal Assistance program became closely identified with migrant 
 
 48. See Telephone Interview with Stan Mark, Program Dir., Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund (June 19, 2006). 
 49. See id. Other major Asian-American groups—including Oakland’s Asian Law Caucus, 
started in 1972, the Asian Law Alliance, started in San Jose in 1978, and the Asian Pacific 
American Legal Center, begun in 1983 in Los Angeles—developed similar hybrid programs that 
combined law reform with access to legal services. See Dale Minami, Asian Law Caucus: 
Experiment in an Alternative, 3 AMERASIA J. 28 (1975); Telephone Interview with Stewart 
Kwoh, Executive Dir., Asian Pac. Am. Legal Ctr. (June 20, 2006); History of the Asian Law 
Alliance, http://www.asianlawalliance.org/whoweare/who_we_are.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008). For Middle Eastern immigrant groups, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination 
Committee was established in 1980 and hired its first attorney in 1982; it has focused on 
coordinating pro bono attorneys for Arab Americans in employment discrimination and 
immigration cases. See Telephone Interview with Nadal Abadelgafer, Legal Assoc., Arab-Am. 
Anti-Discrimination Comm. (Dec. 7, 2005). 
 50. As one indication of this, in the most prominent study of legal rights activities of the 
period, immigration-related legal services were not listed among the principal areas of activity 
for federal legal services program lawyers. See HANDLER, HOLLINGSWORTH & ERLANGER, 
supra note 3, at 52–56 & tbls.3.1 & 3.2. 
 51. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 59–60. 
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farmworker organizing,52 and gained notoriety for impact suits on 
behalf of immigrants challenging working conditions and seeking 
access to public benefits.53 East of the Mississippi, however, it was 
nonimmigrants—mostly African Americans, but also whites and 
native-born Latinos and Asian Americans—who dominated the 
migrant farmworker client base.54 As federally funded migrant 
programs spread out from a handful of major farming regions in the 
early 1970s to every state in the union a decade later,55 immigrant 
issues grew in importance, but were still viewed as ancillary to the 
broader movement for migrant labor rights.56 
Within legal services programs in urban immigration hubs, the 
broad mission was access to justice, echoing back to the tradition of 
legal aid. Yet as the law reform model gained traction within the 
federal legal services program,57 and patterns of systemic abuse 
emerged amid the thicket of individual immigrant grievances, 
momentum built for investing in immigrant rights as a distinct area of 
practice. Early reform efforts,58 combined with the increasing service 
demands of growing urban immigrant populations, underscored the 
 
 52. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 298 (1996). For a discussion of the political backlash against 
California Rural Legal Assistance’s advocacy, see JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, 
LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY ch. 1, 20–21 (1984). 
 53. See Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): 
Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1, 17 (1972). 
 54. See Telephone Interview with Roger Rosenthal, Executive Dir., Migrant Legal Action 
Program (July 19, 2006). 
 55. See id.; see also DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 52, ch. 1, 40 n.49. 
 56. See Telephone Interview with Roger Rosenthal, supra note 54. Advocacy around labor 
violations fueled efforts by the growers’ lobby to reduce funding for migrant projects and to 
abolish legal services altogether. Laura K. Abel & Risa E. Kaufman, Preserving Aliens’ and 
Migrant Workers’ Access to Civil Legal Services: Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 496 (2003); see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS: 
WHAT IS REALLY BEHIND ATTACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj7.pdf. 
 57. See HANDLER, HOLLINGSWORTH & ERLANGER, supra note 3, at 34–35. 
 58. For examples of legal services impact cases from this era, see Hampton v. Wong, 426 
U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a civil service regulation barring noncitizens from 
federal employment); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566–69 (1974) (holding that the San 
Francisco school district’s failure to provide English language instruction to Chinese students 
constituted discrimination under Title VI), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
285 (2001) (“[W]e have since rejected Lau’s interpretation of § 601 as reaching beyond 
intentional discrimination.”); and Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978, 988–90 (7th Cir. 1979) (issuing visas 
based on historical immigration patterns to Western Hemisphere applicants who had been 
denied visas in the 1970s under a policy that counted Cuban refugees against hemispheric 
quotas). 
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need for systemwide coordination of impact suits and technical 
assistance to support immigrant representation in frontline 
programs,59 ultimately leading to the creation of a federal legal 
services backup center for immigration projects that fused the law 
reform movement with the emergent field of immigrant rights.60 
C. The Modern System 
The development of a nascent immigrant rights bar marked the 
cusp of a new period of international engagement for public interest 
law—one characterized by the acceleration of existing immigration 
trends, the resuscitation of old strains of human rights advocacy, and 
the creation of distinct modes of transnational practice adapted to the 
global economic arena.61 Yet although there were systemic 
continuities, Reagan’s election in 1980 forged a new dividing line for 
public interest law, ushering in a modern era framed by two 
fundamental policy shifts that operated to both push and pull public 
interest lawyers toward the international sphere. 
At the level of international relations, Reagan’s election marked 
the transition from Cold War containment to neoliberal market 
integration. Anticommunism, to be sure, remained a defining feature 
of Reagan foreign policy, but Reagan was also a champion of market 
integration, reorienting international institutions like the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund to promote free markets, while 
laying the groundwork for later achievements, such as the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).62 These developments asserted new 
challenges for public interest lawyers. At home, efforts to downsize 
the federal government operated to limit the scope of the regulatory 
bureaucracy and the social welfare state—thus curtailing two major 
arenas of public interest law practice.63 The outflow of corporate 
activity to developing countries with minimal regulatory regimes, 
 
 59. See Telephone Interview with Peter Schey, Executive Dir., Ctr. for Human Rights & 
Constitutional Law (June 14, 2006). 
 60. See id. (discussing the establishment of the National Center for Immigrants’ Rights in 
1978); see also DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 52, ch. 3, 68 n.2. 
 61. This openness has its parallels in private-sector practice. See Richard L. Abel, 
Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994); Susan Bisom-Rapp, 
Exceeding Our Boundaries: Transnational Employment Law Practice and the Export of 
American Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 257 (2004). 
 62. See STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
 63. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 458. 
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where U.S.-based transnational corporations could take advantage of 
cheap labor and lax environmental standards, started to pull public 
interest lawyers toward the international sphere as a new frontier in 
the struggle to assert principles of social justice as a counterweight to 
the spread of free market ideology. Free trade, in turn, produced its 
own market dislocations in developing countries, which fueled 
increased levels of out-migration, particularly from México, 
generating a surge in illegal entry that began to reverberate through 
the domestic public interest bar. 
The trend toward market integration reinforced internal policy 
dynamics, which were marked by the rise of domestic political 
conservatism. The major change was the declining role of the federal 
government as the guarantor of legal rights associated with political 
liberalism.64 This was most striking in the judicial arena, where the 
struggle over the ideological composition of the federal bench began 
to move the weight of the judiciary toward a constitutional vision 
skeptical of economic regulation and claims of minority rights.65 In 
this context, public interest lawyers had to weigh alternatives to the 
traditional federal court litigation paradigm, such as state court 
advocacy66 and nonlitigation strategies.67 Obstacles to domestic 
litigation also began to push public interest lawyers to look more 
intensively outside the United States for new legal resources and 
advocacy opportunities. The international human rights system, 
which grew during the 1980s into a powerful institutional rejoinder to 
governmental abuse outside U.S. borders, emerged as a ready-made 
tool to reframe public interest law’s domestic agenda.68 The appeal of 
human rights as an alternative to domestic law underscored how far 
the public interest law movement had traveled from the heady days of 
the early law reform phase—and punctuated the arrival of the 
modern era of internationalization. 
 
 64. See Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, Retrenchment . . . and Resurgence? Mapping the 
Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 37, 38 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and the Public Interest in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1, 43 (1991). 
 67. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and 
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447 (2001). 
 68. See Alan Jenkins & Larry Cox, Bringing Human Rights Home, THE NATION, June 27, 
2005, at 27, 28–29. 
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II.  TRANSNATIONAL PROCESSES IN THE  
MAKING OF MODERN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 
The modern system of public interest law that has emerged since 
the 1980s is distinguished by its openness: influenced by transnational 
economic and political relations, attentive to possibilities for 
extraterritorial advocacy, and concerned with a broad notion of 
transnational justice. This Part analyzes the structural forces driving 
internationalization, looking specifically at the role of three 
transnational processes—immigration, market integration, and 
human rights—in shaping the domestic public interest field. It 
suggests three significant linkages: (1) the rise of immigrant rights 
practice as a response to the increasing number and changing status 
of immigrant clients, (2) the emergence of new modes of transnational 
advocacy within developing free market arenas, and (3) the 
movement to promote international norms of legal accountability in 
the effort to “bring human rights home.” 
A. Clients 
Public interest lawyers have always found immigrant clients on 
the front lines of practice—defining the most immediate frontier of 
international engagement. What has changed since the 1980s is the 
nature of this engagement: there has been a quantitative increase in 
immigration to the United States,69 combined with a qualitative 
change in both its pattern (more geographically dispersed)70 and 
composition (more undocumented entrants).71 These changes, forged 
along the axis of race, have redefined immigrant advocacy, 
transforming it from an ancillary part of civil rights and poverty law 
practice into a distinctive field. This development is framed at the 
international level by the transition from the Cold War (sparking the 
influx of political refugees in the 1980s) to market integration 
 
 69. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, RISE, PEAK AND DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S. 
IMMIGRATION 1992–2004, at 13 (2005) (showing that total immigration to the United States 
increased from ten million in the 1980s to fourteen million in the 1990s and was estimated to 
grow to sixteen million in the 2000s). 
 70. See PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS, supra note 43, at 12 (stating that since 1990, 
“[t]he rapid growth and spreading of the unauthorized population has been the principal driver 
of growth in the geographic diversification for the total immigrant population into the new 
settlement states such as Arizona, North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee”). 
 71. See id. at 6 (showing the growth in the ratio of “unauthorized migrants” to “legal 
immigrants” and noting that “[s]ince the mid-1990s, arrivals of unauthorized migrants have 
exceeded arrivals of legal immigrants”). 
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(stimulating the growth in economic refugees in the 1990s). Entrance 
during this period has exposed immigrants to acute legal 
vulnerability, with political refugees dependent on adjudications of 
asylum and undocumented workers able to invoke only a thin layer of 
workplace protections. The response of public interest lawyers in this 
context has been to assert immigrant rights in the face of their 
deprivation. 
1. Refugees.  Through the 1970s, the foundation of immigrant 
advocacy was primarily built upon investments by civil rights and 
legal services programs, which extended assistance to the growing 
immigrant client population to advance broader organizational 
missions. The refugee crisis of the early 1980s galvanized a new wave 
of institution building focused on the unique legal status of 
noncitizens. Until 1980, Cold War imperatives dictated U.S. refugee 
law, which defined a refugee as someone fleeing any “Communist or 
Communist-dominated country,” the Middle East, or a “catastrophic 
natural calamity.”72 The Refugee Act of 1980 eliminated these foreign 
policy considerations from the statute,73 and brought the definition of 
asylum in line with international standards by permitting legal 
admission for those who could prove a “well-founded fear of 
persecution” in their home countries.74 Though there was support by 
public interest lawyers for Haitians fleeing political repression, it was 
the U.S. response to civil war in Central America that proved to be a 
decisive catalyst for the immigrant rights bar. Whereas U.S. 
opposition to the governing socialist party in Nicaragua meant that 
asylum claims from that country generally succeeded, the situation 
 
 72. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 3, § 203, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (amending the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 178–79 (1952)). 
 73. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, tit. II, sec. 201(a), § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102–03 
(“The term ‘refugee’ means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”). 
 74. Id. § 208. The Department of Justice first introduced asylum regulations in 1974, see 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 939 (4th ed. 2005), 
however, “the standard of proof for access to asylum was not the ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’ language of the Refugee Convention,” to which the United States became bound in 
1968, James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 504 (2000). 
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was different for those fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala, where 
U.S. support for military dictators made it reluctant to grant asylum 
to refugees from those countries—and thus concede persecution 
committed by U.S.-backed right-wing regimes.75 
The public interest response to the influx of Central American 
refugees proceeded along legal services and law reform paths. The 
legal services component was shaped by the constriction of the 
federal legal services program as a venue for immigrant advocacy. 
Federally funded groups continued to represent asylum seekers in the 
immediate aftermath of a 1980 prohibition on representing “known” 
aliens under a narrow interpretation that applied the restriction only 
to aliens facing a final deportation order.76 Congress, however, quickly 
closed this loophole, barring legal services groups from using federal 
funds to represent asylum seekers who entered the United States 
after 1980, as well as other undocumented immigrants.77 These 
restrictions spurred the development of an alternative organizational 
structure to assist asylum seekers in navigating the administrative 
process to gain legal status. A key part of this new structure grew out 
of the Sanctuary Movement,78 in which churches were turned into 
sanctuaries for refugees denied legal entrance.79 In dioceses with large 
refugee populations, local Catholic church leaders also supported the 
establishment of legal programs to meet the needs of refugees, some 
of which were eventually consolidated into the Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) in 1988.80 There was also a 
 
 75. See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 247–51 
(2004). 
 76. See 125 Cong. Rec. H7085 (1979). On the alien restriction, see Gerald M. Caplan, 
Understanding the Controversy over the Legal Services Corporation, 28 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
583, 588 (1983). 
 77. See Pub. L. 97-377, 96 Stat 1830, 1874 (1982). Congress restricted immigrant 
representation by limiting client eligibility to lawful permanent residents; spouses, parents, or 
children of U.S. citizens who had filed for permanent status; refugees and asylees; and those 
granted withholding of deportation. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5(a)–(e) (2007). Legal services groups 
could use non-federal funds to provide assistance to ineligible immigrants; many groups, 
however, fearing reprisal from the Legal Services Corporation, chose not to. Robert L. Bach, 
Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impoverished Immigrants, 27 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 643 (1994). 
 78. See generally SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS 
ACTIVISM AND THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993). 
 79. See Marah Carter Stith, Immigration Control: A Catholic Dilemma?, 84 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 73, 89 (2007). 
 80. Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., About Us, http://www.cliniclegal.org/ 
Aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
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wave of grassroots activity, animated by a commitment to the 
Movement, which produced important refugee groups in New York, 
Los Angeles, and other key refugee destinations.81 Additional refugee 
organizations started during this period, some grounded in religious 
traditions emphasizing social justice,82 and others defined by a secular 
immigrant rights orientation.83 Augmenting this refugee legal services 
structure were pro bono projects devoted to asylum,84 and an 
emerging group of asylum-oriented law school clinical programs, 
beginning with Harvard’s Immigration and Refugee Clinic.85 
 
 81. Among these groups formed in the early 1980s were the Central American Refugee 
Center in New York, see Telephone Interview with Patrick Young, Dir. of Legal Servs., Cent. 
Am. Refugee Ctr. (Feb. 21, 2006), and El Rescate in Los Angeles, see Susan Bibler Coutin, 
Cause Lawyering in the Shadow of the State: A U.S. Immigration Example, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 10, at 117, 120. For other groups 
that emerged during this time, see Centro Presente, Mission Statement, http://www.cpresente. 
org/missionstatement.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1981); Central American 
Resource Center in Washington, D.C., CARECEN, History and Advocacy, http://www. 
carecendc.org/English/History.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1981); and Central 
American Resource Center in Los Angeles, CARECEN, History, http://www.carecen-la.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1983). 
 82. See, e.g., American Friends Service Committee, Miami, Fl., Immigration Legal Services, 
http://www.afsc.org/miami/legal-services.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); e-mail from Lucio M. 
Perez-Reynozo, Miami Area Program Dir., Am. Friends Immigration Servs. to Scott L. 
Cummings (Nov. 19, 2007) (confirming that the program, sponsored by the Quakers, was started 
in the early 1980s to provide services to Central American refugees). 
 83. Such groups included the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project in Washington State, 
Northwest Immigrant’s Rights Project, About NWIRP, http://nwirp.org/AboutUs/About 
NWIRP.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1984); CASA of Maryland, Inc., CASA of 
Maryland, CASA History, http://www.casademaryland.org/ (follow “About Us: History” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1985); Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy 
Center in El Paso, Texas, Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Our History, 
http://www.las-americas.org/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (founded in 1987); 
and the Political Asylum Project of Austin, Texas, PAPA, About Us, http://www.main. 
org/papa/about_us.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (founded in 1987). In addition, the National 
Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild became a freestanding organization in 1980. 
See National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Inc., About Us, http://www. 
nationalimmigrationproject.org/about/about.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 84. See, e.g., Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project, About PAIR, http:// 
www.pairproject.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (stating that the project was formed 
in Massachusetts in 1989). 
 85. Harvard opened its clinic in the early 1980s. See HARVARD LAW SCH. IMMIGRATION 
AND REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, CLINICAL REPORT 1 (2003) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). Other early clinical programs that worked on asylum cases included those at the 
University of San Diego (late 1970s), George Washington (1979), Loyola University New 
Orleans (early 1980s), the University of California at Davis (1981), Cardozo (mid-1980s), 
CUNY, (1987), John Marshall (late 1980s), and Yale (1988). 
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While the entrance of refugees during the 1980s spurred direct 
legal services groups focused on filing asylum petitions, it also 
generated a law reform response, as lawyers sought to ensure that the 
federal government administered the asylum process in a way that 
was consistent with statutory and constitutional requirements, while 
also treating asylum seekers from different countries fairly. The 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center in San Francisco was an early 
pioneer in the field, helping to litigate the seminal case INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca,86 in which the Supreme Court held that the “well-
founded fear of persecution” standard established in the 1980 
Refugee Act governed asylum petitions made in the context of 
deportation proceedings, even though the standard for withholding 
deportation was technically higher.87 The ACLU also emerged as a 
major player in the immigrant rights field during this time. With the 
Ford Foundation providing seed money, the ACLU launched its 
Immigrants’ Rights Project in 1987,88 which asserted challenges to the 
detention of Haitian refugees in Guantánamo Bay89 and the 
unfavorable treatment of Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum 
seekers.90 As this litigation underscored, the emergent field of 
immigrant rights was premised on a deep critique of U.S. Cold War 
policy and a willingness to champion the cause of its immediate 
victims. 
2. Undocumented Workers.  While the growth of the asylum bar 
constituted a twilight political battle of the fading Cold War era, the 
explosion of immigrant workers’ rights advocacy reflected the legal 
paradox at the heart of the ascendant period of market integration. 
This paradox centered on the differential legal status accorded labor 
and capital under the regime of market integration—and played out 
most dramatically in the evolving economic relationship between the 
United States and México. In particular, as the United States moved 
toward liberalization measures with México permitting the free flow 
of goods and capital, it simultaneously moved to heighten the legal 
 
 86. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 87. Id. at 449. 
 88. Telephone Interview with Lucas Guttentag, Dir., ACLU Immigrant Rights Project 
(July 19, 2006). 
 89. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 90. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 810–11 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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barriers to labor mobility.91 The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA) marked the new policy watershed, granting amnesty 
to those undocumented immigrants already inside the United States, 
while seeking to prevent new entrants by increasing border security 
and imposing sanctions on employers that hired undocumented 
workers.92 Yet, while IRCA raised the costs of illegal entry, the 
pursuit of market integration, culminating in the passage of NAFTA 
in 1994, simultaneously raised the benefits, as a booming economy in 
the United States and economic disruption in México combined to 
increase migration, most of it undocumented.93 
After IRCA, undocumented immigration from México not only 
grew, but changed in ways that increased legal vulnerability. 
Tightened border security at key points of entry diverted 
undocumented immigration to other regions, which caused settlement 
patterns to spread across the United States.94 Those who made it 
across the border began to stay longer,95 increasing their dependence 
on steady employment, which reinforced the movement out of 
seasonal agricultural work into the urban low-wage sector.96 
Employers began to impose the costs of IRCA compliance on 
workers by lowering wages, contracting out work to subcontractors 
with lower labor standards, and engaging in more informal work 
transactions.97 Undocumented immigrant workers, whose precarious 
legal status made them loathe to contest mistreatment, experienced 
heightened insecurity as part of a second-tier labor system. In this 
environment, a dominant question for lawyers representing 
immigrants became how to afford legal protection to a class of people 
 
 91. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 74–101. 
 92. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 93. The total Mexican-born population in the U.S. grew from nearly 2.2 million in 1980 to 
nearly 4.3 million in 1990 to nearly 6.7 million in 2000. PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS, 
supra note 43, at 37. Since 1990, approximately 80 percent of Mexican immigrants have entered 
without authorization. Id. at 16. Undocumented Mexican immigrants accounted for over half of 
the total number of undocumented immigrants in the United States as of 2004. Id. at 10, 16 
(showing estimates of nearly 6 million undocumented Mexican immigrants and 10.3 million 
undocumented immigrants overall). 
 94. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 127–28. 
 95. See id. at 128–33. 
 96. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 
41 (1990). 
 97. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 120–23. 
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defined by their illegality. The workplace—where baseline 
protections existed—emerged as a central arena of legal struggle. 
Two major legal events pushed forward the development of an 
immigrant workers’ rights infrastructure in the post-IRCA era. The 
first was the foreclosure of legal services programs funded by the 
federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) as a venue for 
undocumented worker redress. Concerns about undocumented 
workers’ demands on governmental resources culminated in 1996, 
when Congress prohibited LSC-funded programs—already precluded 
from using federal funds to represent undocumented immigrants—
from using their non-federal funds as well.98 As a result, immigrant 
advocates were forced to move into non-LSC sites in order to serve 
undocumented clients. The second major event occurred six years 
later with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastics 
Compound v. NLRB,99 which denied undocumented workers the 
traditional labor law remedy of back pay when illegally fired for 
union organizing.100 Although the decision struck a blow to immigrant 
worker protection, causing some employers to believe that they could 
violate undocumented workers’ labor rights with impunity,101 it also 
had the effect of stimulating greater coordination among immigrant 
rights advocates and greater investments in immigrant rights from 
organized labor. It is against this backdrop that lawyers began to 
forge a network of non-LSC groups, grassroots worker centers, 
impact organizations, and law school clinical programs dedicated to 
protecting the rights of undocumented immigrant workers. 
In rural areas, the LSC restrictions sparked a split in the migrant 
farmworker advocacy field. Despite the bar on assistance to 
undocumented workers, federally funded migrant projects were able 
to continue representing agricultural guest workers—commonly 
referred to as H-2As in reference to the visa program allowing 
temporary admission102—on matters arising “under the provisions of 
the worker’s specific employment contract,” including wages, 
 
 98. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 504(d)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–56. 
 99. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 100. Id. at 152. 
 101. See Victor Narro & Marielena Hincapié, Organizing Immigrant Workers After 
Hoffman Plastic: The Opportunity and the Challenges, 60 GUILD PRAC. 182, 185 (2003). 
 102. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(h)(ii) (2000). 
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housing, and transportation.103 Because of the strong demand for 
agricultural guest workers after NAFTA,104 H-2A representation 
continued to play an important role within LSC-funded groups 
despite the 1996 restrictions.105 Thus, existing migrant projects 
continued to respond to claims of labor abuse against H-2As (and 
other legal residents), while new programs developed to reach out to 
migrant farmworkers in underserved areas.106 
Yet the prohibition on representing undocumented agricultural 
workers,107 as well as nonagricultural guest workers (so-called H-2Bs), 
contributed to a major restructuring of migrant groups. New 
organizations spun off from LSC-funded entities to escape LSC 
restrictions. For example, the Virginia Justice Center for Farm and 
Immigrant Workers was set up in 1998 after breaking off from an 
LSC group to pursue advocacy for migrant farmworkers and other 
low-wage immigrant workers.108 Similarly, the North Carolina Justice 
Center in Raleigh separated from the federal legal services program 
after the 1996 restrictions, drawing upon Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Accounts and foundation funds to set up an Immigrants Legal 
Assistance Project emphasizing impact litigation on behalf of 
immigrant workers, primarily undocumented farmworkers and H2-
Bs.109 Existing organizations that had no prior connection to 
immigrant rights also initiated new immigrant worker projects. The 
Southern Poverty Law Center, known for its litigation against hate 
crimes, launched the Immigrant Justice Project in 2004 focused on 
enforcing the labor rights of undocumented immigrant migrant 
workers throughout the Southeastern United States.110 In addition, 
clinical programs entered the field: for instance, in 2001, the 
Villanova School of Law initiated a Farmworker Legal Aid clinic, 
 
 103. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.11 (2005). 
 104. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 83–84. 
 105. See Bruce Goldstein, Immigration Policy and Low-Wage Workers: The Farmworker 
Case, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375, 377 (2004). 
 106. See, e.g., Southern Migrant Legal Services Office, http://www.trla.org/office/?of=60 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 107. See Goldstein, supra note 105, at 377 (stating that three-fifths or more of farmworkers 
lack lawful status). 
 108. See Legal Aid Justice Center, History of the Legal Aid Justice Center, http://www. 
justice4all.org/about_us/history (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 109. See Telephone Interview with Carol Brooke, Migrant Worker Attorney, N.C. Justice 
Ctr. (Dec. 1, 2005). 
 110. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Immigrant Justice Project, http://www.splcenter. 
org/legal/ijp.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
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which grew out of a collaboration between the law school and local 
immigrant groups that identified workplace issues as an area of major 
need.111 
In metropolitan areas, the development of an immigrant 
workers’ rights legal services infrastructure grew out of distinct 
strains, one rooted in grassroots organizing groups and the other in 
traditional legal services providers. The grassroots approach built 
upon a foundation of community-based efforts to support immigrant 
workers that developed independent of, and prior to, the LSC 
restrictions. Beginning in the late 1980s, activists began developing a 
network of immigrant worker centers—grassroots organizations that 
arose in places like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago to improve 
working conditions for low-wage workers from immigrant 
communities.112 Some centers, like the Workplace Project on Long 
Island and Korean Immigrant Worker Advocates in Los Angeles, 
were established specifically to address labor abuse in targeted 
industries with large immigrant workforces.113 Other centers started 
with a mission of providing social services to immigrant communities 
and then adopted a workplace focus as labor problems emerged as a 
central concern for members. For example, CASA of Maryland, 
which started in 1985 to serve Central American refugees, shifted its 
focus in the early 1990s to immigrant labor issues in response to a 
“day laborer crisis” near its offices,114 instituting a program to provide 
day laborers with job training and placement services.115 The Coalition 
for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, formed in the wake of 
IRCA to coordinate services between different immigrant agencies in 
Southern California, initiated an outreach and education project for 
day laborers in the early 1990s,116 which grew and was eventually spun 
off as the influential National Day Laborer Organizing Network.117 
 
 111. Telephone Interview with Michele Pistone, Dir., Farmworker Legal Aid Clinic, 
Villanova Sch. of Law (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 112. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF 
THE DREAM 7–26 (2006). 
 113. See id. at 16, 25. 
 114. See id. at 16. 
 115. See CASA of Maryland, Center for Employment and Leadership Mission, 
http://www.casademaryland.org/ (follow “Employment” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 116. Telephone Interview with Victor Narro, Project Dir., UCLA Downtown Labor Ctr. 
(June 29, 2006). 
 117. See National Day Laborer Organizing Network, About NDLON, http://ndlon.org/ 
(follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Steven Greenhouse, 
Labor Federation Forms a Pact with Day Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A18. The 
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Because of the high incidence of legal abuse among immigrant 
workers, legal services emerged as a significant component of the 
worker centers’ agenda.118 As the worker center field grew rapidly 
over the next decade, expanding from fewer than five centers in the 
early 1990s to nearly 140 in 2005,119 the groups drew attention as 
important sites for providing legal help in response to immigrant 
labor abuse in the restaurant, garment, domestic work, and day labor 
sectors.120 
While worker centers developed organically to meet the legal 
needs of undocumented workers, traditional legal services groups 
were spurred into action by the service gap left by the LSC 
restrictions. In major immigrant centers, existing organizations 
expanded their programs to assist immigrant workers. For instance, in 
Los Angeles, Bet Tzedek Legal Services, one of the main non-LSC 
legal services providers in the city, launched an employment project 
focused on immigrant workers in the San Fernando Valley in 2001. In 
New York, Mobilization for Youth withdrew from LSC funding in 
2003, consolidating its immigrant worker representation into a newly 
formed Workers Justice Project, which took on individual wage-and-
hour cases, as well as group labor cases filed in connection with 
grassroots labor organizing campaigns.121 In some areas without pre-
existing non-LSC programs, new groups emerged to fill the vacuum 
created by the LSC restrictions. In 2003, for example, the Northwest 
 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles also started a domestic worker project 
in 1991 that initially focused on outreach and education on labor issues. See Telephone 
Interview with Victor Narro, supra note 116; see also Scott L. Cummings, Developing 
Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 181, 191–94 (1999) (describing an effort to start a domestic worker cooperative 
launched with the assistance of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles). 
For studies of the labor issues faced by domestic workers and day laborers, see PIERRETTE 
HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, DOMÉSTICA: IMMIGRANT WORKERS CLEANING AND CARING IN THE 
SHADOWS OF AFFLUENCE (2001); and ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY 
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/ 
uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner1.pdf. 
 118. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF 
THE DREAM 74 (2006) (finding that over 50 percent of the worker centers surveyed provided 
some type of legal services). 
 119. See Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 421 (2005). 
 120. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the 
Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 471–95 (2005). 
 121. See Telephone Interview with Lynn Kelly, Executive Dir., Mobilization for Youth (July 
28, 2006). 
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Workers’ Justice Project started in Portland, Oregon, to represent 
low-wage immigrant and contingent workers on discrimination, wage-
and-hour, and labor organizing claims, while providing litigation 
support to worker organizing groups, like Oregon’s migrant workers’ 
union.122 
A handful of law school clinical programs also organized around 
the theme of workers’ rights, helping to provide services to the 
immigrant community while operating as critical sites of innovation 
and transmission for new advocacy models. The Immigrant Rights 
Clinic at the New York University School of Law was an early leader 
in the field, drawing attention to creative advocacy approaches, such 
as worker organizing campaigns and international strategies.123 The 
CUNY School of Law Immigrant and Refugee Rights Clinic, led by a 
former NYU clinician, provided litigation support to a number of 
worker center organizing campaigns,124 including a high-profile 
campaign by the Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York that 
won unpaid wages, as well as guaranteed sick days and paid vacations 
for immigrant workers at two popular Manhattan restaurants owned 
by the Smith & Wollensky chain.125 In another law school–worker 
center collaboration, the Central Texas Immigrant Worker Rights 
Center in Austin began in 2003 to offer weekly rights education 
classes, provide legal advocacy in wage-and-hour cases, and connect 
immigrant workers with law student advocates through the University 
of Texas Transnational Workers Rights Clinic.126 
As the concept of immigrant workers’ rights reverberated 
through the direct legal services community, it also began to emerge 
as a major theme of impact litigation groups. Organizations that 
traditionally focused on labor and employment issues started 
devoting more resources to immigrant issues. The trajectory of the 
National Employment Law Project (NELP) in New York, established 
 
 122. See Telephone Interview with D. Michael Dale, Executive Dir., Nw. Workers Justice 
Project (June 12, 2006). 
 123. See Daphne Eviatar, Rebellious Lawyers Are Shaking Up Law School Clinics, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2002, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2002/review_ 
eviatar_novdec2002.msp. 
 124. Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1879, 1893–94 (2007) 
 125. See Steven Greenhouse, Two Restaurants to Pay Workers $164,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 2005, at B3. 
 126. The Central Texas Immigrant Worker Rights Center, http://www.equaljusticecenter. 
org/CTIWoRC.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
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in 1969 as a backup center for legal services programs, is illustrative. 
Because low financial eligibility standards in the federal legal services 
program excluded many of the working poor,127 NELP’s early 
casework focused on unemployment insurance benefits.128 When 
NELP was defunded as a backup center as part of the 1996 LSC 
overhaul,129 it lost almost all of its staff and had to seek funding from 
private foundations, which started to provide resources to enforce the 
employment rights of welfare recipients and contingent workers in 
the wake of welfare reform.130 Through its contingent worker project, 
NELP’s attorneys began to represent increasing numbers of low-wage 
immigrant workers on basic labor enforcement issues and witnessed 
employer efforts to deny liability for violations by pointing to the 
undocumented status of the workers. After Hoffman Plastics, NELP’s 
immigrant work expanded dramatically, as reports increased that 
employers around the country were seeking information about the 
legal status of immigrant plaintiffs both as a means of denying liability 
and intimidating workers who brought suit.131 In response, NELP 
dedicated two full-time lawyers to immigrant worker issues, making 
immigrant workers’ rights NELP’s second-most funded project 
(behind unemployment insurance).132 The organization has since 
become one of the leaders of the national Low-Wage Immigrant 
Worker Coalition, formed to provide backup support to lawyers 
facing post-Hoffman challenges to the legal status of their clients and 
to conduct workers’ rights trainings for advocates around the 
country.133 Following a similar trajectory, the Legal Aid Society’s 
Employment Law Center, a non-LSC group in San Francisco, became 
active in the area of immigrant workers’ rights in the late 1990s, 
launching a formal National Origin, Immigration, and Language 
Rights Program to litigate impact cases,134 and expanding its Workers’ 
 
 127. See Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving 
Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 430–31 (1998). 
 128. Telephone Interview with Cathy Ruckelshaus, Litig. Dir., Nat’l Employment Law 
Project (June 13, 2006). 
 129. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 130. See Telephone Interview with Cathy Ruckelshaus, supra note 128. 
 131. See Nancy Cleeland, Employers Test Ruling on Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, 
at C1. 
 132. Telephone Interview with Cathy Ruckelshaus, supra note 128; see also Daniela Gerson, 
Court Rules Illegal Immigrants Eligible for Lost Wages, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 22, 2006, at 4. 
 133. See Narro & Hincapié, supra note 101, at 187. 
 134. See Telephone Interview with Christopher Ho, Senior Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid 
Soc’y—Employment Law Ctr. (July 11, 2006). 
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Rights Clinic to represent immigrant workers on wage-and-hour 
claims.135 
While immigrant issues thus infiltrated traditional employment-
based groups, workers’ rights, in turn, began to emerge as a salient 
issue for organizations traditionally focused on immigration and civil 
rights. The National Immigration Law Center (NILC), structured as 
an impact litigation and technical assistance back-up center for 
immigration groups, started an immigrant worker project in 2002. 
Around the same time, MALDEF entered directly into the immigrant 
workers’ rights field, collaborating with day labor centers in Los 
Angeles to challenge ordinances in Redondo Beach and Los Angeles 
County designed to prevent day laborers from congregating to seek 
work.136 After Hoffman Plastics, MALDEF also was involved in a 
major suit on behalf of undocumented immigrant janitors denied 
labor protections by a large California supermarket chain that had 
subcontracted out for their services.137 
Although Asian-American workers faced labor abuse across a 
range of industries, it was the revelation of severe exploitation in 
garment sweatshops in the 1990s that focused attention on the cause 
of Asian-American immigrant workers’ rights.138 Though groups like 
the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund had 
represented garment workers as far back as the 1970s,139 changes in 
production in the ensuing two decades erected new legal challenges. 
In particular, the industry underwent a massive restructuring during 
the 1980s in response to global outsourcing that fueled subcontracting 
in domestic garment production as a way to cut labor costs.140 One 
 
 135. See Telephone Interview with Joan Graff, Exec. Dir., Employment Law Ctr. (June 20, 
2006). 
 136. See Narro, supra note 120, at 490–96. 
 137. Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV 01-00515, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6171, at *4–5 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 9, 2002). 
 138. See, e.g., SWEATSHOP SLAVES: ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY (Kent 
Wong & Julie Monroe eds., 2006); see also Edna Bonacich, Intense Challenges, Tentative 
Possibilities: Organizing Immigrant Garment Workers in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING 
IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 130, 131–32 
(Ruth Milkman ed., 2000). 
 139. Telephone Interview with Ken Kimerling, Legal Dir., Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund (June 13, 2006). 
 140. See EDNA BONACICH & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, BEHIND THE LABEL: INEQUALITY 
IN THE LOS ANGELES APPAREL INDUSTRY 8–16 (2000). 
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result was the proliferation of small garment contractors that 
extracted labor cost reductions by exploiting immigrant workers.141 
The extremes of sweatshop abuse were revealed in 1996, when 
the discovery of seventy-one enslaved Thai workers in a garment 
factory in El Monte, California, caused the sweatshop issue to 
explode onto the national scene.142 A lawsuit by the Asian Pacific 
American Legal Center (APALC) against both the individual 
operators of the El Monte facility and the manufacturers and retailers 
that contracted with it (which included Mervyn’s and Montgomery 
Ward) resulted in a high-profile settlement that brought national 
attention to the sweatshop issue143—and generated interest in legal 
advocacy to hold garment manufacturers and retailers “jointly liable” 
with their sweatshop contractors for labor violations. Because of the 
success of the El Monte case, workers’ rights became a major area of 
advocacy for APALC, which hired a number of highly-credentialed 
young lawyers, many through fellowship programs, to litigate 
sweatshop impact cases against prominent retailers such as BCBG, 
bebe, and Forever 21. The Forever 21 case, in particular, underscored 
the challenge that the growth of workers’ rights advocacy posed to 
APALC’s traditional identity-based mission, pitting the organization 
against the Korean-owned garment retailer on behalf of Latino 
garment worker clients claiming labor abuse.144 
The rise of immigrant workers’ rights as an important dimension 
of legal advocacy also underscored the ambivalent—and often 
hostile—relationship between immigrant workers and traditional 
unions. Organized labor had been a major supporter of the IRCA 
employer sanctions regime, viewing undocumented immigrant labor 
as a threat to U.S. organizing efforts, and thus had little involvement 
with immigrant worker advocacy in the 1990s. After the AFL-CIO 
formally reversed course in 2000, embracing immigrant workers and 
calling for the repeal of employer sanctions, it began taking steps to 
support immigrant workers’ rights. One of the first was to help 
convene (in connection with NELP, NILC, and other immigration 
and labor groups) the Low-Wage Immigrant Worker Coalition, which 
 
 141. See id. at 18–19. 
 142. See Julie Su, Making the Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry’s Dirty Laundry, 1  
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 405 (1998). 
 143. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996); George White, 
Sweatshop Workers to Receive $1 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at B1. 
 144. See Castro v. Fashion 21, Inc., 88 F. App’x 987, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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resulted in efforts to create immigrant worker materials, conduct 
trainings, and devise a national legal and legislative strategy to 
advance a pro–immigrant worker agenda.145 In 2004, the AFL-CIO 
created an Immigrant Worker Program in the Associate General 
Counsel’s office to provide formal union support to the Coalition,146 as 
well as technical assistance to local workers’ rights organizations.147 
Despite this logistical support, the AFL-CIO has not provided 
direct funding to immigrant workers’ rights groups, underscoring the 
broader financial insecurity of the field. Some progressive union 
locals have given seed money to legal groups, but this support has 
been ad hoc and sporadic.148 For start-up funds, postgraduate 
fellowship programs have proved to be crucial catalysts for immigrant 
worker projects. The Skadden Fellowship program, which provides 
two-year post–law school fellowships, has been a key supporter of 
public interest groups moving into immigrant worker advocacy, 
launching immigrant workers’ rights projects at APALC, NELP, the 
ACLU, and the Employment Law Center—and producing many 
leaders in the immigrant workers’ rights field.149 The Echoing Green 
Foundation, which provides seed money to start up innovative social 
ventures in a range of fields,150 has made grants to help launch well-
known groups, such as the Workplace Project in Long Island, the 
Northwest Workers’ Justice Project in Portland, Make the Road by 
Walking in Brooklyn, and the Workers’ Rights Law Center in upstate 
 
 145. Telephone Interview with Ana Avendaño, Assoc. Gen. Counsel & Dir., Immigrant 
Worker Program, AFL-CIO (June 19, 2006). 
 146. For instance, the AFL-CIO maintains a listserv to coordinate among the members of 
the Coalition and has been involved in the production of a litigation guide for immigrant worker 
advocates. See AFL-CIO LAWYERS COORDINATING COMM., LITIGATION GUIDE FOR 
IMMIGRANT WORKER ADVOCATES (n.d.) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 147. Telephone Interview with Ana Avendaño, supra note 145. 
 148. For example, the Service Employees International Union provided funding to support 
the development of the Northwest Workers’ Justice Project. Telephone Interview with D. 
Michael Dale, supra note 122. 
 149. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, SKADDEN 
FELLOWSHIP FOUNDATION REPORT, 1989–2007, at 1 (2007). There are over forty Skadden 
Fellows who have been funded to undertake immigrant workers’ rights advocacy since the 
program’s inception, most of them funded in the past ten years. See id. The Equal Justice Works 
(formerly the National Association for Public Interest Law) fellowship program has also funded 
lawyers to undertake immigrant workers’ rights advocacy. Equal Justice Works, Equal Justice 
Works Fellowships, http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/programs/fellowships (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008). 
 150. See Echoing Green, Approach, http://www.echoinggreen.org/approach (last visited Feb. 
23, 2008). 
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New York. Major foundations, like the Open Society Institute,151 have 
entered into the immigrant workers field to help sustain ongoing 
initiatives, while the Mexican government has also made tentative 
steps to support immigrant projects.152 Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Accounts programs and attorney’s fees have played an important 
funding role, and there has been some law firm funding for immigrant 
worker advocacy,153 though this source may be limited by the potential 
conflict between plaintiff-side employment litigation and the interests 
of corporate clients defending against workplace suits. 
3. Deserving Immigrants.  As undocumented immigration 
became a deeply polarizing political issue during the 1990s, it sparked 
a backlash aimed at securing the borders to thwart illegal entry at its 
source,154 while limiting access to public benefits by immigrants (both 
legal and illegal) already on the inside, whose lower incomes and 
higher poverty rates raised concerns about their reliance on 
governmental programs.155 Immigrant rights advocacy—defined by its 
response to undocumented work—also took shape in reaction to this 
anti-immigrant mobilization. 
One strain of advocacy aimed at protecting immigrant access to 
public resources, which prominently came under attack with the 1994 
passage of California’s Proposition 187 as a statewide ballot 
initiative.156 Proposition 187—which barred undocumented 
immigrants in California from using public social services, 
 
 151. For instance, the Open Society Institute provided funds for CASA of Maryland’s 
Workers’ Rights Legal and Organizing Center in Baltimore. See CASA de Maryland, Day 
Laborers Find Solutions in Baltimore, http://www.casademaryland.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=133 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 152. Telephone Interview with D. Michael Dale, supra note 122 (noting that the Northwest 
Workers’ Justice Project receives some money from the Mexican government); see also 
Katherine Corcoran, Mexican Consul Offers Free Legal Hotline, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose), 
Jan. 26, 2006, at 3B. 
 153. The Employment Law Center, for instance, receives law firm support. Telephone 
Interview with Joan Graff, supra note 135. 
 154. MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 91–96. 
 155. For instance, one study showed that the 1994 real median income for immigrants was 
$33,601, compared to $46,011 for natives, while the 1994 poverty rate for immigrants was 25.7 
percent, compared to 13.1 percent for natives. JEFF CHAPMAN & JARED BERNSTEIN, ECON. 
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION AND POVERTY: DISAPPOINTING INCOME GROWTH IN THE 1990S 
NOT SOLELY THE RESULT OF GROWING IMMIGRANT POPULATION 3, 5, available at 
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/130/bp130.pdf. 
 156. See Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial 
Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 118 (1995). 
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nonemergency health care, and schools—galvanized the immigrant 
rights advocacy community, which filed a series of class action and 
individual lawsuits challenging the law’s implementation. These 
actions were brought by the elite immigrant rights impact litigation 
bar: the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, the 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center, NILC, APALC, MALDEF, the 
ACLU, and other organizations represented different groups of 
plaintiffs in the consolidated federal actions that invalidated portions 
of the law.157 Though a settlement of the case in 1999 by newly elected 
Governor Grey Davis ended the appeals process,158 the downfall of 
Proposition 187 signaled the opening of a new front in the legal 
struggle for immigrant rights, as advocacy groups fought similar 
measures in Arizona159 and Virginia.160 
Although the denial of public aid to the undocumented 
generated the most political attention, it was the ban on means-tested 
welfare benefits for legal immigrants that prompted a major influx of 
organizational resources into the immigrant rights field. The 1996 
welfare reform law denied many legal immigrants the right to receive 
disability benefits and food stamps, while authorizing states to enact 
similar bars in allocating welfare and Medicaid.161 In response, the 
Open Society Institute created the $50 million Emma Lazarus Fund 
to promote immigrant naturalization and to engage in policy 
advocacy to restore immigrant eligibility for public benefits.162 Some 
of this funding went to support legal advocacy, both in the form of 
individual assistance to those seeking to naturalize and impact suits 
attempting to protect access to benefits.163 As one outgrowth, some 
 
 157. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1247–49 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 761–62 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 158. See ACLU, Chronology of Proposition 187, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/gen/116 
52prs19990729.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 159. See Maria Pabon Lopez, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Civil Rights Law: 
Noncitizen Workers and the International Human Rights Paradigm, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 611, 626 
(2006). 
 160. See Christina Bellantoni, Virginia Counties Decry Alien Bill; Law Would Bar Health 
Benefits, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 161. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, §§ 400–451, 110 Stat. 2105. 
 162. See Bill Ong Hing, The Emma Lazarus Effect: A Case Study in Philanthropic 
Revitalization of the Immigrant Rights Community, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 48, 80–81 (2000). 
 163. See id. at 72 n.67 (noting that the Immigrant Legal Resource Center set up an “attorney 
of the day” service to assist with requests for naturalization services); id. at 81 n.109 (noting that 
MALDEF received funding to challenge Proposition 187). 
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legal aid and welfare rights groups that received Emma Lazarus 
funding164 became active in the effort to preserve immigrant benefits, 
litigating challenges to state denials of food stamps and Medicaid to 
legal immigrants.165 
As advocacy around welfare reform focused particular attention 
on the restoration of benefits for certain categories of immigrants—
refugees, the disabled, and children—it highlighted a more systemic 
issue: policymakers and funders deemed some groups within the 
immigrant community as more deserving of support than others.166 
The outlines of a hierarchy of immigrant eligibility emerged most 
visibly within the federal legal services program, where after the 1996 
restrictions a complex system of representation arose to assist 
immigrants who could demonstrate either claims to legal status or 
claims to victimhood. 
Those with legitimate claims to legal status—naturalized citizens, 
lawful permanent residents, and those petitioning to obtain lawful 
permanent residence—continued to remain eligible under rules in 
place since the early 1980s.167 Those without legal status could 
nonetheless qualify for services under a series of modifications to the 
eligibility requirements that reflected sympathy for immigrants whose 
illegal status was a product of victimization—or made them more 
vulnerable to it. Thus, the 1996 Kennedy Amendment permitted 
programs to use non-LSC funds to help victims of domestic violence 
petition for permanent status under the Violence Against Women 
Act;168 in 2002, LSC issued a program letter stating that groups could 
assist clients under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
 
 164. See Emma Lazarus Fund, Grants Awarded, http://web.archive.org/web/2000111809 
0700/www.soros.org/emma/html/h-p.html and http://web.archive.org/web/20000901043142/www. 
soros.org/emma/html/q-z.html (describing grants to the Legal Aid Society of New York and 
Welfare Law Center). 
 165. See, e.g., Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (N.Y. 2001) (case filed by the Legal 
Aid Society of New York) (striking down a New York law denying legal immigrants access to 
Medicaid); Teytelman v. Wing, 773 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–05 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (case filed by Legal 
Aid Society of New York, the Welfare Law Center, and other groups) (challenging the New 
York Food Assistance Program’s use of non-needs-based eligibility criteria to restrict access by 
legal immigrants). 
 166. Cf. JOEL F. HANDLER & ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, THE “DESERVING POOR”: A 
STUDY OF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 16–20 (1971). 
 167. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1626 app. (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (2007). 
 168. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
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Protection Act;169 and in 2003, LSC included asylum seekers as 
eligible clients.170 LSC programs were also permitted to represent 
undocumented youth committed to the dependency and delinquency 
systems who were petitioning for legal permanent residence under 
the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status program, as well as torture 
victims.171 The impact of these eligibility requirements could be seen 
in the client base of major legal services organizations. For example, 
at the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, immigrants represented 
roughly 40 percent of the caseload from 2000 to 2004; about half of 
these were domestic violence clients, while the other half were a 
combination of legal permanent residents and those seeking legal 
adjustment, including victims of trafficking and torture.172 
Outside of LSC, victimization issues have similarly become 
popular areas of advocacy, reflecting client need, as well as funding 
priorities. For instance, the National Immigrant Justice Center—
Chicago’s major immigrant advocacy group with five offices and over 
thirty-five staff—has projects focused on asylum, children, trafficking, 
domestic violence, and the rights of detainees; though it is not 
restricted by LSC, it does not engage in undocumented worker 
representation.173 The same is true for Seattle’s Northwest Immigrant 
Rights Project, which has grown from a small group representing 
Central American asylum seekers in the 1980s, into a large-scale 
immigrant legal services provider, with nearly thirty staff members 
who serve around fifteen thousand immigrant clients per year in the 
areas of asylum, trafficking, domestic violence, and children’s rights.174 
Los Angeles’s Public Counsel houses special immigration projects on 
asylum, domestic violence, trafficking, and children,175 while the 
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, which has grown from ten to 
 
 169. Program Letter 02-5 from Randi Youells, Vice President for Programs, Legal Servs. 
Corp., to All LSC Program Dirs., available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/Reference%20Materials/ 
Refrmats/Progltrs/Prgltr2002_5.htm. 
 170. See Sara Campos, Sheila Neville & Linton Joaquin, Representing Immigrants: What Do 
LSC Regulations Allow?, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 253, 258 (2004). 
 171. See id. at 260. 
 172. E-mail from Bruce Iwasaki, Executive Dir., Legal Aid Found. of L.A., to Scott L. 
Cummings (Aug. 27, 2005). 
 173. National Immigrant Justice Center, Client Programs, http://www.immigrantjustice.org/ 
client/programs (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 174. Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Services Provided, http://www.nwirp.org/Services 
Provided/Overview.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 175. Public Counsel, Immigrants’ Rights Project, http://www.publiccounsel.org/overview/ 
irp.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
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forty staff members since it opened in response to the 1996 
restrictions, also has a programmatic focus on asylum, domestic 
violence, and children.176 Within the asylum field, certain groups have 
developed specializations in gender-based persecution: Greater 
Boston Legal Services, in connection with Harvard Law School’s 
Immigration and Refugee Clinic, has been at the forefront of this 
effort, while newer groups, like the Tahirih Justice Center in Virginia, 
have focused attention on providing services for women seeking 
asylum from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, since 
1990, there has been an expansion of law school clinics focused on 
refugee and asylum issues,177 while a number of clinics have been 
started to take on immigrant domestic violence and trafficking 
cases.178 
As immigrant rights groups and clinical programs have embraced 
issues impacting women and children, organizations dedicated to 
women’s and children’s rights have also focused more attention on 
immigrant issues. The Center for Battered Women in New York, for 
 
 176. Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Direct Services, http://www.fiacfla.org/direct 
services.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 177. Since 1990, law schools starting clinics handling asylum matters include St. Mary’s 
University (1990), Boston College (1992), Minnesota (1992), the Hastings College of Law 
(1993), Washington (1993), DePaul (1995), Georgetown (1995), Iowa (1995), Maryland (1995), 
Notre Dame (mid-1990s), Temple (1996), Brooklyn (1997), Houston (1999), Texas (1999), 
Villanova (1999), University of Detroit Mercy (2000), the University of the District of Columbia 
(2001), USC (2001), Connecticut (2002), Cornell (2003), Hofstra (2003), St. John’s (2003), Ave 
Maria School of Law (2004), Florida International University (2004), Chicago-Kent (2005), and 
North Carolina (2006). 
 178. CUNY Law School started a Battered Immigrant Women Clinic in 1998, 
http://www.law.cuny.edu/clii/proj.html#battered (last visited Sept. 25, 2007); the St. John’s 
University Immigrant Rights Clinic, which started in 2003, represents clients in Violence 
Against Women Act and Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act cases, St. John’s 
University School of Law, Immigration Rights Clinic, http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/ 
graduate/law/academics/clinical/immigration (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); and the Pace 
Immigration Justice Clinic, begun in 2005, also works on Violence Against Women Act and 
trafficking cases, Pace Law School, Clinics, http://www.law.pace.edu/jjls/clinic.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2008). In 2005, Stanford started its Immigrants’ Rights Clinic to assist domestic violence 
victims in petitioning for status under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), while also 
providing deportation defense, Stanford Law School, Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/immigrantsrights/#overview (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008). Other law schools with clinics that represent VAWA clients include John Marshall, 
Houston, Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina, St. Mary’s, Seattle, Seton Hall, Temple, the 
University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, and USC. In addition, Northwestern has a 
Children and Family Justice Center, started in 1992, that represents clients in asylum and other 
immigration matters. See Northwestern Law, Children and Family Justice Center, http://www. 
law.northwestern.edu/cfjc/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
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instance, reported that between 1988 and the end of the 1990s its 
client base shifted from 90 percent native born to 70 percent 
immigrant.179 Impact groups have devoted resources to address 
problems at the intersection of women’s and immigrants’ rights. In 
1994, the National Center for Lesbian Rights in San Francisco started 
its Immigration Project to provide representation in impact cases and 
individual asylum claims,180 while NOW Legal Defense Fund began its 
Immigrant Women Program in 1999 to combat domestic violence and 
promote economic empowerment. Similarly, youth organizations 
have begun to engage immigrant issues directly: The Door in New 
York City has started to provide immigration assistance to youth 
(including those in deportation proceedings),181 while Legal Services 
for Children in San Francisco has developed a Detained Immigrant 
Children Project and assisted youth petitioning for Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status.182 
4. Criminal Aliens.  The backlash against illegal immigration 
culminated in 1996, when Congress enacted a series of policy reforms 
intended to strengthen the system of immigration deterrence. In 
addition to reducing incentives to entry by restricting public aid, 
Congress also enacted measures that imposed harsher punishment for 
transgressing the rules of legal entry.183 Because of pressure against 
criminalizing all undocumented immigrant workers, upon whom 
businesses had come to rely, the new legislation focused on those 
immigrants for whom there was the least amount of public sympathy: 
so-called “criminal aliens.” 
 
 179. See Symposium, Partnerships Across Borders: A Global Forum on Access to Justice, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S277, S289 (2000). 
 180. Brochure, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights Immigration Project, available at http://www. 
nclrights.org/site/DocServer/immigration_english.pdf?docID=1401. 
 181. The Door, Legal Services, http://www.door.org/programs/legal.html (last visited Feb. 
23, 2008). 
 182. See Legal Services for Children, Programs, http://www.lsc-sf.org/web/about_ 
programs.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (describing the Detained Immigrant Children 
Project); Legal Services for Children, LSC’s Clients, http://www.lsc-sf.org/web/about_client.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (describing a successful petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status). 
 183. See Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 92–93 (1998). 
02__CUMMINGS.DOC 4/16/2008 8:32:03 AM 
2008] PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 929 
Taken together, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)184 and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),185 made it more likely 
that immigrants convicted of crimes would be deported and, if they 
returned, prosecuted and jailed.186 Prior to 1996, noncitizens were 
subject to deportation if convicted of crimes within a relatively 
narrow range of categories and in some cases were entitled to apply 
for a waiver of deportation.187 The 1996 laws greatly expanded the 
definition of “aggravated felony” triggering mandatory deportation 
and reduced opportunities to seek relief from deportation for the 
commission of other “crimes of moral turpitude.”188 Those deported 
for an aggravated felony who illegally reentered the country faced 
heightened enforcement and prosecution189 and were subject to 
substantial criminal penalties.190 One result of this increased focus on 
immigration crime was to place federal public defenders assigned to 
represent indigent clients in popular immigrant destinations on the 
front lines of a new arena of immigrant advocacy. The Federal 
Defender’s Office in Los Angeles, for instance, saw a sharp increase 
in the proportion of noncitizen clients on its docket: the percentage of 
undocumented immigrant clients grew from about 6 percent in 1994 
 
 184. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 185. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214. 
 186. The new laws also restricted the grounds for judicial review of immigration decisions, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1998), provoking important legal challenges by public interest 
groups. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001) (upholding court’s habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to hear ACLU’s challenge to IIRIRA’s elimination of discretionary authority to 
waive deportation for aliens who entered guilty pleas prior to the Act’s effective date); Reno v. 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 472–74 (1999) (holding that IIRIRA 
eliminated federal court jurisdiction to hear suit brought by lawyers associated with the 
National Lawyers Guild and Center for Constitutional Rights challenging the selective 
deportation of immigrants based on their membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine). 
 187. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process 
Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 107–11 (1998). 
 188. See id. at 111–14 (1998). 
 189. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2000, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iofcjs00.pdf. 
 190. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 469, 478 (2007). 
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to over 36 percent in 2004.191 Significant resources were therefore 
invested to defend against illegal reentry prosecutions and other 
immigration-related crimes.192 
While the new laws made it more likely that immigration 
violations (crossing the border) would result in criminal sanctions, 
they also attached harsher immigration consequences (deportation) 
to criminal violations. Thus, it became increasingly important that 
public defenders in the state system understood the immigration 
consequences of criminal proceedings, such as pleading guilty to a 
crime that might constitute a deportable “aggravated felony.”193 To 
address this issue, the New York State Defenders Association started 
an Immigrant Defense Project to provide immigration law backup 
assistance to New York defense lawyers representing immigrant 
clients.194 In conjunction with the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 
the National Lawyers Guild, and the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association, the New York State Defenders Association 
also launched the Defending Immigrants Partnership to “ensure that 
indigent noncitizen defendants are provided effective criminal 
defense counsel to avoid or minimize the immigration consequences 
of their criminal dispositions.”195 In addition, the growing linkages 
between immigration and criminal law prompted responses by 
frontline legal services groups: Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, for 
example, moved to consolidate civil and criminal defense under the 
umbrella of one legal aid program to serve its immigrant client base 
more effectively.196 
The close interaction between the criminal and immigration law 
systems also brought the issue of immigrant detention to the fore. 
One factor drawing public attention to the issue was the growth of the 
detained immigrant population after the passage of IIRIRA and 
 
 191. E-mail from Ingrid V. Eagly, Office of the Fed. Pub. Defender, L.A., to Scott L. 
Cummings (Nov. 17, 2005). 
 192. See Daniel P. Blank, Note, Suppressing Defendant’s Identity and Other Strategies for 
Defending Against a Charge of Illegal Reentry After Deportation, 50 STAN. L. REV. 139, 143 
(1997). 
 193. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) (enumerating crimes that constitute aggravated felonies). 
 194. New York State Defenders Association, Immigrant Defense Project, http://www.nysda. 
org/idp/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 195. National Legal Aid & Defender Association, About the Defending Immigrants 
Partnership, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Immigrants/Defending_Immigrants_ 
About (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 196. See Karen Gleason, Indigent Defense Program to Start Up Soon, DEL RIO NEWS-
HERALD (Tex.), Apr. 25, 2006. 
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AEDPA,197 which imposed mandatory detention on many criminal 
aliens pending deportation.198 In response, legal groups have 
developed projects specifically focused on providing redress to the 
detained immigrant population. CLINIC has been at the forefront of 
this movement, representing detained long-term residents seeking 
prehearing release or relief from deportation,199 as well as detainees 
subject to indefinite detention due to refusal by their home countries 
to repatriate them.200 The U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive 
Office for Immigration Review has contracted with CLINIC and 
other groups in immigration detention facilities around the country to 
carry out Legal Orientation Programs, which provide educational 
presentations on immigration court procedures, one-on-one 
counseling, and pro bono referrals to detained immigrants with the 
goal of improving “judicial efficiency” and assisting “all parties in 
detained removal proceedings.”201 A handful of law school clinics, 
including NYU and Arizona, have worked on detention issues. The 
organized bar has also responded to immigrant detention by 
supporting pro bono programs, such as the South Texas Pro Bono 
Asylum Representation Project, which finds volunteer lawyers from 
the private bar to represent detainees on a range of immigration 
matters.202 The ABA Immigration Pro Bono Development and Bar 
Activation Project has launched two special initiatives around 
detention: the Detention Standards Implementation Initiative, which 
works with local bar associations and law firms to monitor detention 
 
 197. See ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 38, at 697 (“Daily capacity [in 
federal immigration detention facilities] increased from about 8200 beds in 1997 to around 
23,000 in early 2003, but enforcement officials still consider that short of overall need.”). 
 198. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). The ACLU unsuccessfully challenged this provision on due 
process grounds. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 199. See Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., Detained Long-Term Residents, 
http://www.cliniclegal.org/Programs/DetainedLongTermResidents.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008). 
 200. See id. 
 201. See U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Pro Bono 
Program—Major Program Initiatives, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probono/MajorInitiatives.htm 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008). The EOIR also has established a “Pro Bono Project” in concert with 
the Board of Immigration Appeals “to increase pro bono representation for individuals 
detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with immigration cases 
under appeal.” Id. 
 202. ProBAR Marks 15th Anniversary, 67 TEX. B.J. 319, 319–20 (2004). 
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centers, and the Detained Immigrant and Refugee Children’s 
Emergency Pro Bono Representation Initiative.203 
The ABA’s focus on immigrant children underscores a second 
factor raising the profile of the detention issue: the harsh treatment of 
unaccompanied juvenile immigrants—many refugees seeking asylum 
who are indefinitely detained under the legal guardianship of the U.S. 
government, sometimes in state facilities for convicted juvenile 
offenders.204 Despite the settlement in a class action litigated by the 
Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law requiring the U.S. 
to place juvenile immigrants in appropriate facilitates pending release 
to adult custodians,205 many minors have still remained in secured 
facilities. In response, CLINIC has launched a project to assist 
detained juvenile immigrants to secure release into the custody of 
family members or file asylum, trafficking, or Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status claims.206 In addition, Los Angeles–based Latham & 
Watkins started a high-profile project in 2001, making representation 
of unaccompanied refugee children its signature pro bono initiative.207 
The final catalyst for immigrant detention advocacy was 9/11, 
which transformed the detention debate by focusing on executive 
power to hold suspected terrorists in the name of national security. 
One response focused on efforts to provide direct services to Arab 
and South Asian Muslim men detained after 9/11 and held for long 
periods without charges: law school clinics and pro bono attorneys led 
 
 203. American Bar Association, Commission on Immigration, Detention Standards, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/detention_standards.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008). 
 204. See CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SLIPPING THROUGH THE 
CRACKS: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1–5 (1997). 
 205. See Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration 
Policy More Dangerous Than the Big Bad Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 609, 645 (2004) (citing the settlement agreement in Flores v. Reno requiring the 
United States to “place each detained minor in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the 
minor’s age and special needs, provided that such setting is consistent with its interests to ensure 
the minor’s timely appearance before the INS and the immigration courts and to protect the 
minor’s well-being and that of others”). 
 206. See Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., Indefinite Detainees, http://www. 
cliniclegal.org/Programs/IndefiniteDetainees.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 207. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, PRO BONO ANNUAL REVIEW 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1812_1.pdf (emphasizing the firm’s 
commitment to assisting refugee children); see also Lawyers Try to Improve Lot of Young 
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at 26 (highlighting Latham & Watkins’s commitment to pro 
bono work). 
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attempts to represent the detainees, though many were ultimately 
denied access to counsel.208 The Asian American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund challenged the related practice of closing deportation 
hearings to the public in “special interest” cases in which the 
government alleged that immigrant detainees had suspected terrorists 
ties;209 it also set up a legal hot line and clinics to provide information 
to immigrants from predominately Muslim countries required to 
report to local immigration officials under the government’s Special 
Registration program.210 On the law reform side, the ACLU brought 
suit challenging the practice of targeting Muslims for search and 
detention upon entering the country,211 while other groups have 
attacked the Department of Homeland Security’s policy of 
mandatory detention for asylum seekers from Muslim countries.212 
War on Terror advocacy has thus brought the immigrant rights 
bar full circle, underscoring the deep connection between U.S. policy 
abroad and the legal insecurity of immigrants at home. As in the Cold 
War period, when lawyers sought to protect Central American 
refugees denied legal status in the name of anticommunism, public 
interest lawyers have now found themselves defending Arab and 
South Asian immigrants deprived of legal rights in the name of 
antiterrorism. It is the reverberation of foreign policy back home—
and the legal insecurity that it produces for noncitizens—that 
constitutes a central theme of immigrant rights in the modern era, 
sparking advocacy efforts to fortify the legal status of immigrants and 
resist the deprivation of their civil rights and civil liberties in the face 
 
 208. See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS REGARDING POST 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETENTIONS IN THE USA, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
ENGAMR510442002; see also Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: 
The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192–99 
(2002). The Center for Constitutional Rights filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of those 
detained in the post-9/11 sweep, alleging violations connected to racial profiling, indefinite 
detention, and inhumane conditions. The district court in the case dismissed the charges of 
racial profiling and prolonged detention, but let stand challenges to the conditions of 
confinement and religious discrimination. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307 (JG), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006). The case has been appealed. 
 209. See Sin Yen Ling, Frontline Lawyering: Defending the Attack on Immigrant 
Communities After September 11, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 238, 238–39 (2004). 
 210. See id. at 240–43. 
 211. See Class Action Complaint at 2, Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-C-3761 (N.D. Ill. filed 
June 28, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/aclu%20of%20il%20-%20rahman% 
20complaint%20file-stamped.pdf. 
 212. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as 
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1274–75 (2004). 
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of governmental power. The parallel movement to protect 
undocumented workers from abuses of private power in the 
marketplace has provided the other engine driving the growth of 
immigrant rights practice during this period—underlining the 
corresponding influence of market integration on the domestic public 
interest field. 
B. Arenas 
Within the system of market integration, immigration represents 
one type of transnational economic flow: the movement of outside 
workers into U.S. jobs. Because this outside-in movement imposes 
degraded legal status on undocumented workers, the public interest 
law project has focused on efforts to level the legal playing field by 
augmenting the system of immigrant rights inside the United States. 
Yet immigration is only half of the market integration story. Indeed, 
while immigration brings market integration home, the outflow of 
U.S. corporations in search of investment opportunities and low-cost 
production locales extends it to developing countries abroad.213 This 
inside-out movement further challenges domestic legality—not by 
importing legally degraded labor, as is the case with immigration—
but by exporting U.S. corporate activity to deregulated geographic 
spaces where it escapes the full force of U.S. law. Within these new 
arenas of U.S. economic activity, the main focus of public interest law 
becomes upgrading systems of legal governance and regulatory 
enforcement outside of U.S. borders. This involves advocating new 
theories of U.S. jurisdiction; entering new venues of global economic 
governance, such as the NAFTA system and the WTO; and building 
alliances with new partners, both transnational activist networks 
challenging market integration from below,214 and governmental and 
 
 213. See JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 271–89, 559–80 (1997). 
 214. On the emergence of transnational activist networks and social movements, see Luis 
Eduardo Guarnizo & Michael Peter Smith, The Locations of Transnationalism, in 
TRANSNATIONALISM FROM BELOW 3 (Michael Peter Smith & Luis Eduardo Guarnizo eds., 
1998); John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy & Mayer N. Zald, Globalizations and Social 
Movements, in GLOBALIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURE, POWER, AND THE 
TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 1 (John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 
2000); Louis Kriesber, Social Movements and Global Transformation, in TRANSNATIONAL 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE 3 (Jackie 
Smith, Charles Chatfield & Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997); Donatella della Porta & Sidney Tarrow, 
Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST 
AND GLOBAL ACTIVISM 1 (Donatella della Porta & Sidney Tarrow eds., 2005). 
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philanthropic institutions promoting the rule of law from above. 
Thus, transnational economic activity shapes new forms of 
transnational advocacy, with public interest lawyers following market 
activity across U.S. borders into regional and global economic arenas. 
1. The Region.  For U.S. public interest lawyers, the move 
toward regional market integration, punctuated by NAFTA, has 
focused attention on the unique relationship between the United 
States and México, which is defined by a gulf in economic and 
regulatory circumstances that prompts in-migration by Mexicans 
seeking jobs and out-migration by U.S. companies seeking low-cost 
labor and a less stringent regulatory environment. As the regional 
market has been liberalized, advocates have attempted to extend new 
mechanisms of transnational regulation to corporations throughout 
the regional system, while also promoting cross-border investments in 
community-based economic development in México as a step toward 
ameliorating conditions for the poor. 
a. Labor.  Corporate access to cheap Mexican labor has been 
the driving force—and major battlefield—of regional market 
integration. Its symbol is the Mexican maquila program, which has 
permitted foreign-owned assembly plants to import unfinished goods 
duty free to the border region, process them using cheap Mexican 
labor, and then export the final products to the United States with 
duties imposed only on labor’s value added.215 Despite its opposition 
to the maquila program as it evolved after its creation in 1965, U.S. 
organized labor retained an isolationist stance toward México 
through the 1980s, driven by its staunch opposition to the emerging 
NAFTA movement and its deep skepticism of the official Mexican 
union, the pro-integration Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos 
(CTM).216 The passage of NAFTA in 1994 altered the terrain in two 
ways that created new opportunities for public interest advocacy 
focused on transnational workers’ rights. 
First, NAFTA sparked the formation of new transnational labor 
networks, composed of progressive unions, like the Mexican Frente 
 
 215. See Sanford E. Gaines, NAFTA as a Symbol on the Border, 51 UCLA L. REV. 143, 
162–63 (2003). 
 216. See David Brooks & Jonathan Fox, Movements Across the Border: An Overview, in 
CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKING 1, 12–13 
(2002). 
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Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT),217 and grassroots organizations, such as 
the San Antonio–based Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras 
(CJM),218 that came together to address cross-border grievances.219 In 
addition, NAFTA had the effect of internationalizing domestic labor 
disputes under a side labor agreement that permitted private parties 
to challenge their home country’s failure to enforce domestic labor 
laws in venues set up within foreign member states.220 Though the 
agreement lacked hard enforcement mechanisms, its unique structure 
did create the potential for political pressure to complement 
organizing campaigns: successful petitions could be used to provoke 
high-level “ministerial consultations” about labor violations,221 outside 
expert reviews,222 and—in limited cases—arbitration of disputes.223 
Because the structure of the side labor process required workers 
to object to their own government’s labor violations by filing a 
complaint in another member country’s National Administrative 
 
 217. See Manuel García Urrutia M., The Authentic Labor Front in the NAFTA-Era Regional 
Integration Process, in CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
NETWORKING, supra note 216, at 77, 82–83. 
 218. Telephone Interview with Martha Ojeda, Executive Dir., Coal. for Justice in the 
Maquiladoras (June 13, 2006). 
 219. See Tamara Kay, Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance: The Impact of 
NAFTA on Transnational Labor Relationships in North America, 111 AM. J. SOC. 715, 718–19 
(2005). 
 220. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.–Can.–Mex., arts. 3–4, Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]; see also Jonathan Graubart, “Politicizing” a New 
Breed of “Legalized” Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of 
NAFTA’s Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 98–99 (2005). 
 221. NAALC, supra note 220, art. 22(1). 
 222. A member country may request that matters not resolved via ministerial consultations 
(except those that involve the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike) be referred to 
an outside Evaluation Committee of Experts, which is obligated to issue a final report. Id. arts. 
23–26. 
 223. If the matter involves the enforcement of a nation’s “occupational safety and health, 
child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards,” any member country may request 
further consultations, a review by the ministerial council, and finally outside arbitration. Id. arts. 
27–29. Commentators have noted that NAFTA creates weaker enforcement of labor rights than 
investment rights since NAFTA’s Chapter 11 permits foreign investors to sue member 
governments for cash compensation for regulatory policies that investors claim violate their 
NAFTA privileges. See, e.g., Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade 
System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 401, 
403 (2000). U.S. public interest groups have tried to block Chapter 11 suits and gain access to 
litigation records. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA’S THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES 1994–2005, at 
vii (2005). 
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Office (NAO),224 it encouraged the formation of transnational 
networks to execute submissions. On the Mexican side, this meant 
enlisting U.S. legal groups to bring Mexican grievances to the U.S. 
NAO—a dynamic that, in turn, drew U.S. groups across the border in 
support of Mexican labor struggles, which coalesced around two main 
issues within the maquila sector. 
The first wave of Mexican complaints centered on the official 
system for state certification of union representation, which critics 
charged was biased in favor of unions affiliated with the CTM and 
effectively excluded the certification of independent unions, like 
those allied with the FAT. The D.C.-based International Labor 
Rights Fund (ILRF), started in the 1980s to monitor labor standards 
under international trade agreements, emerged as a key organization 
in these campaigns, providing legal support for petitions challenging 
Mexican labor practices.225 In one of the earliest petitions, filed in 
1994 by the ILRF and CJM against Sony,226 workers alleged that local 
labor boards illegally denied an independent union’s request for 
official registration.227 Though the independent union did not achieve 
victory on the Sony plant floor, the United States issued a strong 
condemnation of Mexican practice and recommended ministerial 
consultations,228 which labor activists used to publicly criticize the 
labor certification process.229 Three years later, the ILRF helped to 
file another challenge to the certification system, singling out the 
labor board for bias and delay that harmed an independent 
organizing drive at the Han Young truck assembly plant. The U.S. 
response this time was even stronger, citing the fact that only one 
independent union existed in the entire maquila sector and charging 
the local board with imposing obstacles to independent labor 
organizing in a manner that “is not consistent with Mexico’s 
obligation to effectively enforce its labor laws.”230 
 
 224. NAALC, supra note 220, art. 16(3). The NAOs are organized under each member 
country’s department of labor. 
 225. See Graubart, supra note 220, at 115. 
 226. U.S. NAO Public Submission No. 940003, In re Sony Corporation (1994), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/sub940003.htm. 
 227. Id. 
 228. U.S. NAT’L ADMIN. OFFICE, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF NAO SUBMISSION NO. 
940003 (1995), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/pubrep940003.htm. 
 229. See Graubart, supra note 220, at 118. 
 230. U.S. NAT’L ADMIN. OFFICE, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF NAO SUBMISSION NO. 
9702 (1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/pubrep9702.htm. In another 
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The positive reception given to the petitions around independent 
union certification prompted advocates to pursue a parallel set of 
NAFTA complaints focused on workplace conditions, particularly 
health and safety issues. While attempting to redress health problems 
within the maquilas, these petitions also sought to test the side labor 
process: unlike the independent union complaints, petitions alleging 
health and safety violations were technically open to review by a 
committee of outside experts—and even arbitration. As with the 
independent union organizing drive, the health and safety campaign 
was forged by the ILRF, which in 1997 charged México with 
permitting maquiladoras to impose illegal pregnancy screening on 
female job applicants.231 In response, the Mexican government 
launched an outreach campaign on antidiscrimination laws and a 
number of U.S. companies discontinued the screening practice.232 
CJM coordinated the most systematic and well-documented health 
and safety petition in 2000 on behalf of workers at two U.S.-owned 
plants who placed leather covers on steering wheels and gear shifts 
and suffered from a range of musculoskeletal disorders.233 This 
petition represented the first drafted with U.S. law school clinics as 
legal counsel: the International Human Rights Clinic at St. Mary’s 
School of Law in San Antonio helped to prepare the submission,234 as 
 
petition on independent union organizing, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 
Union filed the 1997 ITAPSA petition targeting a U.S.-owned auto parts subsidiary, which had 
entered into a secret protection contract with the CTM that effectively precluded employees 
from joining the FAT-affiliated union. U.S. NAO Public Submission No. 9703, ITAPSA (1997), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/sub9703.htm. The petition, 
which condemned the labor board’s failure to respond to election manipulation, was brought in 
connection with a large binational coalition of unions and NGOs, which included not only 
grassroots groups like CJM, but also major U.S. public interest groups like the Center for 
Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers Guild. See id. The United States issued a report 
charging the labor board with failing to act impartially, which Mexican activists used to pressure 
the government to sign onto a declaration in support of secret elections and the public 
registration of union contracts. See Graubart, supra note 220, at 126–27. 
 231. U.S. NAO Public Submission No. 9701, Concerning Pregnancy-Based Sex 
Discrimination in Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector (2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/ 
media/reports/nao/submissions/sub9701.htm. 
 232. See Graubart, supra note 220, at 120. 
 233. U.S. NAO Public Submission No. 2000-01, In re Auto Trim de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. 
(2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/Sub2000-01pt1.htm. 
 234. Id. § III. Monica Schurtman, the professor who supervised the St. Mary’s clinical 
students who helped prepare the submission, moved to the University of Idaho College of Law 
during the case, where she continued working on the submission through its Legal Aid Clinic. 
Id. 
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did the Columbia Law School International Human Rights Clinic.235 
Despite the optimism generated by the NAO’s aggressive handling of 
the case, the transition from the relatively labor-friendly NAO under 
the Clinton administration to the more hostile Bush NAO thwarted 
the effort to appeal health and safety claims up the NAFTA system,236 
and signaled a new era of diminished interest in the side labor process 
as a vehicle for reforming Mexican labor practices.237 
Yet while the Bush election marked the decline of the side labor 
agreement as a site for contesting Mexican labor practices, the victory 
of Vicente Fox in México that same year—on a platform that 
included a commitment to migrant rights—signaled new 
opportunities for public interest lawyers to contest U.S. labor 
practices vis-à-vis immigrant workers.238 With the Fox administration 
as a potential ally, U.S. public interest lawyers began to view the 
Mexican NAO as a potential venue for advancing the cause of 
immigrant workers in the United States. This strategy, which involved 
U.S. lawyers crossing the border to generate political support from 
Mexican officials and turning it back to advance domestic rights 
campaigns, had its roots in efforts that predated Fox’s victory: in 1998, 
the ACLU went to the Mexican NAO with a submission charging the 
United States with violating its labor laws by requiring the 
Department of Labor to investigate the immigration status of those 
reporting labor violations—and thus deterring the reporting of 
violations by undocumented immigrants.239 The Mexican NAO 
accepted this submission and the labor department subsequently 
changed its policy to protect migrant privacy.240 
 
 235. U.S. NAO Public Submission No. 2000-01, supra note 233, § III. 
 236. Though there were ministerial consultations in Auto Trim, U.S. Secretary of Labor 
Chao disappointed advocates by refusing to pass review of the health and safety issues raised by 
that case, along with ITAPSA and Han Young, to an outside committee of experts. See Letter 
from Monica Schurtman, Assoc. Professor of Law & Supervising Attorney, Univ. of Idaho 
Legal Aid Clinic, et al., to Elaine Chao, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Mar. 20, 2002), available at 
http://mhssn.igc.org/nafta6.htm (protesting Chao’s refusal to convoke an “Evaluation 
Committee of Experts”). 
 237. See LINDA DELP ET AL., NAFTA’S LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: FADING INTO 
OBLIVION? AN ASSESSMENT OF WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY CASES 34–35 (2004). 
 238. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of 
International Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 546 (2001–2002). 
 239. See Mexican NAO Submission No. 9804, Yale/INS (1998) (on file with the U.S. NAO). 
 240. Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ 
nao/status.htm#iib5 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Telephone Interview with Michael 
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Since 2000, a handful of law school affiliated programs and 
independent advocacy groups have brought immigrant rights 
submissions in the Mexican NAO, reflecting the fact that the petitions 
themselves are experimental exercises in political influence 
undertaken by organizations with both the resources and inclination 
to try out innovative strategies. In 2001, NYU’s Immigrant Rights 
Clinic (run by Michael Wishnie, who also worked on the previous 
ACLU suit against the Department of Labor) filed a petition arguing 
that New York State’s workers’ compensation system subjected 
immigrant workers to unwarranted delays and inadequate 
compensation, violating the U.S. pledge under NAFTA to effectively 
enforce its labor law.241 A 2003 petition by the Farmworker Justice 
Fund challenged the discriminatory treatment of H-2A agricultural 
guest workers in North Carolina under U.S. law,242 while the Brennan 
Center for Justice and the Northwest Workers’ Justice Project filed a 
petition with the Mexican NAO in 2005 alleging that the rule 
prohibiting LSC-funded attorneys from representing H-2B 
nonagricultural guest workers violates the United States’s obligation 
to allow workers to enforce their rights.243 The H-2 petitions, in 
particular, played out against the backdrop of negotiations between 
the United States and México over a guest worker program, which 
the lawyers pointed to as the process they sought to influence by 
highlighting issues with Mexican officials that could be explored as 
part of the framework for reform.244 
Outside of the NAFTA system, the issue of migrant farmworker 
abuse has prompted other efforts at transnational advocacy. The 
temporary nature of farm work creates cross-border migratory 
circuits that pose challenges for migrant advocates since workers in 
the United States for short periods may not develop a full 
understanding of their labor rights or stay long enough to pursue 
 
Wishnie, Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch. (July 14, 2006) (noting, however, that the 
policy change likely had little to do with the NAFTA petition). 
 241. Mexican NAO Submission No. 2001-01, New York State Case (2001), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/mxsub2001-1.htm; see also Sam Smith, Mexico Rips 
Pataki over Worker Woes, N.Y. POST, Nov. 28, 2004, at 10. 
 242. Mexican NAO Submission No. 2003-1, North Carolina Case (2003) (on file with the 
U.S. NAO). 
 243. Mexican NAO Submission No. 2005-01, Forestry Guest Worker Case (2005), available 
at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/2005-01petition.htm#i. 
 244. Telephone Interview with D. Michael Dale, supra note 122. 
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claims to completion.245 The Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, 
Inc. (CDM), launched in Zacatecas, México in 2005, has attempted 
both to provide education on rights and to deal with the issue of 
coordinating labor rights litigation in U.S. courts with clients who 
move back and forth across the border.246 In addition to offering 
know-your-rights trainings on workplace issues before migrants leave 
for the United States, CDM has provided two related services to 
connect Mexican residents with U.S. lawyers. For workers who return 
to México with labor claims but have not filed cases, the group has 
attempted to make referrals to U.S. advocates who can pursue their 
cases.247 For workers who return with U.S. cases already open and 
ongoing, CDM has served as the Mexican arm for U.S.-based counsel, 
tracking down hard-to-find clients and conducting research and 
discovery in México. The Global Workers Justice Alliance has 
offered similar services in connection with clients from Central 
America, underscoring how the circulation of workers across borders 
has prompted lawyers to follow in the pursuit of effective 
representation.248 
b. Environment.  In the environmental context, transnational 
advocacy has responded to the inability to contain pollution within 
national borders249—a problem exacerbated by post-NAFTA 
increases in investment in the maquila border zone.250 NAFTA’s side 
environmental agreement, which allows citizen submissions to 
challenge violations of a member country’s environmental laws,251 was 
 
 245. See Jack Daniel, Alegria de la Cruz, Mike Meuter & Jeff Ponting, Indigenous 
Farmworker Project: Legal Protection for California’s Isolated Farmworkers, 38 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 289, 290 (2004). 
 246. Telephone Interview with Rachel Micha-Jones, Dir., Centro de los Derechos del 
Migrante, Inc. (Nov. 11, 2005). 
 247. This program has been supported by the Zacatecan government, which runs its own 
U.S. guest worker program. Id. 
 248. See Global Workers Justice Alliance, Programs, http://www.globalworkers.org/ 
programs (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 249. See Elizabeth A. Ellis, Note, Bordering on Disaster: A New Attempt to Control the 
Transboundary Effects of Maquiladora Pollution, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 621, 622–25 (1996). 
 250. See Gaines, supra note 215, at 165 (reporting “a sharp increase in foreign direct 
investment flows to Mexico after NAFTA, nearly doubling the number of maquiladora plants 
from 2114 in 1993 to 3729 in 2001”). 
 251. See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (2004). 
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established in part to respond to the issue of transborder pollution;252 
it has been little used for this purpose, however, reflecting both the 
political constraints of the process and the availability of alternative 
venues for transborder advocacy.253 
The system’s constraints are a product of its unique structure, 
which departs from the side labor process in key respects. Citizen 
submissions by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are directed 
to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, whose Council is 
comprised of the environmental ministers from the three member 
countries and served by a Secretariat. The Secretariat receives 
submissions and is empowered to either dismiss them or request a 
response from the country whose environmental enforcement is being 
challenged.254 Once a response is requested, however, the Secretariat 
may only proceed to develop and publish a factual record of the case 
with the authorization of two of the three members of the Council.255 
Accordingly, political pressure can block investigation in a way not 
possible under the side labor process, which proceeds through 
member state NAOs.256 Furthermore, the citizen submission process 
ends with the publication of a factual record; there are no 
opportunities for ministerial consultations or outside review.257 
Although U.S. groups engaged in early efforts to use the 
environmental process to raise public attention and gain political 
advantage in environmental enforcement campaigns, the limitations 
of the system soon came into view. 
As in the labor context, a central thrust of the early petitions was 
to test how aggressive the Secretariat would be in executing its 
mandate. One question in particular was whether the Secretariat 
 
 252. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) contained 
provisions for developing recommendations on establishing a transboundary environmental 
impact process, but they have not been implemented. See John H. Knox, The CEC and 
Transboundary Pollution, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 80, 82–83 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003). 
 253. Telephone Interview with Mary Kelly, Program Dir., U.S./Mex. Border Initiatives, 
Envtl. Def. (Oct. 12, 2005). 
 254. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.–Can.–Mex., art. 14, 
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
 255. Id. art. 15. 
 256. See Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements 
on Social Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement,  
6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425, 431–33 (2001–2002). 
 257. The NAAEC only provides for ministerial consultations and the arbitration of disputes 
in cases initiated by member countries. NAAEC, supra note 254, arts. 22–24. 
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would review U.S. policy decisions that undercut environmental 
enforcement. Along these lines, Earthlaw, a group affiliated with the 
University of Denver’s Environmental Law Clinic, brought a 1995 
petition that specifically targeted a reduction in funding to enforce 
the Endangered Species Act.258 Though couched in the language of 
enforcement, however, the Secretariat interpreted this submission as a 
challenge to U.S. policy and rejected the submission after finding that 
it constituted a dispute over competing legislative mandates, rather 
than putting at issue the United States’s failure to enforce 
environmental laws.259 Later efforts to narrowly target 
nonenforcement also proved disappointing: though the Council 
agreed to develop a factual record in a case contesting the lack of 
standing of citizen groups to enforce the U.S. Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act, it later narrowed the inquiry under pressure from the United 
States and the final report did not address critical issues surrounding 
the government’s discretionary nonenforcement of the law against 
logging operations.260 In light of the restrictions placed on the 
Secretariat’s role, major environmental groups withdrew from the 
process as a mechanism for influencing U.S. decisionmaking,261 though 
 
 258. See Secretariat Public Submission No. SEM-95-001, Spotted Owl Case (1995), available 
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-1-sub-EO.pdf. 
 259. See COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION—SECRETARIAT, DETERMINATION OF 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION NO. SEM/95-001, at 4 (1995), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ 
95-1-DET-E2.PDF; see also COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION—SECRETARIAT, 
DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC SUBMISSION NO. SEM/95-002, at 4 (1995), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-2-DET-OE.pdf (rejecting a challenge to a bill precluding 
logging lawsuits against the U.S. government because it concerned the “application of a new 
legal regime” rather than “a failure to enforce an old one”). 
 260. See COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION—SECRETARIAT, FINAL FACTUAL RECORD 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION NO. SEM-99-002, at 18–19, 59–63 (2003), available at http://www.cec.org/ 
files/pdf/sem/MigratoryBirds-FFR_EN.pdf. 
 261. Of the other four petitions filed against the United States, one was withdrawn, see 
Letter from Dawn M. McKnight, Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, to the Secretariat of the 
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation (June 5, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-
4-wit-e.pdf (withdrawing Public Submission No. SEM-96-004 regarding Fort Huachuca); two 
were terminated, see COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION—SECRETARIAT, DEVELOPMENT OF 
A FACTUAL RECORD IS NOT WARRANTED PUBLIC SUBMISSION NO. SEM-98-003, at 23 (2001), 
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-3-det-e3.pdf (terminating Public Submission No. 
SEM-98-003 regarding the Great Lakes); Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Jamaica Bay, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/ 
details/index.cfm?varian=english&ID=45 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (noting that Public 
Submission No. SEM-00-003 regarding Jamaica Bay was terminated after a thirty-day response 
deadline expired); while the last one is still pending, see COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION—
SECRETARIAT, NOTIFICATION TO COUNCIL THAT A DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD IS 
WARRANTED PUBLIC SUBMISSION NO. SEM-04-005, at 29 (2005), available at http://www.cec. 
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some advocates have continued to view it as useful in mobilizing 
political pressure in Canada and México.262 
The retreat from the side environmental process as a lever to 
influence U.S. action suggests not simply its political limits, but also 
the possibility for alternative advocacy strategies embedded within 
the transborder regulatory framework. On the litigation side, groups 
have pressed for environmental review of transborder projects:263 for 
example, the environmental group Earthjustice (formerly the Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund) has won rulings requiring the federal 
government to comply with U.S. environmental laws before 
permitting privately owned power plants on the Mexican side of the 
border to import power into California.264 Outside of the domain of 
U.S. courts, there are institutions governing transborder issues that 
provide opportunities for advocacy through more cooperative 
routes.265 For instance, the NAFTA-inspired Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission, which provides for public input into 
proposed border region infrastructure projects, and the North 
American Development Bank, which finances the projects, have 
provided some basis for participation by border groups on 
infrastructure planning, channeling efforts away from the NAFTA 
process.266 
Though NAFTA has not been a popular venue for attacking 
transborder pollution, it has nonetheless been credited with 
stimulating cross-border environmental networks.267 Because the 
structure of transborder environmental regulation is primarily 
organized around regional cooperation, and offers limited avenues 
 
org/files/pdf/sem/00-4-ADV-E.PDF (recommending the development of a factual record for 
Public Submission No. SEM-04-005 regarding coal-fired power plants). 
 262. See Graubart, supra note 256, at 458–59. 
 263. Courts have permitted the application of environmental laws to federal projects that 
affect the global commons. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536–37 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (applying the National Environmental Protection Act to impacts on the global commons). 
 264. See Earthjustice, Full Environmental Review Order for Mexican Power Imports,  
Mar. 7, 2006 http://www.earthjustice.org/our_work/victory/mexican-power-imports-full-environ 
mental-review.bin. 
 265. See Knox, supra note 252, at 81–82. 
 266. See Mary E. Kelly, Cross-Border Work on the Environment: Evolution, Successes, 
Problems, and Future Outlook, in CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT NETWORKING, supra note 216, at 133, 137. 
 267. See id. at 135–40. 
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for litigation,268 much of the work of these networks has focused on 
organizing and policy advocacy.269 In one example, Environmental 
Defense, in collaboration with Mexican NGOs, participated in 
negotiations between the United States and México to help establish 
a binational air quality management district in the El Paso–Ciudad 
Juárez area that created a local advisory committee to promote 
citizen participation in developing strategies to improve air quality in 
the region.270 Cross-border activism has also been employed to block 
corporate attempts to build environmentally damaging projects:271 in a 
notable case, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
coordinated a consumer boycott as part of a five-year campaign to 
halt the construction of a proposed Mitsubishi industrial salt plant in 
a biosphere reserve off the coast of Baja California that is a birthing 
area for grey whales.272 As these efforts suggest, transnational 
advocacy in the environmental context reflects an impulse to 
collaborate in the face of mutual environmental threats, as well as a 
shared political commitment to redress environmental harm wherever 
it occurs. 
c. Community Development.  Although the labor and 
environmental impacts of free trade have received the most attention, 
public interest lawyers have also supported cross-border efforts to 
promote community development in Mexican towns connected by 
social and economic ties to the immigrant community in the United 
States. These transnational relationships have long existed among 
immigrants, but have been reinforced and adapted in the context of 
 
 268. Advocates have nonetheless resorted to U.S. courts on those occasions when litigation 
provides opportunities to prevent transborder environmental degradation. One well-known 
example of this occurred in Sierra Blanca, Texas, where the Sierra Blanca Legal Defense Fund 
filed a federal lawsuit in its successful effort to stop a nuclear waste plant from being built in a 
predominately Latino border town. Sierra Blanca Protests Sweep Both Sides of the Border, 
BORDERLINES, Oct. 20, 1998, http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/updater/1998/oct20sierra. 
html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Environmental Justice Case Study: The Struggle for Sierra 
Blanca, Texas Against a Low-Level Nuclear Waste Site, http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/blanca. 
html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 269. See Knox, supra note 252, at 81. 
 270. See Carlos Rincón & Peter Emerson, Binationally Managing Air Quality in the U.S.-
Mexico Borderlands: A Case Study, BORDERLINES, Jan. 2000, http://americas.irc-online.org/ 
borderlines/PDFs/bl63.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 271. See Fernando Bejarano, Mexico-U.S. Environmental Partnerships, in CROSS-BORDER 
DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL MOVEMENT NETWORKING, supra note 216, at 113, 115. 
 272. See Brooks & Fox, supra note 216, at 25. 
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market integration.273 Advances in communications technologies have 
made it easier to maintain transnational networks, while the Mexican 
government has taken steps to promote closer transnational ties.274 
This political attention, in turn, is a function of the economic clout of 
immigrants, who remit $10 billion per year to México—the second-
largest source of foreign direct investment.275 The magnitude of 
remittances reflects an important aspect of immigration in the era of 
market integration: as stricter border policies reduce the rate of 
return for Mexican immigrants to the United States, remittances have 
become a substitute strategy for supporting family back home.276 
The organizational expressions of this transnational activity are 
Mexican “hometown associations” (HTAs)—grassroots immigrant 
groups that operate to collectivize immigrant remittances and transfer 
them to development projects in the immigrants’ hometowns.277 
México has provided important financial incentives to promote 
collective remittances through matching grant programs,278 while U.S.-
based foundations have also entered the HTA field, offering some 
grant money to facilitate research and technical support.279 As a result, 
 
 273. See LINDA G. BASCH, NINA GLICK SCHILLER & CHRISTINA SZANTON BLANC, 
NATIONS UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS, AND 
DETERRITORIALIZED NATION-STATES 7 (1994); see also THOMAS FAIST, THE VOLUME AND 
DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL SPACES (2000). 
 274. Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Mexican Migrants and the Mexican Political System, in 
INVISIBLE NO MORE: MEXICAN MIGRANT CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 31, 
31 (Xóchitl Bada et al. eds., 2006). 
 275. See INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, ALL IN THE FAMILY: LATIN AMERICA’S MOST 
IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOW 1, 3–4 (2004). 
 276. See Luis Eduardo Guarnizo & Luz Marina Díaz, Transnational Migration: A View from 
Columbia, 22 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 397, 407–08 (1999). 
 277. See MIKE DAVIS, MAGICAL URBANISM: LATINOS REINVENT THE US CITY 77–89 
(2000); ROBERT S. LEIKEN, THE MELTING BORDER: MEXICO AND MEXICAN COMMUNITIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2000); Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Cross-Border Grassroots Organizations 
and the Indigenous Migrant Experience, in CROSS-BORDER DIALOGUES: U.S.-MEXICO SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT NETWORKING, supra note 216, at 259, 263; Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Mixtec 
Activism in Oaxacalifornia: Transborder Grassroots Political Strategies, 42 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1439, 1451–52 (1999). 
 278. See Anapum Chander, Homeward Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 74 (2006) (describing 
México’s “Tres por Uno” (“Three for One”) program, under which the federal, state, and 
municipal governments match contributions to development projects made by HTAs). 
 279. Major foundations, including Rockefeller and MacArthur, have provided grants to 
fund HTA research and activism. The North American Integration & Development Center, 
Immigrant Remittance Corridors, http://naid.sppsr.ucla.edu/ImmigrantRemittanceCorridors. 
htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); Meg Sullivan, Mexican Immigrants in U.S. Keep Close Ties with 
Their Hometowns, USC CHRONICLE, Apr. 17, 2000, http://uscnews.usc.edu/detail.php?record 
num=5382. 
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the number of HTAs has grown significantly since the early 1990s, 
increasing to over five hundred by the end of the decade, with nearly 
250 in Los Angeles alone.280 Although HTAs emerged primarily as 
vehicles for investment in community infrastructure projects,281 they 
have begun to promote employment-generating opportunities as a 
way to stem out-migration from the hometowns.282 
As HTA operations have become more sophisticated and their 
cross-border transactions have increased, their need for legal 
assistance has grown. And although HTAs generate significant cash 
investments in their hometowns, their meager operational budgets 
typically allow little funding for private legal assistance, which has 
pushed them to look to low-cost or no-cost alternatives. Legal 
services lawyers in areas of high immigrant density, particularly Los 
Angeles and Chicago, have connected with HTAs as a strategy of 
promoting community economic development. This has linked 
pockets of U.S. legal services lawyers into cross-border circuits of 
HTA investment, internationalizing traditionally localized community 
economic development practice. 
In many ways, the representation of HTAs mirrors the type of 
work community economic development lawyers undertake on behalf 
of U.S.-focused community-based organizations. HTAs are often 
organized as nonprofit groups with development and social service 
goals and thus require standard legal assistance with respect to issues 
of tax exemption, corporate governance, and fundraising.283 In Los 
Angeles, legal services groups have therefore provided training and 
direct services to support HTA nonprofit formation and operation. 
For instance, at the Legal Aid Foundation, lawyers in the Community 
Economic Development unit have conducted workshops for HTA 
members on how to form nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations and 
participate in the local planning process.284 Similarly, in Chicago, the 
 
 280. See LEIKEN, supra note 277, at 12. 
 281. Carol Zabin & Luis Escala Rabadan, Mexican Hometown Associations and Mexican 
Immigrant Political Empowerment in Los Angeles (Aspen Inst., Nonprofit Sector Research 
Fund, Working Paper Series 98-042, 1998), available at http://www.ime.gob.mx/investigaciones/ 
bibliografias/zabin_Escala1.pdf. 
 282. Telephone Interview with Efrain Jiminez, Sec’y of Projects, Federación de Clubes 
Zacatecanos (Sept. 26, 2005). 
 283. See Zabin & Escala, supra note 281, at 7–12. 
 284. E-mail from Nona Randois, Directing Attorney, Cmty. Econ. Dev. Unit, Legal Aid 
Found. of L.A., to Scott L. Cummings (Nov. 20, 2007). Neighborhood Legal Services, an LSC-
funded group in Los Angeles’s San Fernando Valley, has also represented HTAs on nonprofit 
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Community Economic Development Law Project has represented a 
handful of HTAs from Michoacán,285 while Enlaces América, a 
project of Chicago’s Heartland Alliance that grew out of the Mexico-
U.S. Advocates Network in the late 1990s,286 has instituted a 
Hometown Association Leadership Development Initiative designed 
to build HTA organizational capacity.287 Civil rights groups focused 
on the immigrant community have also stepped into the HTA field: in 
2005, MALDEF launched a Hometown Association Leadership 
Program to provide training to HTA officials on how to form 
nonprofit groups, facilitate decisionmaking, and build HTA political 
coalitions, while also offering workshops relevant to HTA members 
on topics such as business development and domestic violence.288 In 
rural areas, some farmworker groups have also been active in 
supporting HTA development and individual remittances. The 
Oregon Law Center in Woodburn, Oregon has provided trainings to 
HTAs and their members (from indigenous communities in México 
and Guatemala) on farmworker employment issues, although it limits 
actual representation to individual HTA members.289 In upstate New 
York, Farmworker Legal Services reports helping individual migrants 
in remitting money to friends and family.290 
Although the community-based structure of HTAs resonates 
with community economic development, the transnational nature of 
their investment strategies and political activism has also generated 
tensions. The fact that HTAs’ end goal is to promote development 
abroad raises concerns about service allocation within legal groups 
with limited resources. In response to this concern, Public Counsel, 
Los Angeles’s pro bono program, has chosen to decline service to 
 
incorporation and tax-exemption issues. E-mail from Joshua Stehlik, Supervising Attorney of 
Cmty. Dev. and Workers’ Rights, Neighborhood Legal Servs. of L.A. County, to Scott L. 
Cummings (Nov. 19, 2007). 
 285. Telephone Interview with Susan Kaplan, Dir., Community Economic Development 
Law Project (Nov. 14, 2007). 
 286. See Enlaces América, Who We Are, http://www.enlacesamerica.org/aboutus/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 287. See Enlaces América, Hometown Association Leadership Development Initiative, 
http://www.enlacesamerica.org/leadership/hometown.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 288. Press Release, J.C. Flores, MALDEF Launches Immigrant Leadership Program (May 
18, 2005), available at http://www.maldef.org/news/press.cfm?ID=261. 
 289. E-mail from Julie Samples, Attorney & Coordinator, Indigenous Farm Worker Project, 
Or. Law Ctr., to Scott L. Cummings (Nov. 16, 2007). 
 290. E-mail from Lewis Papenfuse, Executive Dir., Farmworker Legal Servs. of N.Y, Inc., to 
Scott L. Cummings (Nov. 15, 2007). 
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those HTAs that engage primarily in activities abroad. The 
transnational objectives of HTAs also create tensions with the 
mandate of LSC-funded organizations, which are required by federal 
regulations to serve clients within geographically bounded service 
areas.291 In addition, the high level of involvement by HTAs in 
hometown politics cuts against the traditional orientation of 
community economic development advocacy, which focuses on 
assisting community groups engaged in economic revitalization 
activities, rather than partisan political activity. 
While public interest lawyers in immigrant centers like Los 
Angeles have supported transnational development through their 
work with HTAs, their counterparts on the border have promoted a 
parallel set of development initiatives with transnational dimensions. 
Unlike HTA advocacy, which is driven by remittances, border 
development is directed to the infrastructure deficits of border towns, 
where growth pressures caused by the maquila sector have led to 
sprawling development, seen in the spread of informal housing 
settlements—called colonias—on both sides of the border.292 Texas 
RioGrande Legal Aid, with a service area extending the length of the 
Texas border, has an active program addressing colonia housing 
issues, which focuses on regularizing the land tenure of residents, 
many of whom have purchased land under financial contracts that 
leave them vulnerable to dispossession. The group also supports the 
development of new housing projects and small businesses, while 
assisting colonia residents to gain access to public utilities.293 Through 
these strategies, colonia lawyers, like those assisting HTAs, mobilize 
self-help responses by poor communities struggling under the system 
of regional market integration. 
2. The Developing World.  The dynamics that have shaped 
regional practice in North America are also at play on the wider 
global stage as the United States has developed closer ties with the 
developing world. As with México, U.S. economic policy has been a 
key driver, with the push to expand U.S. corporate access to 
 
 291. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1634.1–.2 (2007). 
 292. Jane E. Larson, Negotiating Informality Within Formality: Land and Housing in the 
Texas Colonias, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN 
LEGALITY 140, 141 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
 293. Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc., Colonias & Real Estate, http://www.trla.org/teams/ 
colonias.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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developing markets extending production patterns—and the potential 
for corporate abuse—to locations previously less subject to U.S. 
economic influence: Latin America and Asia in the 1980s, and 
Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 
addition, U.S. linkages with the developing world have been 
reinforced through foreign aid programs, originally initiated to 
advance the Cold War agenda and then moving toward the objective 
of open markets. 
a. Trade.  For U.S. public interest lawyers, the spread of free 
trade has magnified the complexity of advocating for corporate 
accountability across the regulatory divide that separates the United 
States from the developing world. In this environment, lawyers have 
deployed three basic strategies to advance accountability within the 
free trade regime: (1) participation in global institutions governing 
trade, (2) domestic litigation asserting rights against corporations 
operating abroad, and (3) transnational collaborations to promote 
corporate social responsibility. 
i. Governance.  In an effort to inject social standards into the 
trade regime, U.S. lawyers have pursued multi-tiered advocacy 
focused on the interplay between the domestic implementation and 
global governance of free trade. The key organizations involved in 
these campaigns—the ILRF, Earthjustice, and Public Citizen—reflect 
the centrality of labor, environmental, and consumer issues in the free 
trade debate. 
Within the domestic political arena, these groups have attempted 
to raise public interest issues within the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), the executive agency authorized to 
negotiate and administer U.S. trade commitments. On the labor front, 
the ILRF was an early pioneer in trying to link foreign countries’ 
access to U.S. markets to compliance with international labor 
standards through enforcement of “labor conditionality,” which ties 
duty-free treatment of products from developing countries to the 
enforcement of workers’ rights.294 From 1985, when labor 
conditionality was adopted, to 1995, the ILRF was involved in nearly 
one-third of all petitions to the USTR requesting that a country’s 
 
 294. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7) (2000). 
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eligibility for trade benefits be reviewed due to labor violations,295 
including high-profile cases requesting the revocation of Indonesia’s 
preferential trade status because of its association with Nike 
sweatshops.296 This tactic, however, was frustrated by the political 
discretion accorded the USTR, which explicitly used labor 
conditionality to reward Cold War allies and discipline foes—a 
practice that the ILRF challenged through litigation, but ultimately 
lost.297 While the ILRF has continued to use labor conditionality to 
spotlight abuses under free trade, it has emphasized nonlitigation 
efforts, such as documenting labor violations by trading partners and 
testifying against new free trade accords.298 Earthjustice has played a 
similar role on trade-related environmental issues through its 
International Office, which it created in 1996 to coordinate the 
group’s trade and human rights advocacy.299 One important aspect of 
its work has focused on opening up the USTR’s trade negotiation 
process to public input: it sued the USTR to release documents 
associated with negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas,300 while also challenging the exclusion of public interest 
groups from the Trade Advisory Committees that counsel the USTR 
on trade policies affecting public health.301 Public Citizen, which 
launched a major Global Trade Watch program in 1995 to link 
consumer protection and trade, has promoted the participation of 
NGOs in setting trade policy,302 undertaken extensive documentation 
and reporting campaigns on the costs of free trade for consumers, and 
 
 295. Pharis J. Harvey, Int’l Labor Rights Fund, U.S. GSP Labor Rights Conditionality: 
“Aggressive Unilateralism” OR a Forerunner to a Multilateral Social Clause? 3 (n.d.) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 296. See Ann Harrison & Jason Scorse, Improving the Conditions of Workers? Minimum 
Wage Legislation and Anti-Sweatshop Activism, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 144, 145 (2006). 
 297. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 186 (2002). 
 298. See id. 
 299. Telephone Interview with Martin Wagner, Managing Attorney, Int’l Office, 
Earthjustice Legal Def. Fund (July 12, 2006). 
 300. Press Release, Earthjustice, U.S. Trade Representative Sued for Hiding Documents from 
Public (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/001/us_trade_ 
representative_sued_for_hiding_documents_from_public.html. 
 301. See Earthjustice, Health Trade Advisory Committees: Earthjustice: Environmental 
Law, http://www.earthjustice.org/our_work/cases/2005/page.jsp?itemID=27548798 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2008). 
 302. See Public Citizen, On Procedures for Obtaining Trade Policy Advice from Non-
Governmental Organizations, http://www.citizen.org/trade/harmonization/comments/articles. 
cfm?ID=4492 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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opposed efforts to extend free trade into Central and South America 
and Africa.303 
These and other groups have also pursued reform at the 
supranational level by working to open international trade 
institutions to public participation.304 This effort has centered on the 
WTO, which operates as an institutional forum for facilitating trade 
negotiations, implementing trade agreements, and resolving trade 
disputes among member states.305 Though NGO access to the WTO is 
limited,306 U.S. groups have used the available opportunities to press 
for greater responsiveness to environmental, labor, and public health 
issues. Beginning in 1999, a handful of U.S. organizations—including 
the Center for International Environmental Law and Public Citizen—
have consistently attended the WTO Ministerial Conferences, where 
they are authorized to go to (but not participate in) public sessions 
and meet with member representatives.307 Environmental groups have 
also attempted to intervene in the WTO’s dispute resolution process, 
under which member states can bring complaints of trade violations 
to dispute resolution panels, with appeals available to the Appellate 
Body and remedies that include compensation and, in extreme cases, 
suspension of the offending state from the WTO.308 The Center for 
International Environmental Law successfully pressed the WTO to 
authorize the submission of public interest amicus briefs.309 However, 
the WTO’s decision to grant the panels complete discretion over 
whether to accept public interest submissions has meant that they are 
 
 303. Public Citizen, Global Trade Watch, http://www.citizen.org/trade/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 304. Telephone Interview with Martin Wagner, supra note 299. 
 305. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 16–18, 26–29 (1998). 
 306. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. V, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) (“The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for 
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters 
related to those of the WTO.”). 
 307. See World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil 
Society, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 308. See Susan H. Shin, Comparison of the Dispute Settlement Procedures of the World 
Trade Organization for Trade Disputes and the Inter-American System for Human Rights 
Violations, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 43, 49–54 (2003). 
 309. See Brief for Center for International Environmental Law et al. as Amici Curiae to the 
Appellate Body, On United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(July 23, 1998), available at http://ciel.org/Publications/shrimpturtlebrief.pdf. 
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rarely reviewed,310 and, accordingly, few amicus briefs have ever been 
filed.311 
As a result, U.S. groups have taken tentative steps to build up 
alternative institutional power to challenge the WTO’s authority over 
free trade policy. For instance, environmental groups have begun 
testing methods of participating in emerging multilateral 
environmental agreements and promoting closer collaboration 
between the governing bodies of such agreements and the WTO.312 
On the labor front, the ILRF has sought to strengthen the 
International Labour Organization as a counterweight to the WTO in 
balancing the competing demands of trade and labor protections,313 
while groups have also advocated for the adoption of UN rules on 
corporate social responsibility.314 Yet the marginal nature of these 
efforts thus far highlights the power and continued insularity of the 
WTO and brings into sharp relief the unequal terrain on which trade 
policy is determined. 
ii. Extraterritorial Legality.  Advocacy within international 
institutions attempts to shape the legal contours of the transnational 
trade regime by expanding the range of stakeholder inputs and 
 
 310. See REPORT OF THE APPELLATE BODY, UNITED STATES—IMPORT PROHIBITION OF 
CERTAIN SHRIMP AND SHRIMP PRODUCTS, WT/DS58/AB/R, ¶¶ 107–08 (Oct. 12, 1998). On the 
WTO’s stance on NGO participation, see generally Steve Charnovitz, Participation of 
Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
331 (1996). 
 311. See World Trade Organization, Amicus Curiae Briefs, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/a2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, ¶ 9, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/257ABR.doc (noting amicus brief filed by Defenders of Wildlife, 
NRDC, and Northwest Ecosystem Alliance). The Center for International Environmental Law 
has continued to advocate for WTO reform through participation in public hearings. See 
Federal Register Comments on US Position Regarding Qatar Ministerial Meeting of the World 
Trade Organization, http://ciel.org/Publications/FRNQatarCommentsFinal.pdf (last visited 
Febt. 24, 2008). 
 312. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW 2001–2002 ANNUAL REPORT 21, available at http://www. 
ciel.org/Publications/CIEL_Report_2002.pdf. 
 313. See Int’l Labor Rights Fund, Developing Effective Mechanisms for Implementing Labor 
Rights in the Global Economy, in WORKERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 7 (Randolyn Kay 
Gardner ed., 2001). 
 314. See Lary Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United 
Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 
(2006); EarthRights International, U.N. Norms and International Programs, http://www. 
earthrights.org/legal/unnorms/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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exploiting opportunities to embed social standards within free trade 
frameworks. More traditional litigation efforts, in contrast, seek to 
force U.S. corporations abroad to internalize the costs of harms 
committed within territories where no viable mechanisms of legal 
enforcement exist.315 Litigation strategies to impose labor and 
environmental standards on transnational corporations have 
therefore emerged as both a complement to institutional-level reform 
efforts and an expression of frustration with existing enforcement 
mechanisms.316 Limits on the extraterritorial application of federal law 
have spurred advocates to look at both international and state law as 
tools to challenge corporate abuse outside U.S. borders.317 
International law efforts to promote corporate accountability in 
developing countries have focused on the extension of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS),318 which provides federal court jurisdiction for 
noncitizens bringing tort claims alleging human rights violations.319 
The use of the ATS to contest the human rights violations of 
corporate actors has built upon its successful deployment as a vehicle 
to challenge human rights abuses by foreign governmental officials—
launched by the landmark Filartiga v. Pena-Irala320 case in 1980. The 
pioneering group was the ILRF, which spearheaded a test case that 
for the first time used the ATS to attack corporate action abroad, 
alleging that Unocal authorized the government in Burma to commit 
forced labor, torture, and other abuses in helping to build its pipeline 
project.321 The ILRF case was joined by a parallel suit orchestrated by 
EarthRights International,322 a group founded on an Echoing Green 
 
 315. Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic 
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 401–03 (2001). 
 316. Id. at 401–02. 
 317. Courts have limited the extraterritorial application of environmental and labor laws. 
James Salzman, Seattle’s Legal Legacy and Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements, 31 
ENVTL. L. 501, 507 (2001); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four 
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987, 1017 (1995). 
 318. See Scott Pegg, An Emerging Market for the New Millennium: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 
17 (Jedrzej George Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003). 
 319. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 320. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATS conferred 
federal court jurisdiction on a claim by the family members of a Paraguayan torture victim 
against his Paraguayan torturer). 
 321. Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (upholding ATS claims by individual plaintiffs). 
 322. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
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grant in 1995 by two recent law school graduates and a Burmese 
human rights activist who sought to bring together traditional 
litigation with human rights tactics to advance international 
environmental rights.323 From its inception, EarthRights was 
organized around opposition to the Unocal pipeline, and one of its 
founders developed the idea of an ATS suit in connection with the 
Center for Constitutional Rights, which litigated Filartiga.324 In a 
consolidated appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 
upheld the ATS claims against Unocal for forced labor, rape, and 
murder,325 and the case settled for an undisclosed amount.326 
The Unocal case highlighted both the potential for and 
complexities of using human rights litigation to hold transnational 
corporations to account. At one level, the case represented an 
important ATS innovation: unlike the conventional model of bringing 
ATS cases against foreign individuals on behalf of human rights 
victims residing in the United States, Unocal opened domestic courts 
to victims from all over the world to challenge corporate actors.327 But 
by confronting global corporations on their own terms, Unocal also 
raised the stakes for advocacy groups in ways that have presented 
new challenges for their practice. The sheer scale and expense of 
litigating against global companies have required that ATS suits 
proceed as partnerships between NGOs and for-profit firms 
specializing in labor and environmental issues, which are able to 
finance large-scale, risky cases.328 Yet while this model has brought 
together NGOs and progressive public interest firms in productive 
collaborations, it has also exposed ATS litigation to the charge that it 
is driven by fee-hungry plaintiffs’ lawyers.329 
In addition, efforts to fit corporate abuse within the rubric of 
human rights have also confronted lawyers with strategic tradeoffs. 
 
 323. Telephone Interview with Marco Simons, U.S. Legal Dir., EarthRights Int’l (June 23, 
2006). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc 
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), district court opinion vacated by 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 326. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting the parties’ stipulated 
motion to dismiss). 
 327. Telephone Interview with Marco Simons, supra note 323. 
 328. EarthRights has also reached out for assistance from law school clinics at Rutgers, 
Harvard, Yale, Virginia, and George Washington. Id. 
 329. See Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 2314. 
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Though forced labor easily fits within the scope of ATS claims,330 
more traditional labor abuses—such as violations of the right to 
organize—may not fall within the types of universally accepted 
international law violations that are required under the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain to state a common law 
cause of action.331 This has caused labor groups to raise the issue of 
human rights more obliquely, focusing on specific allegations of 
egregious abuse against labor activists: recent ILRF cases therefore 
spotlight the torture and murder of union organizers in U.S. 
subsidiaries in Latin America.332 Similarly, in the environmental 
context, EarthRights has not succeeded in attempts to bring 
environmental degradation, by itself, under the human rights tent of 
ATS jurisdiction.333 The group has thus been forced to pursue 
environmental justice indirectly, again through claims of activist 
repression. For example, its case against Shell has alleged complicity 
in the murder and abuse of environmental activists by the Nigerian 
military in support of Shell’s oil pipeline.334 By foregrounding human 
rights in this way, the ATS cases also blur the distinctions between 
labor and environmental harms, subsuming them both under the 
rubric of corporate abuse: the ILRF has thus litigated cases that 
center on environmental damage,335 while EarthRights has paired 
claims of repression against environmental activists with allegations 
of forced labor.336 
Because of the constraints on ATS jurisdiction, advocates have 
also attempted to enlist state courts to police transnational corporate 
actors. Building on the domestic sweatshop work of groups like 
 
 330. E.g., Igor Fuks, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: 
Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 125 (2006). 
 331. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (“[W]e think courts should require 
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”). 
 332. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–53 (11th Cir. 
2005) (reversing a lower court dismissal of an ATS claim of torture in connection with actions 
by employees of a Del Monte subsidiary in Guatemala against labor activists); Sinaltrainal v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing ATS claims against 
Coca-Cola USA and its Colombian subsidiary for the murder of a labor activist). 
 333. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 127–32 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal 
of ATS claims in connection with the Bhopal chemical plant disaster in India). 
 334. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 335. See Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 336. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
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APALC, this litigation has focused on using state law theories to 
extend joint liability for labor violations to U.S.-based retailers that 
contract their production to sweatshops abroad. One prominent case, 
which settled in 2002,337 was brought by antisweatshop groups on 
behalf of garment workers in the U.S. commonwealth of Saipan 
charging major garment retailers (including The Gap, Target, JC 
Penney, and The Limited) with making false statements that their 
garments were “sweat-free” in violation of California’s unfair 
business practices law.338 In 2005, the ILRF filed a case against Wal-
Mart on behalf of a class of workers from supplier factories in Africa, 
Central America, and Asia that assigns liability for labor violations to 
Wal-Mart on the ground that its supplier contracts contain a code of 
conduct enforceable by the workers as third-party beneficiaries.339 
iii. Collaboration.  While U.S. public interest lawyers deploy 
traditional legal strategies with an eye toward radiating law outward 
into the global economic arena, they also confront the limits of this 
approach in a legal environment comprised of heterogeneous 
regulatory regimes that permit corporations to shop for countries that 
insulate them from legal liability.340 Faced with this uneven playing 
field, advocates supplement traditional legal tactics with alternative 
strategies, such as the documentation and reporting of abuse, the 
development of corporate codes of conduct, and the promotion of 
international norms governing global corporate activity. These 
strategies rely on the mobilization of transnational activist networks 
 
 337. See Global Exchange, The Saipan Victory, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/ 
sweatshops/saipan (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 338. This case was brought in connection with two federal cases alleging labor, RICO, and 
international law violations. See Global Exchange, Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop 
Litigation, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/saipan/summary112399.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2008). The Saipan settlement resulted in a code of conduct governing 
garment production on the island as well as damages amounting to $20 million for the workers. 
Jenny Strasburg, Saipan Lawsuit Terms OK’d: Garment Workers Get $20 Million, S.F. CHRON., 
Apr. 25, 2003, at B1. A similar state lawsuit was brought against Nike for allegedly misleading 
statements of compliance with labor rights abroad. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 
(Cal. 2002). 
 339. See Press Release, Int’l Labor Rights Forum, Sweatshop Workers on Four Continents 
Sue Wal-Mart in California Court (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.laborrights.org/press/ 
Wal-Mart/lawsuit_pressrelease_091305.htm. 
 340. See César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, Nike’s Law: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 
Transnational Corporations, and the Struggle over International Labor Rights in the Americas, in 
LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY, supra note 
292, at 64, 65 
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to develop standards, call attention to violations, and monitor 
compliance.341 
These dynamics are illustrated by the development of 
transnational advocacy networks formed to oppose sweatshops. 
These networks—composed of public interest law organizations, 
labor and religious groups, and student associations—emerged in the 
1990s as the global counterpart to domestic efforts to stem the 
exploitation of immigrant workers in U.S. garment production 
firms.342 Transnational strategies evolved as the phase out of global 
import quotas on garment items pulled more production overseas to 
countries with weak labor standards,343 underscoring the increasing 
impotence of antisweatshop advocacy that focused solely on the 
shrinking base of U.S. producers.344 
Los Angeles’s APALC, which spearheaded domestic impact 
litigation against sweatshops, also helped to coordinate a 
transnational response to labor abuse along the global garment 
supply chain. In 1995, APALC co-founded Sweatshop Watch, a 
coalition of immigrant rights and labor groups formed in the wake of 
the El Monte Thai worker case to advocate for corporate 
accountability in the garment industry.345 Although Sweatshop Watch 
was a party in the class action litigation against U.S. garment retailers 
for selling products made by sweatshops in Saipan,346 it has generally 
emphasized policy advocacy and cross-border organizing over 
lawsuits, acknowledging the legal and logistical limits on transnational 
litigation. For instance, in 1998, Sweatshop Watch convened a 
conference with participants from Latin America, Europe, and Asia 
to chart strategies for advancing living wage demands within the 
global garment production sector.347 That same year, it collaborated 
 
 341. See id. at 67. 
 342. See BONACICH & APPELBAUM, supra note 140, at 174–75. 
 343. Katie Quan, Strategies for Garment Worker Empowerment in the Global Economy, 10 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 29–30 (2003). 
 344. Telephone Interview with Julie Su, Legal Dir., Asian Pac. Am. Legal Ctr. (July 13, 
2006). 
 345. In addition to APALC, the founders of Sweatshop Watch included the Asian 
Immigrant Women Advocates, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, Employment Law Center, 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates, La 
Raza Centro Legal, Los Angeles County Commission on Women, and Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund. See Quan, supra note 343, at 32. 
 346. See Global Exchange, supra note 338. 
 347. See Quan, supra note 343, at 33. 
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with labor and workers’ rights groups to develop a model code of 
conduct requiring companies that produce university logo items to 
meet minimum labor standards and in 1999 helped to launch the 
Worker Rights Consortium to monitor and enforce the codes against 
universities and their suppliers abroad.348 More recently, Sweatshop 
Watch has led efforts to develop new global antisweatshop strategies, 
convening a 2004 gathering to create an action plan for garment 
advocacy in the face of free trade349 and launching a Globalization and 
Economic Justice Project to “spark more dialogue about the 
strategies needed to continue promoting workers’ rights in the global 
economy.”350 Through these efforts, Sweatshop Watch’s agenda—
initially forged in the struggle for domestic immigrant rights—has 
been pulled in the direction of transnational collaboration. 
b. Aid.  While trade policy has contributed to the emergence of 
U.S. advocacy organized around the development of different forms 
of global regulation, U.S.-driven foreign aid programs have opened 
distinct avenues of global influence that have also operated to pull 
public interest lawyers toward the developing world. The 
implementation of foreign aid programs has placed U.S. public 
interest lawyers in conflicting relationships with development 
agencies—at times opponents and champions of aid-driven reform in 
the developing world. The common theme has been a commitment to 
promoting the rights of marginalized groups within the foreign 
assistance framework. Beginning in the 1970s, this commitment pitted 
public interest lawyers against development agencies, which were 
charged with sponsoring development projects that curtailed 
fundamental rights and imposed environmental and economic harms 
on vulnerable local populations. By the 1990s, however, the 
movement to use foreign aid to export the “rule of law” abroad 
created new opportunities for collaboration between the 
development community and public interest lawyers, who were 
enlisted as agents of legal modernization projects in developing 
countries promising to build legal systems that married a respect for 
open markets with a commitment to human rights. 
 
 348. See id. 
 349. See Sweatshop Watch, The Future of California’s Garment Industry, http://www. 
sweatshopwatch.org/index.php?s=73 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 350. See Sweatshop Watch, Globalization and Economic Justice Project, http://www. 
sweatshopwatch.org/index.php?s=42 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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i. Law and Development.  The movement to export U.S. law as 
a way of fostering development can be traced back to the first law and 
development movement in the 1950s and 1960s, which promoted legal 
reform as a way of facilitating active state management of developing 
economies to cultivate internal industries.351 The carriers of reform 
were U.S. law professors,352 who were enlisted to transmit the 
antiformalist, policy-oriented model of American legal education to 
developing countries, where it was believed that educational reform 
would mold a new generation of pragmatic, problem-solving lawyers 
to advance economic modernization.353 As a project of legal reform, 
the law and development movement died out in the 1970s, when 
those once sympathetic to its aims began to view the movement as 
American-led legal imperialism.354 
As law fell out of favor among liberals as a vehicle for promoting 
economic development in poor nations, it gained traction as a weapon 
for contesting the use of development policy for conservative ends. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, development initiatives constituted an 
important aspect of Cold War policy, with USAID targeting 
assistance to countries as a way to avoid instability and Communist 
 
 351. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, The Third Moment in Law and Development 
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1, 2 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 352. The main funders were the Ford Foundation and USAID. See John Henry Merryman, 
Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and 
Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 457–58 n.4 (1977); see also Hugo Frühling, 
From Dictatorship to Democracy: Law and Social Change in the Andean Region and the 
Southern Cone of South America, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF 
FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD 55, 56 (Mary McClymont & Stephen 
Golub eds., 2000) (“[In 1966,] the Ford Foundation provided $3 million to establish the 
International Legal Center in New York City as a vehicle for mobilizing legal assistance to 
developing countries.”). 
 353. See David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and 
Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 
351, at 74, 76–77 [hereinafter Trubek, The “Rule of Law”]. On the law and development 
movement generally, see JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS 
AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK (1975); Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal 
Culture and Social Development, in LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1000 (Lawrence M. 
Friedman & Steward Macaulay eds., 1969); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: 
Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998); David M. Trubek, 
Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 
1 (1972). 
 354. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 
1062, 1080 (1974). 
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influence, while the Ford Foundation promoted sustainable 
development and public health initiatives to benefit the global poor.355 
But as aid programs operated as a force for change in the developing 
world, they also came to be viewed by some legal groups as carrying 
with them the potential for as much harm as good. 
Within the women’s movement, it was the U.S. effort to use aid 
to restrict reproductive rights abroad that focused attention on the 
developing world. The conservative backlash against the Roe v. 
Wade356 decision spread into the international domain with the Nixon 
administration eliminating USAID funding for foreign programs that 
provided information about “abortion as a method of family 
planning,” and the Reagan administration later imposing a “global 
gag rule” that precluded all U.S. funding for foreign NGOs that 
performed or promoted abortions.357 Although domestic legal 
challenges to these rules failed,358 they helped to sensitize U.S. 
women’s groups to the scope of gender inequity abroad and built 
support for greater investment in law reform programs to protect the 
rights of women globally.359 The main organizational outgrowth of this 
international movement was the creation of the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, which split off from the ACLU in 1992 to focus 
on mobilizing women’s rights around the world, with an agenda 
encompassing advocacy within international fora and treaty 
monitoring to promote women’s rights in developing countries.360 
Environmental groups also followed the flow of international 
aid, tracing the dispensation of U.S. funds to support development 
projects in poor countries that contributed to environmental 
 
 355. See Jay S. Ovsiovitch, Feeding the Watchdogs: Philanthropic Support for Human Rights 
NGOs, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 341, 347–50 (1998). 
 356. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 357. See AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A.I.D. POLICIES RELATIVE TO 
ABORTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES 2 (1974); White House Office of Policy Dev., US Policy 
Statement for the International Conference on Population, 10 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 574, 
578 (1984). 
 358. See Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive & Erica Smock, The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives 
Curtailing Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 775 (2004). 
 359. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts on 
the Case of Women’s Rights, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2004). 
 360. See Center for Reproductive Rights, International Litigation, http://www.reproductive 
rights.org/ww_litigation.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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damage.361 In 1976, lawyers at the NRDC set up an international 
program with the central objective of forcing U.S. adherence to 
environmental standards in the administration of its foreign aid 
policy.362 After USAID settled a lawsuit that led to a system of 
environmental review for U.S.-sponsored overseas projects,363 the 
NRDC began to work with groups outside the United States on 
monitoring implementation of the USAID environmental mandate.364 
This led, in turn, to heightened sensitivity about the scale of 
environmental problems outside of U.S. borders—reinforced by new 
scientific evidence of the global scope of environmental pollution—
which spurred an expansion of the NRDC’s international work.365 
With the movement toward free markets in the 1980s, 
environmental groups began to focus on the World Bank, which 
provided international aid funds for development projects, often 
conditioned on structural adjustments designed to open the markets 
of recipient countries. U.S.-based environmental groups, concerned 
about the impact of World Bank–financed infrastructure and resource 
extraction projects on protected environments and indigenous 
populations,366 worked in coalition with developing country NGOs to 
intervene in World Bank processes at three levels. First, groups 
interceded during the loan negotiation process to raise environmental 
concerns with proposed projects—a tactic used by the NRDC to 
successfully incorporate pro-environmental terms into World Bank 
financing in the mid-1980s.367 Second, as groups became increasingly 
disappointed with the World Bank’s track record on environmental 
review and indigenous resettlement, pressure began to mount for a 
campaign to reform the Bank’s decisionmaking structure to provide 
for meaningful public participation.368 That campaign was led by U.S.-
 
 361. Telephone Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, Dir., Int’l Program, Natural Res. Def. 
Council (June 12, 2006). 
 362. See id. 
 363. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,121 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 1975); Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979). 
 364. Telephone Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, supra note 361. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights 
Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791, 1792 (2005). 
 367. See David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for 
Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2645–48 (1991). 
 368. See Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed?, in 
THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS 
MOVEMENTS 391, 394–98 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998). 
02__CUMMINGS.DOC 4/16/2008 8:32:03 AM 
2008] PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 963 
based NGOs, including Environmental Defense and the Center for 
International Environmental Law,369 which pressured Congress to cut 
off funding for the World Bank in the absence of reforms.370 One 
important result of this campaign was the 1993 creation of an 
independent Inspection Panel to review citizen complaints about the 
World Bank’s failure to follow its own policies, with the Panel 
empowered to investigate and make recommendations for corrective 
action to the Bank’s executive board.371 With this Panel in place, 
environmental groups undertook a third form of activism: assisting 
local groups in the submission of petitions. Through 2002, U.S.-based 
groups participated in eleven of twenty-eight filings, most challenging 
the impact of infrastructure and extractive industry projects on local 
environments and communities.372 The Washington, D.C.–based 
Center for International Environmental Law was the key 
organization behind these petitions, providing some form of technical 
assistance in each case.373 However, though these petitions did lead to 
environmental mitigation and compensation for the displaced in a few 
cases, because of the Panel’s lack of enforcement power, the overall 
results of the process were limited at the project level and in some 
cases fueled backlash against the Panel by member states.374 
ii. Rule of Law.  While public interest lawyers in the 1990s 
resisted outside development projects that threatened to harm local 
populations in the name of open markets, they also became key 
participants in a massive new aid movement to promote development 
from within through comprehensive legal reform based on the “rule 
 
 369. See Dana Clark, Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel, in DEMANDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 1, 7 
(Dana Clark et al. eds., 2003). 
 370. See Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction to THE STRUGGLE FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS, supra note 
368, at 1, 7. 
 371. See Inspection Panel, Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 511; see also 
LINDA A. MALONE & SCOTT PASTERNACK, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY 
STRATEGIES TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 108–13 (2004). 
 372. See Kay Treakle, Jonathan Fox & Dana Clark, Lessons Learned, in DEMANDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra 
note 369, at 247, 248–50. 
 373. See generally Center for International Environmental Law, Brief Summaries of 
Inspection Panel Claims, http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifibs.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). 
 374. See Treakle, Fox & Clark, supra note 372, at 258–65. 
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of law.”375 This movement continued to link the agendas of foreign aid 
and free markets, but also exposed the tensions between them. On 
the one hand, investors promoted the rule of law as a way to facilitate 
the integration of developing countries into the free market system, 
through reforms designed to reduce political corruption and ensure 
strict enforcement of contract and property rights.376 On the other 
hand, proponents of human rights, who viewed rule-of-law reforms as 
a means to guarantee individual rights against governmental and 
corporate abuse, also supported the movement.377 The tensions 
between these agendas centered on the degree to which the rule of 
law contemplated strict corporate accountability and redistributive 
social welfare policies—and were reflected in the ideologically diverse 
range of funders backing the rule-of-law movement, with the Ford 
Foundation, Open Society Institute, USAID, World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and UN acting as the core sponsors.378 
There were, however, important areas of convergence: in particular, 
both free market and human rights proponents agreed that the broad 
outlines of rule-of-law reform must include an empowered judiciary 
to protect private property and individual liberty, and access to justice 
for all social classes to ensure political legitimacy.379 Programmatically, 
this convergence has meant a new funding emphasis on building 
public interest law systems within emerging democratic societies as a 
way to strengthen judicial independence and legal enforcement.380 
Because the rule-of-law project is sponsored primarily by U.S. 
institutions, U.S. lawyers have played central roles in its 
implementation. Although the lawyers engaged in rule-of-law reforms 
are sensitive not to be seen as missionaries, the overall project is 
missionary in scope, thus reprising concerns about American legal 
imperialism voiced during the first law-and-development movement. 
U.S. lawyers have responded to these concerns by structuring their 
 
 375. See Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal 
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 179, 184–93 (1999). 
 376. See Trubek, The “Rule of Law,” supra note 353, at 74. 
 377. See id. at 84. 
 378. See Chua, supra note 353, at 17–18. 
 379. See id. at 11–12; see also deLisle, supra note 375, at 181. 
 380. The rule-of-law movement has built upon previous efforts to extend public interest law 
abroad. See Stephen Ellman, Cause Lawyering in the Third World, in CAUSE LAWYERING: 
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 349, 355–70 (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1998) (describing efforts to export public interest law in the 1980s). 
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involvement around technical support for local institutions, 
collaborations with local leaders, and training for foreign 
professionals.381 Although these arrangements do not eliminate U.S. 
influence, rule-of-law proponents have viewed them as efforts to 
promote indigenous initiatives and foster more incremental change. 
With respect to program implementation, U.S. lawyers have 
played important roles providing technical advice on adapting public 
interest systems to the local legal environment. Some work has been 
done to establish public interest law firms abroad;382 however, the 
major efforts have been around promoting access to justice and 
clinical legal education. Access to justice programs have emerged as 
popular rule-of-law reforms, focused on providing free individual 
representation for poor clients in cases typically directed at 
governmental institutions. The Ford Foundation has sponsored legal 
aid in South America,383 China,384 and Eastern Europe,385 enlisting U.S. 
lawyers in the project of developing new institutional systems abroad. 
For instance, in 1997, Ford funded the creation of the Public Interest 
Law Initiative at Columbia University to focus on building public 
interest law systems in Central and Eastern Europe.386 The 
organization has provided technical assistance in the implementation 
of access to justice programs in Poland and Bulgaria, and is 
undertaking research and providing programmatic support in 
connection with initiatives in the Balkans and Russia.387 USAID 
programs have also enlisted U.S. lawyers to assist developing legal aid 
programs abroad, supporting the Center for Law and Social Policy’s 
 
 381. See Frühling, supra note 352, at 58. 
 382. See id.; Helen Hershkoff & Aubrey McCutcheon, Public Interest Litigation: An 
International Perspective, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD 
FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 352, at 283, 294. 
 383. See Frühling, supra note 352, at 70–73. 
 384. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 211, 232 (1999). 
 385. See Aubrey McCutcheon, Eastern Europe: Funding Strategies for Public Interest Law in 
Transitional Societies, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD 
FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 352, at 233, 233–34. 
 386. The organization has spun off from Columbia and changed its name to the Public 
Interest Law Institute. See Public Interest Law Institute, About PILI, http://www.pili.org/ 
(follow “about us: about pili” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 387. See Public Interest Law Institute, Legal Aid Reform, http://www.pili.org/ (follow 
“programs: legal aid reform” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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Russian Rule of Law Consortium, which pursues the development of 
traditional civil legal aid systems for the poor in ten Russian states.388 
U.S. lawyers have also played key roles in the emerging 
international pro bono network of NGOs and corporate law firms.389 
An important trend has been the expansion of transnational law 
practice,390 with elite law firms increasingly opening up branch offices 
abroad to cultivate foreign business and facilitate international 
transactions.391 One result of the increase in transnational practice has 
been the extension of pro bono networks across national borders,392 
with foreign offices taking steps to promote pro bono opportunities, 
both as a way of responding to local legal services needs and meeting 
professional service obligations established in the United States.393 
This development can be seen in Latin America, where there is a 
major push to create pro bono structures to fill holes in legal aid 
systems. As large firms expand into major Latin American cities, they 
are learning that to justify their lucrative practices, they have to give 
something back to the community.394 Local NGOs have sought to tap 
into this professional impulse as a way to supplement legal aid 
services in foreign systems. The Ford Foundation has been a leading 
financial sponsor of international pro bono networking,395 which has 
been coordinated through the Cyrus Vance Center for International 
Justice Initiatives, a project of the Bar of the City of New York. The 
 
 388. See e-mail from Alan W. Houseman, Dir., Ctr. for Law and Soc. Policy, to Scott L. 
Cummings (July 11, 2006). USAID has also funded the human rights group Global Rights to 
provide training and capacity building for nascent legal aid programs in Mongolia, Burundi, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Morocco, and India. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rasmussen, 
Deputy Dir. for Core Program Design, Global Rights (July 16, 2006). 
 389. Nathan Koppel, American Export, AM. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 92, 92. 
 390. See Abel, supra note 61, at 739. 
 391. In 1988, forty-four of the one hundred largest U.S. firms had at least one office abroad, 
for a total of 136 international offices. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, 
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 48 (1991). By 
2005, eighty of the largest one hundred U.S. firms had a total of 487 international offices. See 
The Billion-Dollar Club Expands, AM. LAW., July 2005, at 123, 123–29. The number of 
international offices is based on information provided by the firms on their websites and in the 
National Association for Law Placement Directory of Legal Employers. See National 
Association for Law Placement, NALP Directory of Legal Employers, http://www. 
nalpdirectory.com. 
 392. See Koppel, supra note 389, at 92. 
 393. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 97 (2004). 
 394. Pro bono programs have been started in México under the auspices of the Mexican Bar 
Association (Asocación de Servicios Legales), and in Brazil (Instituto Pro Bono). See, e.g., 
Instituto Pro Bono, http://www.probono.org.br (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 395. See, e.g., Frühling, supra note 352, at 78. 
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Center has sponsored conferences and facilitated information 
exchange between Latin American professional associations and U.S. 
pro bono leaders, such as Los Angeles’s Public Counsel, as well as law 
firm pro bono coordinators.396 
Lawyers within U.S. law school clinics have also been involved in 
helping to establish clinical education programs in developing 
countries. One rationale for the expansion of clinics abroad has been 
to promote the development of practical legal skills that students can 
later use to advance rule-of-law initiatives.397 Proponents have also 
emphasized the importance of clinics augmenting legal services to the 
poor.398 The free market and social justice rationales have coalesced to 
ignite an increase in financial support, some of which has been used 
to enlist U.S. clinical educators as program advisors. Since the 1980s, 
the Ford Foundation has been a key player in South America, where 
it has brought in U.S. clinicians from American, Wisconsin, Yale, and 
other schools to assist in the development of clinical programs 
oriented around human rights.399 The Open Society Institute’s clinical 
initiative was launched in the mid-1990s and has placed more 
emphasis on using clinics to promote market integration and 
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe.400 Balancing the twin 
goals of market integration and human rights has been the main 
thrust of the USAID and World Bank–funded Central and Eastern 
 
 396. See THE CYRUS R. VANCE CTR. FOR INT’L JUSTICE INITIATIVES, STRATEGY SUMMIT 
FOR THE AMERICAS: A PROFESSION SUPPORTIVE OF DEMOCRACY SUMMIT REPORT 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.nycbar.org/VanceCenter/PDF/strategysummit/English_Final%20Report. 
pdf. 
 397. See Aubrey McCutcheon, University Legal Aid Clinics: A Growing International 
Presence with Manifold Benefits, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF 
FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 352, at 267, 271. 
 398. See id. at 272–73; see also Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper, Rethinking Lawyering 
for the Underrepresented Around the World: An Introductory Essay, in EDUCATING FOR 
JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE AND THE COMMUNITY 
1, 8–9 (Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper eds., 1999). 
 399. Richard J. Wilson, Three Law School Clinics in Chile, 1970–2000: Innovation, 
Resistance and Conformity in the Global South, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 515, 555–56 (2002); see also 
Stephen Golub, From the Village to the University: Legal Activism in Bangladesh, in MANY 
ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND 
THE WORLD, supra note 352, at 127, 144–45 (detailing Ford’s clinical initiative in Bangladesh). 
 400. See Open Society Institute, Europe, http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ 
lcd/cle/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (describing how Open Society’s Central and Eastern Europe 
Program began in 1996 and has funded nearly seventy-five clinics in twenty-two countries); see 
also Richard J. Wilson, Training for Justice: The Global Reach of Clinical Legal Education, 22 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 421, 424–25 (2004). 
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European Law Initiative of the ABA,401 a third major source of 
clinical funding that has recruited U.S. lawyers to help set up refugee, 
prisoner, and women’s rights clinics in Europe, the former Soviet 
republics, and South Asia.402 On top of these philanthropic initiatives, 
the Fulbright program has also been important in funding U.S. 
clinicians to spend time at law schools abroad to expand and deepen 
clinical education curricula.403 
In addition to providing technical assistance through rule-of-law 
programs to support the development of public interest law abroad, 
U.S. lawyers have also established networks to facilitate connections 
with foreign counterparts. Technology-based programs have spurred 
cross-border collaboration. For instance, Lawyers Without Borders 
was established in 2000 as an e-mail listserv that connects advocates 
from the developing world with “rule of law needs” to a network of 
U.S. lawyers, who serve as “global ambassadors” by responding to 
legal inquiries.404 Similarly, the Environmental Law Alliance 
Worldwide (E-LAW) is a listserv that permits members in over sixty 
countries to request legal and scientific information, access model 
environmental policies, and connect with teams of international 
lawyers in support of environmental campaigns.405 Within the legal 
education arena, the Global Alliance for Justice Education (GAJE) 
was founded in the late 1990s to facilitate the network of clinical and 
practice-oriented law school professors from around the world 
interested in promoting social justice pedagogy.406 GAJE has 
sponsored four global meetings and a series of regional gatherings 
focused on examining different models of justice education and 
 
 401. See CEELI, CEELI Funding, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/about/funders.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 402. See CEELI, CEELI Focal Area: Legal Education Reform, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/ 
areas/legaled.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 403. See Richard J. Wilson, The New Legal Education in North and South America, 25 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 375, 380–81 n.12 (1989) (discussing the author’s Fulbright year in Colombia); 
Telephone Interview with Frank Bloch, Professor, Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. (Aug. 3, 2006) 
(noting his Fulbright year in India). 
 404. See Darhiana Mateo, Pro Bono Goes Global: A Look at Lawyers Without Borders, 
BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 35, 35. 
 405. See Laila Weir, Logging in for the Environment: Environmental Lawyers Around the 
World Join Forces Via E-LAW, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2005, at 54, 54. 
 406. See Clark D. Cunningham, Clinical Education Changing the World and the World 
Changing Clinical Education: The Global Alliance for Justice Education (July 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.gaje.org/History/Cunningham-AusClinicConf05.htm. 
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promoting transnational collaborations, while also creating a listserv 
to facilitate ongoing communication.407 
Finally, American LL.M. programs have provided important 
linkages between the U.S. public interest community and foreign 
lawyers, who capitalize on U.S. training and contacts to support the 
development of public interest systems in their home countries. One 
direct effort to train foreign public interest lawyers was NYU’s LL.M. 
program in Public Service Law,408 which was started under the 
auspices of the Global Public Service Law Project initiated in 1998 to 
examine global public interest models and promote cross-cultural 
collaboration and training.409 Though the program suspended 
operations in 2006 for lack of funding, it succeeded during its tenure 
in producing graduates who returned to public interest law positions 
in Africa, East Timor, the Philippines, and Argentina.410 At 
Georgetown, the law school has sponsored a Leadership and 
Advocacy for Women in Africa program since 1993 that provides an 
LL.M. to African lawyers committed to returning to their countries of 
origin to advocate for women’s rights; the program includes academic 
training, a six-month internship with a D.C.-area public interest or 
governmental organization, and public interest seminars designed to 
expose students to U.S. public interest methodologies.411 Like the 
efforts around access to justice and clinical education, the goal of 
U.S.-based training is to produce lawyers who will carry with them 
the ideology and technique of U.S.-style public interest law to build 
institutional systems abroad. 
C. Norms 
As the rule-of-law movement abroad underscores, the public 
interest impulse outside U.S. borders is articulated in the language of 
human rights, which proponents seek to embed in embryonic legal 
systems to counter the deregulatory thrust of market integration and 
 
 407. See Telephone Interview with Frank Bloch, supra note 403. 
 408. See New York University School of Law, Global Public Service Law Project: LL.M. in 
Public Service Law, http://www.law.nyu.edu/programs/globalpublicservice/llm/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 409. See John E. Sexton, The Global Law School Program at New York University, 46 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 329, 335 (1996). 
 410. See New York University, Global Public Service Law Project: Focus on Alumni, 
available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/programs/globalpublicservice/about/alumni.pdf. 
 411. See Mary Hartnett, The Need for International Women’s Human Rights Lawyers: Now 
More than Ever, HUM. RTS., Summer 2002, at 21, 21. 
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to assert in international political institutions (like the UN) as a 
bulwark against the power of international financial institutions (like 
the WTO). Human rights is thus viewed as a way to infill the multiple 
fissures in global governance with laws of uniform consistency—to 
globalize a set of universal political norms to act as a countervailing 
force against economic globalization. For U.S. public interest lawyers, 
the interest in “bringing human rights home,”412 represents the 
optimism of this international human rights movement, but also a 
pragmatic acknowledgment of the limits of domestic law to produce 
political change at home. The picture of American public interest 
lawyers—who a generation ago championed the transformation of 
domestic law for progressive ends—now turning to human rights as a 
master frame for social change highlights the contrasting fortunes of 
public interest law at home and its human rights counterpart abroad. 
It also suggests the strong influence of changing U.S. policy on the 
circuitous path of human rights domestication. Whereas the 
international human rights system promoted in the Cold War era was, 
in part, a way to export American-style public interest law to activists 
in foreign countries resisting authoritarian regimes, the current U.S. 
human rights movement represents an effort by public interest 
lawyers to import the very norms and methods built through 
international struggle to contest what they view as the erosion of 
domestic legal standards resulting from new American policy 
imperatives: market integration, conservatism, and the War on 
Terror. 
1. Process.  The new interest in human rights among public 
interest lawyers has been seen in the increasing number and range of 
groups launching domestic human rights projects, incorporating 
human rights arguments into domestic litigation, and taking domestic 
causes to international human rights bodies. This Section examines 
the major organizational actors promoting domestic human rights and 
traces the strategies they have employed to import international 
norms into domestic practice. 
 
 412. See Maria Foscarinis, Advocating for the Human Right to Housing: Notes from the 
United States, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 447, 453 (2006) (“[T]he Ford Foundation 
organized a day-long conference called ‘Bringing Human Rights Home,’ highlighting the 
domestic use of human rights strategies and encouraging funders to support such efforts.”). 
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a. Institutions.  The lure of human rights for U.S. lawyers has 
grown against the backdrop of expanding institutional opportunities 
for human rights advocacy at the international level. Beginning in the 
late 1960s, the UN Commission on Human Rights enlarged its power 
to hear and respond to complaints of human rights violations. First, 
the Commission created a procedure to allow NGOs to identify 
country-specific human rights violations at its annual session and 
authorized the investigation of gross violations.413 Second, the 
Commission established a procedure to examine individual 
complaints alleging a “consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms” in any country 
in the world.414 These procedures, combined with a parallel system for 
individual complaints established under treaty-based committees,415 
created new opportunities for advocates to raise specific allegations 
of human rights violations within UN deliberative bodies as a means 
of mobilizing international pressure for domestic change. These 
mechanisms grew in importance in the late 1970s and 1980s, as the 
Commission started to apply them with greater force to a broader 
range of countries and violations.416 During the same period, the 
regional Inter-American human rights system began to develop as an 
important venue for contesting governmental abuse in Latin 
America, with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
empowered both to examine individual claims of human rights 
violations and investigate countrywide human rights conditions.417 
These changes widened the scope of participation for NGOs within 
key human rights institutions and thus stimulated the growing 
movement to enforce human rights within the international system.418 
 
 413. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1235 (XLII), U.N. Doc. E/4393 (June 
6, 1967). 
 414. ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLVIII), U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (May 27, 1970). In the 1980s, 
the Commission also began to initiate inquiries into “thematic”—as opposed to country-
specific—violations, initially focused on investigating the disappearances under Argentina’s 
military dictatorship. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 641–42 (2000). 
 415. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights created a Human Rights 
Committee empowered to issue human rights reports and hear individual complaints. See G.A. 
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 416. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 414, at 613, 620. 
 417. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM RTS. Q. 439, 440–43 
(1990). 
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In a prominent example of the emerging power of human rights 
enforcement, human rights groups combined traditional “naming and 
shaming” documentation efforts with advocacy in the UN and Inter-
American systems to pressure the Argentinian military dictatorship to 
cease the “disappearences” of political opponents.419 
b. Sponsors.  International human rights activism moved 
forward with the key financial support of the Ford Foundation, which 
made significant investments in human rights in South America as a 
way of opposing the U.S. Cold War alliance with repressive 
authoritarian leaders.420 In 1978, Ford funded what would become two 
of the most important U.S.-based international NGOs: the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights First) and the 
International Human Rights Law Group (now Global Rights).421 As 
Reagan’s election again pushed anticommunism to the fore, Ford 
increased its investment in human rights in the 1980s to support 
democratic movements, transforming the field of international human 
rights NGOs, which more than doubled between 1983 and 1993.422 
The geographic division of labor that evolved through the 
1980s—with U.S. legal groups focused on domestic rights at home and 
international groups promoting human rights abroad—bore the 
strong imprint of Ford, which viewed domestic and human rights 
strategies as two sides of the same coin.423 This division began to break 
down within Ford in the 1990s. One influence was the increasing 
 
 418. On the role of NGOs in the human rights movement generally, see David Weissbrodt, 
The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human 
Rights, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293 (1977), updated and reprinted in David Weissbrodt, The 
Contribution of International Nongovernmental Organizations to the Protection of Human 
Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 403 
(Theodor Meron ed. 1984). 
 419. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 31, at 103–10. 
 420. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power: Investing in 
Human Rights as an Alternative Political Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A 
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 10, at 354, 363; Frühling, supra note 352, at 60–63. 
 421. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 420, at 363. 
 422. Ford Foundation grants for international human rights work grew from nearly $2 
million in 1983 to nearly $9 million in 1993. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 31, at 99 fig.2. 
During the same period, the number of international human rights NGOs grew from 79 to 168. 
See id. at 11 tbl.1. 
 423. The Ford Foundation’s ten-year public interest funding campaign, which was the key 
stimulus to the nascent field, formally ended in 1981, see FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 
1981, at 8 (1981), at the same moment that Ford made human rights one of its five major 
program areas, see FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 20 (1982). 
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frustration with domestic rights litigation that had been mounting 
through the 1980s.424 So long as domestic strategies had proven 
successful, Ford saw no need to promote human rights on the 
domestic front, viewing human rights as a potential distraction from 
the project of building progressive domestic legal precedent. Yet 
when the limits of the domestic rights framework became apparent, 
Ford began to explore the possibility of developing alternative 
strategies, including the incorporation of human rights. In addition, 
there was increasing concern within Ford about the damage to the 
global human rights movement caused by American exceptionalism, 
which was fueled by complaints from overseas grantees who saw 
hypocrisy in the United States’s resistance to the adoption of 
international standards.425 
It was against this backdrop that Ford moved to integrate its 
human rights and public interest law programs. In the late 1990s, 
Ford’s strategy emphasized technical assistance and networking to 
build the domestic human rights field. In 1997, Ford provided support 
to the Human Rights USA campaign to assess attitudes toward 
human rights in the United States and funded the International 
Human Rights Law Group and the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights to train domestic legal groups to use human rights more 
effectively.426 Ford then sponsored a meeting of domestic advocates to 
develop strategies for introducing human rights into U.S. public 
interest law, which resulted in the formation of the U.S. Human 
Rights Network,427 and helped to launch Columbia’s Human Rights 
Institute to facilitate domestic human rights training.428 
After 9/11, Ford began to provide direct support to domestic 
groups applying international human rights. For instance, in 2002, the 
foundation funded a number of organizations to protect the human 
rights of noncitizens in the wake of 9/11;429 in 2003, Ford funded the 
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights in San Francisco and New 
 
 424. Telephone Interview with Larry Cox, Senior Program Officer for Int’l Human Rights, 
Ford Found. (Oct. 13, 2005). 
 425. Id. 
 426. FORD FOUND., 1997 FORD FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT 79 (1997). 
 427. See U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, SOMETHING INSIDE SO STRONG: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2003). 
 428. See FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 120 (2001), available at http://www. 
fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/ar2001.pdf. 
 429. FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 70–72, 74 (2002), available at http://www. 
fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/ar2002.pdf. 
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York’s Center for Economic and Social Rights to build domestic 
human rights programs;430 and in 2004, Ford made a $1 million human 
rights grant to the ACLU.431 Unable to fund all of the growing 
domestic human rights activity, Ford also began to promote the 
concept to other funders, publishing a series of case studies of 
successful Ford grantees,432 and helping to launch the U.S. Human 
Rights Fund in 2005 to provide $10 million to support a “strategic, 
field building initiative that aims to promote human rights in the 
United States.”433 Partly as a result of Ford’s leadership, other 
important foundations entered the domestic human rights field, 
including the Open Society Institute.434 
Fellowship programs have also played a key role in funding 
highly credentialed lawyers to undertake human rights work for 
limited periods, allowing them to gain entry into the field and develop 
professional skills and networks.435 There are a small number of 
organization-based programs that internally fund fellows to do human 
rights work at the host site. For instance, the ACLU and Human 
Rights Watch instituted a two-year Aryeh Neier Fellowship to honor 
the leadership of Neier, who was the first director of Human Rights 
Watch,436 while Human Rights Advocates created an internship 
program to fund law students to attend sessions of the UN and make 
arguments in front of international bodies.437 Nationally, the 
prestigious Skadden Fellowship program, which has traditionally 
focused on domestic public interest law advocacy, has dedicated one 
of its fellowship positions to support international human rights.438 At 
 
 430. FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 64, 66 (2003), available at http://www. 
fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/ar2003.pdf. 
 431. FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 61 (2004), available at http://www. 
fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/ar2004.pdf. 
 432. FORD FOUND., supra note 12. 
 433. U.S. Human Rights Fund, About the US Human Rights Fund, http://www. 
ushumanrightsfund.org/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 434. E-mail from Kate Black, Open Soc’y Inst., to SJ-Fellows Listserv (Oct. 27, 2005). 
 435. See generally HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, SERVING THE PUBLIC: A JOB SEARCH GUIDE, 
VOLUME II-INTERNATIONAL, 2005–2006, at 126–52. 
 436. Human Rights Watch, 2007–2009 Aryeh Neier Fellowship, http://www.hrw.org/about/ 
info/hrw-aclu-fellowship.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 437. Human Rights Advocates, Frank C. Newman Internship Program, http://www.human 
rightsadvocates.org/frank.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 438. Skadden Fellowship Foundation, List of Fellows, About the Foundation, 
http://www.skaddenfellowships.org/sitecontent.cfm?page=recentFellows&listYear=2007 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008) (listing Adam Weiss’s project in London to provide “legal assistance 
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the law school level, Yale’s Robert L. Bernstein Fellowship in 
International Human Rights has funded two recent Yale Law School 
graduates to undertake human rights work for one year.439 These 
programs, though not exclusively targeted at domestic human rights 
work, break down barriers between public interest law and human 
rights by exposing domestic lawyers to human rights methodologies 
and producing high-prestige lawyers who circulate between the 
domestic and international fields. 
c. Education.  While increased funding has strengthened 
demand for domestic human rights advocates, law school human 
rights programs have operated to reinforce supply. Indeed, law 
schools have become important incubators of domestic human rights 
practice, exposing students to the theoretical and practical dimensions 
of human rights law and connecting domestic students to efforts by 
foreign counterparts around the world. Since the early 1980s, there 
has been a notable expansion in the number of international human 
rights courses offered within the law school curriculum,440 as well as an 
increase in human rights centers.441 
From an advocacy perspective, a key dimension of this 
international trend is the rise in human rights clinical courses.442 Two 
of the earliest and most influential clinics were started at Yale in 1989 
and American University’s Washington College of Law in 1990.443 
 
under European law for low-income EU nationals and their families migrating within Europe 
with a special focus on sexual minorities”). 
 439. Yale Law School, Bernstein Fellowship, http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/ 
bernsteinfellowship.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). The University of Minnesota Human Rights 
Center provides fellowships for residents of the Upper Midwest to undertake short-term 
placements in human rights organizations. See University of Minnesota Human Rights Center, 
Upper Midwest Human Rights Fellowship Program, 2008 Guidelines and Application, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/center/uppermidwest/guidelines.html. 
 440. See Peter Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple 
Discourses, and Lingering Dreams, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 301, 302 (2002). 
 441. Examples of human rights centers include American University Washington College of 
Law’s Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (1990); Fordham’s Joseph R. Crowley 
Program in International Human Rights (1997); Indiana’s Program in International Human 
Rights Law (1997); Northwestern’s Center for International Human Rights (1998); Columbia’s 
Human Rights Institute (1998); Iowa’s Center for Human Rights (1999); Florida State’s Center 
for the Advancement of Human Rights (2000); NYU’s Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice (2002); and Northeastern’s Program on Human Rights and the Global Economy (2005). 
 442. See Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International 
Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 548 (2003). 
 443. See RICHARD J. WILSON ET AL., THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW CLINIC AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: TWELVE YEARS OF OPERATION 3 (May 2002). 
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Although both clinics have privileged international over domestic 
approaches to human rights, they have evolved in slightly different 
directions that have reinforced connections between human rights 
and public interest law. The Yale clinic has emphasized human rights 
litigation in U.S. courts, bringing the high-profile challenge to the 
U.S. government’s detention of Haitian refugees in Guantánamo 
Bay,444 and winning the first federal court ruling applying the ATS to 
human rights violations committed by non-state actors.445 Though 
Yale’s clinic has not specifically promoted domestic human rights, it 
has been a venue for public interest–minded students to experiment 
with human rights advocacy, producing graduates who have gone on 
to play important roles bringing international strategies into the 
domestic public interest arena.446 American’s clinic has split its focus 
between political asylum and human rights,447 and has gained 
attention for its work within the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights,448 where clinic students have filed a number of cases 
targeting disappearances, the detention of political prisoners, and the 
forced displacement of indigenous peoples.449 The clinic has been a 
pioneer in using the Commission as a venue to challenge U.S. 
practices, bringing early death penalty cases and playing a key role 
coordinating a hearing to air complaints about the United States’s 
treatment of immigrant workers in the wake of Hoffman Plastics.450 
 
 444. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993). 
 445. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 446. These graduates include Fordham’s Catherine Powell, Yale’s Michael Wishnie, and 
Texas’s Sarah Cleveland. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (1998) (book review); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: 
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 245 (2001); Wishnie, supra note 238. 
 447. Telephone Interview with Richard Wilson, Professor of Law & Founding Dir., Int’l 
Human Rights Clinic (July 12, 2006). 
 448. See id. 
 449. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 443, at 15–17. 
 450. See EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS: STORIES OF UNDOCUMENTED 
WORKERS: THE DENIAL OF EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS DUE TO IMMIGRATION STATUS 5–10 
(Anais Sensiba & Shaun Yavrom eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ARE 
HUMAN RIGHTS]. In addition, Richard Wilson, the director of American’s clinic, has also 
worked closely with U.S. NGOs and clinics to promote human rights advocacy. See, e.g., 
RICHARD J. WILSON & JENNIFER RASMUSSEN, PROMOTING JUSTICE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERING (International Human Rights Law Group, 2001); 
Richard Wilson, Clinical Legal Education for Human Rights Advocates, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
EDUCATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (George J. Andreopolis & Richard Pierre 
Claude eds., 1996). 
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Following these programs, about fifteen human rights clinics 
have been established since the early 1990s. Some have focused 
specifically on women’s issues,451 others have emphasized 
immigration,452 and the rest have taken on a broad range of 
international human rights issues,453 with the overall focus on civil and 
political—as opposed to economic and social—rights. Although these 
programs have a variety of structures and focus on different elements 
of advocacy,454 they have generally served to expose American law 
students to international human rights problems and 
methodologies,455 while also offering resources to support the work of 
academics and lawyers in the human rights field. 
d. Entrepreneurs.  The evolution of clinic programs, spurred by 
the leadership of pioneering clinic directors, highlights the broader 
importance of entrepreneurialism as a factor in spreading human 
rights techniques within public interest law.456 From a practice 
standpoint, though many groups have shaped the domestic human 
rights field, two have made distinct contributions. The Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) has played a key role in designing and 
executing test-case litigation to embed human rights within American 
law, gaining wide notoriety for resuscitating the ATS as a tool to 
 
 451. E.g., CUNY School of Law, Clinical Programs: International Women’s Human Rights: 
Program Overview, http://www.law.cuny.edu/clinics/clinicalofferings/IWHRC.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2008); Georgetown Law, International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, http://www.law. 
georgetown.edu/clinics/iwhrc/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 452. Examples include Connecticut Law School’s Asylum and Human Rights Clinic, Seton 
Hall’s Immigration and Human Rights Clinic, and St. Mary’s Immigration and Human Rights 
Clinic. 
 453. Examples include NYU’s International Human Rights Clinic (1992), Berkeley’s 
International Human Rights Law Clinic (1998), Columbia’s Human Rights Clinic (1998), the 
University of San Francisco’s International Human Rights Law Clinic (1998), Illinois’s 
International Human Rights Clinic (2001); Harvard’s Human Rights Clinic (2002), Seattle 
University’s International Human Rights Clinic (2002), Virginia’s Human Rights Clinic (2003), 
George Washington’s International Human Rights Clinic (2004), and Cardozo’s Human Rights 
and Genocide Clinic (2005). See Hurwitz, supra note 442, at 549. 
 454. Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human 
Rights Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 531–34 
(2004). 
 455. See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for This 
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 59 (2000). 
 456. Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks in 
International and Regional Politics, 51 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 89, 91 (1999); see also Anthony J. 
Nownes & Grant Neeley, Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group 
Mobilization, 49 POL. RES. Q. 119 (1996). 
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attack human rights abuse.457 After their success in the landmark 
Filartiga case, CCR attorneys worked to systematically expand the 
reach of the ATS,458 enlarging the number of torts deemed to 
constitute human rights violations for purposes of the statute, while 
also extending the range of potential defendants.459 As a result of 
CCR’s advocacy, the ATS has gained attention from activists and 
academics in the human rights field,460 while CCR lawyers have 
become critical transmitters of information on human rights, 
conducting trainings on ATS litigation,461 authoring books and articles 
on human rights,462 and speaking at conferences and media events. 
Unlike CCR, whose domestic work has grown out of its long-
standing commitment to internationalism, the ACLU’s emergence as 
a leading proponent of domestic human rights reflects the ascendance 
of internationalism within a group historically committed to domestic 
public interest law. The ACLU did have a limited tradition of human 
rights work and adopted a formal policy recognizing that 
“international human rights are significant to the ACLU” in 1973.463 
Because of ambivalence among board and staff, however, human 
rights did not occupy a significant place on the ACLU’s agenda 
during this period. Paul Hoffman, who was the legal director of the 
ACLU of Southern California from 1984 to 1994, took up the mantle 
of human rights, persuading the board to approve UN advocacy and 
 
 457. Center for Constitutional Rights, Fact Sheet ATCA: Pioneering the Field of Civil 
Human Rights Law, http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/factsheet%3A-alien-tort-statute (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008). The Center for Justice and Accountability in San Francisco has also been 
a leader in applying the ATS to foreign human rights violators. The Center for Justice and 
Accountability, About CJA, http://www.cja.org/aboutCJA/aboutCJA.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 458. Telephone Interview with Michael Ratner, President, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights 
(July 12, 2006). 
 459. See id. 
 460. E.g., Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A “Sinical” 
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 473, 481–82 (2002). 
 461. See Michael Ratner, Representing the Guantanamo Detainees Presentation at the 
Human Rights at Home: International Law in U.S. Courts Conference, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/hrc/RatnerPresentationon.pdf (discussing ATS claims for Guantánamo 
detainees). 
 462. E.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996). 
 463. Memorandum from Ann Beeson, Steve Shapiro & Anthony D. Romero to the ACLU 
Executive Comm. 2 (Apr. 2005) (detailing ACLU human rights work) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
02__CUMMINGS.DOC 4/16/2008 8:32:03 AM 
2008] PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 979 
human rights litigation as part of the ACLU’s mission;464 the group’s 
overall human rights work during this period, however, was limited by 
staff capacity and political resistance.465 Anthony Romero, who left 
the Ford Foundation’s human rights program to become the ACLU’s 
national executive director in 2001,466 picked up the human rights 
strand initiated by Hoffman and—spurred by 9/11—made major 
investments in the domestic human rights program. After convening a 
national conference entitled Human Rights at Home in 2003,467 the 
ACLU launched a Human Rights Working Group “to apply human 
rights strategies to the ACLU’s work on national security issues, 
immigrants’ rights, women’s rights, and criminal justice.”468 As a 
result, the ACLU has increased its human rights litigation and UN 
advocacy.469 In addition, the ACLU has deliberately sought to raise 
the profile of domestic human rights issues, publishing human rights 
reports, sponsoring conferences, and actively promoting human rights 
in the press.470 
e. Networks.  The ACLU’s role in reaching out to public 
interest lawyers and transmitting human rights strategies is part of the 
broader development of a domestic human rights network, which has 
emerged over the last decade as an ensemble of groups seeking to 
mobilize resources within the human rights system to influence U.S. 
 
 464. Telephone Interview with Paul Hoffman, Partner, Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris 
& Hoffman LLP (July 24, 2006). During his tenure, Hoffman also launched the ACLU’s annual 
International Civil Liberties Report. See Paul Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing 
International Human Rights Law in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR 
THE NEXT CENTURY (1994). Hoffman, who founded a small law firm in Los Angeles after 
leaving the ACLU, continues to play an active role in the human rights field, litigating Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004), with the ACLU and Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 
932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), with the Center for Constitutional Rights. 
 465. See Beeson, Shapiro & Romero, supra note 463, at 7. 
 466. Telephone Interview with Anthony Romero, Executive Dir., ACLU (Dec. 27, 2005). 
 467. See ACLU, Human Rights at Home: International Law in U.S. Courts, 
http://www.aclu.org/hrc (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
 468. See Press Release, ACLU, Advocates Urge Accountability for U.S. Abuse of Power 
and Hurricane Katrina’s Human Rights Crisis (Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.aclu. 
org/intlhumanrights/gen/24573prs20060316.html; Press Release, ACLU, Citing Growing 
Abuses, ACLU Intensifies International Human Rights Advocacy in the United States (Dec. 6, 
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/International/International.cfm?ID=17150&c=36. 
 469. See Ann Beeson & Paul Hoffman, Introduction to ACLU, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LIBERTIES REPORT 1 (2004). 
 470. E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A REPORT ON U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1993). 
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policy.471 As part of a strategy of U.S. human rights “socialization,”472 
network actors have operated in loose coordination to access outside 
institutions to amplify their claims, share information on tactics and 
goals, and train new organizations in human rights techniques.473 
In the United States, network building has occurred with 
different degrees of organizational formality and coordination. 
Connections have been forged through informal contacts between 
public interest and human rights lawyers, which are facilitated by the 
physical proximity of flagship public interest groups and the human 
rights community in the New York–Washington, D.C. corridor, as 
well as professional movement by lawyers between the two sectors.474 
There are also public-private networks, as big law firms have 
partnered with public interest groups on human rights cases, while 
feeding associates with international law experience into the public 
interest field. 
Transnational linkages have also been stimulated by the 
institution of regular UN conferences,475 which connect U.S. advocates 
with their counterparts abroad and thus provide opportunities for 
sharing strategies, while situating U.S. activism within a broader 
frame of human rights struggle.476 In addition to networking, these 
conferences have permitted domestic lawyers to become familiar with 
substantive human rights standards, understand the procedures 
governing UN human rights bodies, and directly engage in UN-level 
advocacy. Domestically, conferences have spurred the formalization 
of networks between public interest lawyers and human rights 
advocates. One important initiative has been the U.S. Human Rights 
 
 471. Keck & Sikkink, supra note 456, at 93. 
 472. See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction to THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 8–15 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & 
Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). 
 473. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 456, at 90, 92, 95. 
 474. For instance, Ann Beeson, Associate Legal Director for the ACLU, came from Human 
Rights Watch, while Dalia Hashad, USA Program Director for Amnesty International USA, 
and Catherine Albisa, Executive Director of the National Economic and Social Rights 
Initiative, came from the ACLU. 
 475. The 1995 UN World Conference on Women is often cited as a major stimulus to the 
development of international contacts and strategies within the women’s rights movement. See 
Schneider, supra note 359, at 689–90. 
 476. It is for this reason that the Ford Foundation funded travel for the participation of U.S. 
groups in the UN meetings on the environment in Rio de Janeiro, human rights in Vienna, 
women in Beijing, and racism in Durban. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 8. 
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Network, which formed after a Howard University Law School 
conference in 2002 to “assess, strengthen and expand the use of 
human rights in the United States,”477 and has since brought together 
lawyers and grassroots activists across disciplines to advance the 
“U.S. Human Rights Movement.” 
Other organizations have been established to facilitate 
information exchange and provide technical assistance to strengthen 
the capacity of public interest groups to apply human rights. 
Columbia Law School’s Bringing Human Rights Home project is one 
of the most prominent network actors. Established in 1998 to build 
the capacity of U.S. lawyers to apply human rights domestically, it 
sponsors a “Lawyers Network” that has over eighty member 
organizations,478 and works with Columbia’s Human Rights Clinic to 
train public interest lawyers in human rights law.479 The project also 
conducts research on human rights legal theories and provides 
backup support to legal groups bringing human rights claims in U.S. 
courts and international bodies,480 while hosting the U.S. Human 
Rights Online section of probono.net, a web-based information 
clearinghouse.481 
The flow of ideas and tactics across the domestic human rights 
network has been a two-way street: while domestic public interest 
groups have incorporated international techniques, internationally 
focused groups have launched domestic programs—reflecting cross-
fertilization, but also competition for funding and status. Long a 
major supporter of human rights litigation abroad, Global Rights 
launched a U.S. project in 1998, with funding from the Ford and 
MacArthur foundations, in response to pressure from international 
partner organizations that chafed at the United States’s role in 
exporting human rights abroad while failing to abide by their 
 
 477. See U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, SOMETHING INSIDE SO STRONG, supra note 427, 
at 7. 
 478. Members include the NAACP, ACLU, Asian American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, and Legal Momentum, as well as major human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights First. Telephone Interview with 
Cynthia Soohoo, Dir., Bringing Human Rights Home (Sept. 28, 2005). 
 479. See Columbia Law School, Bringing Human Rights Home Program, http://www.law. 
columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/BHRH (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 480. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 40. 
 481. See probono.net, Human Rights, http://www.ushumanrightsonline.net/index.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
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mandates at home.482 The project has since worked to assist groups in 
filing human rights amicus briefs in U.S. courts,483 litigating ATS 
cases, bringing Inter-American petitions, and undertaking advocacy 
within the UN.484 Amnesty International started its USA Program in 
2001, again with Ford funding, initially focusing on criminal justice 
issues, particularly around prison conditions and racial profiling, and 
more recently expanding into the areas of border enforcement, 
Katrina displacement, and War on Terror policies.485 Human Rights 
First has also moved to apply human rights domestically, launching its 
post-9/11 domestic U.S. Law and Security Program focused on War 
on Terror detention and intelligence gathering practices,486 while 
Human Rights Watch has started a U.S. project on workers’ rights.487 
f. Venues.  Whereas the classic public interest law model 
centered on precedent-setting federal court litigation, domestic 
human rights advocacy seeks to incorporate human rights norms 
though “multiple ports of entry.”488 By no means have domestic 
human rights advocates eschewed the high-stakes federal court case, 
as ATS litigation underscores. But they have also gone outside of the 
federal courts—by choice and out of necessity—targeting other 
venues of influence to advance human rights agendas: the UN and 
Inter-American regimes “above” the federal system and local 
 
 482. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rasmussen, Deputy Dir. for Core Program Design, 
Global Rights (July 16, 2006). 
 483. Global Rights filed an amicus brief in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), see 
Brief for Global Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, id. (No. 03-1027), and was 
one of several amici in Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005), which challenged the United 
States’s failure to apply the Vienna Convention to Mexican nationals on death row, see Brief for 
Bar Associations and Human Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, id. 
(No. 04-5928). 
 484. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Rasmussen, supra note 482. 
 485. Telephone Interview with Dalia Hashad, USA Program Dir., Amnesty Int’l USA (July 
18, 2006). 
 486. Telephone Interview with Hina Shamsi, Senior Counsel, U.S. Law and Sec. Program 
(July 23, 2006); see also Human Rights First, Program Areas at Human Rights First, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/issues.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (describing the group’s 
“U.S. Law and Security” program). Human Rights First also has a long-standing program in 
support of asylum seekers, directed during its early years by the leading refugee and asylum 
advocate Arthur Helton. See Press Release, Human Rights First, Human Rights First Mourns 
Death of Arthur C. Helton in U.N. Bombing (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www. 
humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/0820.htm. 
 487. Jenkins & Cox, supra note 68, at 28. 
 488. Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1579 (2006). 
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legislative bodies “below.” The range of tactics slides along a 
spectrum of legalism: traditional litigation when there are domestic 
legal hooks and acceptable targets, quasi-judicial international 
tribunals when the goal is to enlist international pressure and gain the 
imprimatur of legal authority, and grassroots legal activism when 
local legislative actors are more amenable to human rights claims 
than central decisionmakers. 
i. Courts.  Despite their limitations from the perspective of 
liberal law reformers, federal courts nonetheless remain a critical site 
for advancing human rights, given their prestige as the most 
important arbiters of American law. Though there is a great deal of 
controversy over whether U.S. courts should consider international 
sources,489 the availability of routes to present human rights claims in 
domestic courts,490 combined with the receptiveness of some judges to 
international arguments, has stimulated action. In an effort to embed 
human rights precedent within American jurisprudence, domestic 
advocates have developed two related strategies. One is the 
deployment of human rights to determine case outcomes: human 
rights claims are asserted with the goal of having a court incorporate 
them as the formal grounds of adjudication. The other is the use of 
human rights for the purpose of reinforcing case outcomes: human 
rights claims are raised not to provide the actual grounds for decision, 
but to explain the international legal context to reinforce the 
propriety of a decision on domestic law grounds.491 
The outcome-determinative use of human rights is framed by 
opportunities to advance claims under substantive law and 
jurisdictional rules.492 The starting point for litigators is thus the 
Constitution, which proclaims treaties the “supreme Law of the 
Land,”493 and federal common law, which accords the same status to 
 
 489. See Ann-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1118–19 
(2000). 
 490. See FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 67–78 (2000) (discussing federal and state court 
jurisdiction over international human rights claims). 
 491. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de L’Homme: Speaking a 
New Legal Language, 13 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 499, 502–03 (1991). 
 492. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 10–17 (2002). 
 493. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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customary international law.494 Yet steep jurisdictional barriers to 
litigating treaty-based violations,495 as well as legal constraints on 
customary international law claims,496 have limited efforts to raise 
human rights directly in federal courts. 
An alternative human rights litigation strategy has centered on 
the extension of the ATS,497 traditionally used to target foreign 
governmental and corporate actors, as a tool to hold domestic actors 
accountable for human rights violations in U.S. courts. The domestic 
ATS cases can be grouped into two broad categories based on the 
identity of the defendants as governmental or private actors. Both 
categories, by virtue of the statutory mandate, have involved the 
assertion of rights by immigrants or noncitizen detainees. 
In suits against governmental defendants, public interest lawyers 
have made limited use of the ATS to challenge federal detention 
practices as contrary to international law, contesting inhumane 
conditions for asylum seekers,498 and the mistreatment of immigrant 
detainees.499 After 9/11, CCR has used the ATS as part of its effort to 
contest the detention and torture of Guantánamo detainees,500 and the 
roundup and detention of Arab and South Asian Muslims immigrants 
 
 494. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102 cmt. j (1987) (“Customary law and law made by international agreement have equal 
authority as international law.”). 
 495. Within American law, international treaties are not deemed “self-executing,” and 
because the United States has ratified most of its human rights treaties with “reservations” as to 
their legal effect, they cannot be enforced through private actions in court. See Martin A. Geer, 
Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights 
Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 
13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71, 109–10 (2000). 
 496. U.S. courts have been reluctant to extend customary law beyond core jus cogens 
proscriptions, such as genocide, slavery, and torture. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. k (1987). And courts have issued 
contradictory rulings about whether customary law claims arise under federal law for 
jurisdictional purposes. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 & n.19 (2004). 
 497. See Jeffrey Davis, Justice Without Borders: Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts, 28 LAW 
& POL’Y 60, 62–63 (2006). 
 498. See, e.g., Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 
2004) (granting in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss ATS claims against the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and its private contractor for torture, beatings, and 
other mistreatment of asylum seekers held in detention). 
 499. See, e.g., Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the 
dismissal of ATS claims in a suit by Brazilian citizen Lucia Papa and her six children against the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service for the death of Papa’s husband). 
 500. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 (2004). 
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on security grounds.501 On the private defendant side, immigrant 
plaintiffs have used the ATS to sue their domestic employers for 
egregious labor violations that are alleged to cross the line of 
international law. Attorneys at the NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic 
pioneered these cases, which involved undocumented domestic 
workers claiming that their employers held them in servitude, forcing 
them to work long hours under onerous conditions for little or no 
pay.502 Yet these innovative efforts to extend the ATS have been met 
by their own jurisdictional constraints. On the governmental 
defendant side, the issue of U.S. sovereign immunity and the 
exclusivity of other remedies against governmental officials limit the 
potential scope of ATS’s jurisdictional hook;503 on the private 
defendant side, immunity has confounded some of the domestic 
worker cases brought against foreign diplomats,504 while the issue of 
private employer liability under the ATS remains unresolved.505 
Alternatively, public interest lawyers have sought to use human 
rights not as a basis for decision, but as a frame of reference to 
educate judges about relevant human rights standards and thus to 
help them situate domestic decisions within a broader international 
context. This outcome-reinforcing use of human rights has been 
 
 501. See Third Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 12, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307(JG) 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (filed Sept. 13, 2004). 
 502. Using this tactic, the clinic has settled a number of forced labor cases on behalf of 
domestic workers. See Topo v. Dhir, No. 01 Civ. 10881(PKC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4134, at 
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004) (suit by an Indian domestic worker forced to do child care and 
housework for over 100 hours per week, receiving $50 for seventeen months of work); Okezie v. 
Udogwu, No. 99 Civ. 03345 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (filed May 7, 1999); Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 377, 380–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (suit by a Malaysian domestic worker paid $1,050 for two 
years of work in which she took care of three children and did burdensome household chores, 
while receiving little food and no rest); Hikabanze v. Shamapande, No. 00 Civ. 9712 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (filed Dec. 22, 2000) (suit by a Zambian domestic worker paid $70 for 160 hours of work 
per week); Helen Peterson, Maid: I Was Slave for 9 Years, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2000, at 
19 (suit by a Nigerian woman held as a “virtual slave” by a New York City employee and his 
wife for nine years). Washington Square Legal Services also settled an ATS case of involuntary 
servitude and forced labor brought against U.S. employers of Mexican landscaping workers. See 
Castillo v. Neave, No. 03 Civ. 00763 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (filed Feb. 3, 2003). 
 503. See Turkmen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *154–57 (June 14, 2006) (dismissing 
ATS claims on the ground that the Liability Reform Act makes an action under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for tort violations committed by federal employees). 
 504. Telephone Interview with Muneer Ahmad, Assoc. Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of 
Law (June 13, 2006). 
 505. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2002), which squarely posed the 
question, settled before the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing en banc. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting the parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss). 
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advanced through the medium of the amicus brief in connection with 
high-profile Supreme Court litigation. This mechanism has received a 
great deal of attention, as the Supreme Court has referenced 
international human rights standards in striking down sodomy laws506 
and the death penalty for juveniles and defendants with mental 
retardation,507 and in upholding law school affirmative action.508 In 
each case, public interest and human rights groups filed amicus briefs 
laying the basis for the international human rights arguments that the 
Court cited.509 This human rights amicus strategy has been 
coordinated by a handful of NGOs and law school clinics that watch 
the Court and have the resources to intervene. On the NGO side, the 
Bay Area’s Human Rights Advocates has been an important player, 
helping to file amicus briefs on affirmative action, the death penalty, 
and the ATS,510 while Global Rights has focused on War on Terror 
detention practices.511 Yale’s International Human Rights Clinic and 
San Francisco Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic have 
also played key roles, working to coordinate briefs in the major 
Supreme Court cases in which human rights received significant 
attention.512 The amicus tactic trades on the notion that U.S. judges 
 
 506. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
 507. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316 n.21 (2001). 
 508. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 509. See Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 558 (No. 03-633); Brief for Mary Robinson 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Brief for 
Human Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats 
Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina 
(No. 00-827), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 533 U.S. 975, resubmitted in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452). 
 510. See Human Rights Advocates, Litigation, http://humanrightsadvocates.org/litigation. 
html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
 511. See Brief for Global Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027); Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights in Support of 
Petitioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696). 
 512. Yale filed the briefs in Lawrence and Atkins. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 509; Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton 
Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 509. The University of San 
Francisco Law School filed the briefs in Roper and Grutter. See Brief for the Human Rights 
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 509; Brief for Human Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights 
Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 509. Individual law school faculty 
members have also been involved in filing human rights briefs. See, e.g., Brief for Human Rights 
Watch et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent and Affirmance, Reno v. Ma, 531 U.S. 924 
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are influenced by what their foreign counterparts do abroad and 
seeks to exert a subtle form of peer pressure as a way of informing 
domestic jurisprudence. But it also highlights the weakness of 
international law, using it as an interpretive guide, rather than a set of 
norms legally binding on the United States. 
ii. Supranational Bodies.  Public interest lawyers have 
increasingly ventured outside the U.S. legal system to raise human 
rights claims in international venues, reflecting both the constraints of 
litigating human rights in domestic courts, as well as the desire to 
connect with foreign allies and mobilize the authority of international 
bodies. The main advantage of this external strategy is that it removes 
much of the complex legal maneuvering that stymies domestic 
litigation, permitting human rights claims against the United States 
and its officials to be aired without assertions of immunity or 
formalistic substantive limitations. The costs, though, are significant: 
international bodies are subject to immense political pressure by the 
United States, impose their own jurisdictional hurdles, and are 
handicapped by their lack of enforcement powers. As a result, U.S. 
lawyers enter these arenas facing a set of trade-offs: able to fully 
adopt the rhetorical power of the human rights framework and 
operate within a quasi-judicial forum, but unable to translate that 
power into the implementation of hard legal reforms. Unlike U.S. 
litigation that attempts to achieve a judicial determination binding on 
the parties, the process of petitioning international bodies is designed 
to achieve distinct objectives: publicizing U.S. wrongdoing, generating 
international pressure on U.S. actors, influencing the administration 
of U.S. justice, and galvanizing domestic constituencies to mobilize 
for reform. 
The two primary international bodies for advocacy by U.S. 
public interest lawyers have been the UN and the Inter-American 
Commission. Within the UN, advocates have pursued two different 
tracks, reflecting the bifurcated structure of human rights monitoring 
and enforcement within the institution. On one track, advocates have 
targeted the UN Commission on Human Rights,513 empowered to 
 
(2000) (No. 00-38) (challenging indefinite immigrant detention on human rights grounds with an 
amicus brief filed by a professor at California Western School of Law). 
 513. In 2006, the Commission was reorganized as the Human Rights Council, though NGO 
participation will operate by the same procedures. See G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶¶ 1, 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006). 
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hear and investigate NGO complaints of gross human rights 
violations through public debate and confidential petitioning 
procedures,514 and, as a body organized under the UN Charter, not 
something from which the United States can opt out. One strategy of 
influence is through direct participation in Commission proceedings: 
NGOs granted consultative status are permitted access to attend 
meetings, address Commission members, and circulate written 
statements.515 There is a small but significant group of U.S. public 
interest organizations with consultative status:516 the ACLU, in 
particular, has made active use of its status, filing written statements 
protesting the torture and detention of prisoners in the War on 
Terror.517 In addition to participation, NGOs are able to invoke the 
Commission’s confidential complaint procedure to generate internal 
investigations of gross violations by the U.S., and to publicly identify 
violations at the annual session of the Commission, which may take 
up a matter by soliciting a formal response from the government, 
issuing a critical resolution calling for specific measures, or appointing 
a Special Rapporteur or working group to conduct further 
investigation and submit a report.518 
American lawyers have also sought to influence human rights 
through advocacy in front of UN bodies created under the auspices of 
international treaties. Although the United States has signed onto a 
number of human rights treaties, their reach has been limited either 
 
 514. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 414, at 611. 
 515. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], G.A. Res. 1996/31, ¶¶ 33–36, U.N. Doc. 
E/RES/1996/31 (July 25, 1996). 
 516. U.S. public interest groups that have gained consultative status include the NRDC 
(1973), Sierra Club (1973), the National Organization for Women (1975), Earthjustice (1991), 
Environmental Defense (1993), the ACLU (1996), the Center for Reproductive Rights (1997), 
the American Indian Law Alliance (1999), the Native American Rights Fund (2002), and the 
NAACP (2003). See U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, LIST OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNSEL AS 
AT 31 AUGUST 2006, available at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/pdf/INF_List.pdf. 
Starting in 1996, domestic groups gained consultative status under a rule change by the UN 
Economic and Social Council permitting the participation by NGOs with an exclusively 
domestic focus. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], G.A. Res. 1996/31, supra note 515, 
¶¶ 5, 8. 
 517. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. On Human Rights, Torture and Detention: Written Statement 
Submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union in Special Consultative Status to the 
Commission on Human Rights Regarding Item 11(a) of the Provisional Agenda, Sixty-First 
Session, Mar. 14–Apr. 22, 2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/written%20 
statement%20on%20torture%20and%20detention.pdf. 
 518. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 414, at 612, 620–21. 
02__CUMMINGS.DOC 4/16/2008 8:32:03 AM 
2008] PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 989 
by nonratification or through the assertion of reservations;519 as a 
result, even in those treaty-based committees that permit individual 
petitions alleging human rights violations, U.S. action is largely 
shielded from review.520 Nonetheless, U.S. public interest groups have 
sought limited room to operate by taking advantage of the fact that 
the United States, as a signatory to international treaties, has an 
obligation to report on treaty compliance, even if it is not bound by 
the individual petitioning process. U.S. groups have therefore played 
a role in augmenting the record before committees through the 
submission of “shadow reports,”521 which document U.S. human rights 
violations and thus highlight discrepancies between the official U.S. 
position on treaty compliance and its actual practice on human 
rights.522 In an attempt to expand interest in this tool, the ACLU 
organized a 2005 conference to train advocates on UN reporting 
obligations under various treaties and the role of NGOs in submitting 
shadow reports.523 
Since the early 1990s, the Inter-American system has emerged as 
another forum for airing U.S. human rights claims that offers a 
greater degree of legal formality than the more decentralized UN 
system. Originally created to investigate and issue reports on gross 
 
 519. Of the seven core human rights treaties, the United States has ratified the Convention 
Against Torture, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See United States Department of State, 
Treaties in Force, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89668.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 520. Of the treaties that the United States has ratified, it has only granted the Committee 
Against Torture the authority to investigate complaints; but this authority only extends to 
petitions by state parties, not individual complainants. See Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Declarations and Reservations, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 521. See US Human Rights Network, Why Do “Shadow Reporting?,” Apr. 2007, 
http://njjn.org/media/resources/public/resource_492.doc (“In U.N. terminology, a ‘shadow 
report’ is information submitted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the treaty 
monitoring bodies that addresses omissions, deficiencies, or inaccuracies in the official 
government reports.”); see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: An Introduction to the Core Human 
Rights Treaties and the Treaty Bodies, Fact Sheet No. 30, at 20 (2005) (noting points during the 
state reporting process at which NGOs can provide input to treaty bodies). 
 522. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 3 (1993). 
 523. See Conference, Shadow Reports: Documenting U.S. Failure to Comply with Human 
Rights Treaties, Oct. 6–7, 2005, available at www.aclu.org/humanrightsconference/LA_ 
Training.pdf. 
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human rights violations, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights has since 1965 also exercised the power to adjudicate 
individual complaints of isolated human rights violations against 
members of the Organization of American States.524 The 
Commission’s limitations are significant: it has no authority to 
execute a judgment,525 and the United States has refused to recognize 
its competence to issue orders.526 However, the Commission’s 
procedural repertoire—which includes the authority to receive legal 
petitions,527 hold hearings,528 make on-site investigations,529 and issue 
reports530—has made it an important mechanism for generating 
international publicity about U.S. actions.531 
The Commission’s appeal as a venue for U.S. advocates has been 
shaped by its jurisdictional mandates and its political connection to 
Latin American states.532 Because of the Commission’s exhaustion of 
remedies requirement, only cases that have been litigated up the 
ladder of domestic appeals may be presented.533 One result of this 
procedural rule has been the relatively large proportion of death 
penalty challenges among U.S. petitions,534 which are meticulously 
litigated through habeas corpus and are then moved into the Inter-
American system as a last-ditch effort to avoid execution. U.S. civil 
cases have also been brought to the Commission, but they lack the 
 
 524. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., RULES OF PROCEDURE art. 49 (“The Commission shall receive 
and examine any petition that contains a denunciation of alleged violations of the human rights 
set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.”). 
 525. See Medina, supra note 417, at 441. 
 526. See Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 276 (2004). 
The Commission has rejected the argument that it has no authority to issue orders against 
nonparties to the American Convention on Human Rights, such as the United States. See 
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89, July 14, 1989, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A), Rep. No. 10 (1989). 
 527. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., supra note 524, art 13. 
 528. See id. art. 30(5). 
 529. See id. art. 40. 
 530. See id. arts. 43, 45. 
 531. See YING-JEN LO, HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
U.S. COURTS 72 (2005). 
 532. As of 2005, there were twenty-eight U.S. cases in which the Commission had issued 
written opinions. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Cases Published by the 
IACHR, http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos.eng.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 533. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., supra note 524, art. 31. 
 534. Seventeen of the twenty-eight U.S. cases in which the Commission had issued a written 
ruling through 2005 involved the death penalty; another three cases involved criminal 
defendants. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 532. 
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tactical urgency of death penalty challenges in which one goal of 
invoking the Commission’s power is to seek delay by any means 
necessary. In the civil arena, the objective is to enlist international 
support in building a case that generates meaningful political pressure 
on U.S. actors, usually over a longer time period. A handful of 
petitions have thus been brought on immigration issues,535 suggesting 
the potential for mobilizing political pressure from sending countries, 
and Native American land claims,536 raising the possibility of political 
resonance with indigenous movements throughout the region. The 
Inter-American Court, which has the power to impose remedies that 
the Commission lacks, has been less useful for U.S. advocates due to 
its limited jurisdiction: it can only adjudicate claims brought by state 
parties against those states that have both ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights and accepted its contentious 
jurisdiction, which the United States has not done.537 
iii. Local Fora.  The barriers to federal court litigation and the 
relative weakness of international institutions have prompted some 
advocates to focus on promoting grassroots human rights organizing 
strategies and legislative campaigns targeted at local governmental 
decisionmakers. A handful of legal groups have directly undertaken 
human rights organizing. For instance, El Rescate, a major immigrant 
organization in Los Angeles, has a long-standing Human Rights 
Department that promotes the human rights of immigrants through 
monitoring, community education, and legislative advocacy.538 Other 
legal groups, such as MALDEF, have more recently begun to train 
communities on human rights norms and mechanisms of 
 
 535. Four of the twenty-eight U.S. cases through 2005 involved immigration issues; in 
addition, four of the death penalty cases involved Mexican nationals deprived of consular 
assistance. See id. 
 536. Two of the twenty-eight U.S. cases through 2005 involved Native American land 
claims. See id. 
 537. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 61, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The Court does have advisory jurisdiction to issue opinions interpreting 
other human rights instruments, which México invoked in gaining a 2003 ruling that the 
Hoffman Plastics decision violated international law. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A), Rep. No. 18 
(2003). 
 538. See El Rescate 20th Anniversary Annual Dinner Celebration, El Rescate Human 
Rights Department, at 17 (2002) (on file with author). 
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enforcement.539 In addition, grassroots human rights organizations 
have used traditional human rights documentation strategies to 
expose human rights concerns in connection with welfare reform and 
public school education.540 
Because the prospects for U.S. ratification of core human rights 
treaties are slim, there have been efforts to pass local human rights 
ordinances in major cities with receptive legislatures. In San 
Francisco, the Women’s Institute for Leadership Development for 
Human Rights, in connection with Amnesty International, helped 
gain the 1998 passage of a local ordinance that requires city 
departments to conduct analyses of budgets, funding allocations, 
employment practices, and service delivery to identify areas of 
discrimination against women and girls in accordance with the 
Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW).541 The ordinance also created a CEDAW Task Force 
composed of city officials and community members to implement the 
ordinance.542 Following this effort, groups in New York, including 
Legal Momentum and the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project,543 are 
working to pass a similar initiative.544 The engagement of public 
interest groups at the local legislative level underscores a willingness 
to adapt tactics away from traditional legal advocacy to take 
 
 539. See Katherine Culliton, Presentation on Behalf of the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund: Los Derechos Humanos y Derechos Laborales de los 
Inmigrantes Latinos en los Estados Unidos 4–5 (Apr. 16, 2004) (on file with author). 
 540. See generally N.Y. CITY WELFARE REFORM & HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION 
PROJECT, HUNGER IS NO ACCIDENT: NEW YORK AND FEDERAL WELFARE POLICIES 
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO FOOD 2 (2000), available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/ 
pdf/publications/humanrights/full_rpt.pdf; Urban Justice Center Human Rights Project, Past 
Projects, Events and Trainings: The Right to Education Project, http://www.hrpujc.org/projects. 
html (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 541. See WILD for Human Rights, Summary of San Francisco’s CEDAW Ordinance, Apr. 
14, 1998, http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/ourwork/cedawsfsummary.html (last visited Feb. 
24, 2008). 
 542. See id. In 2001, the ordinance was expanded to require a similar racial analysis for 
compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. See WILD for Human Rights, 
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/ourwork/cedaw.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
 543. See New York City Human Rights Initiative, About the New York City Human Rights 
Initiative, http://www.nychri.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 544. See ACLU, The New York City Human Rights Initiative, http://www.aclu.org/hrc/ 
NYC_Initiative.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). Los Angeles and Chicago have also passed local 
CEDAW resolutions. See New York City Human Rights Initiative, Other Human Rights 
Initiatives and Resources, http://www.nychri.org/resources.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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advantage of alternative political openings for domestic human rights 
incorporation. 
2. Substance.  Though still limited in scope and early in its 
development, the movement to promote human rights as a domestic 
advocacy strategy has left an imprint on traditional substantive 
categories of public interest law, with domestic lawyers integrating 
human rights both as a way to reinforce the existing U.S. framework 
of civil and political rights, while also seeking to enlarge the sphere of 
economic and social rights. 
a. Civil and Political Rights.  Driven by the greater political 
openness to civil and political rights claims in the United States, as 
well as the funding priorities of the major domestic human rights 
sponsors, public interest lawyers have emphasized civil and political 
rights advocacy both as a means of reviving the American civil rights 
legacy and resisting the threat to civil liberties posed by the expansion 
of executive power after 9/11. Yet the level of interest in human rights 
strategies has not been consistent across the public interest field, 
reflecting the continuing legacy of historical disputes over 
international engagement, as well as the degree to which domestic 
groups have embraced international constituencies. 
The traditional civil rights bar has been relatively cool to the 
human rights agenda, echoing back to Cold War–era divisions over 
human rights. For instance, the NAACP LDF—committed to 
consolidating and protecting domestic gains for African Americans—
has moved incrementally toward human rights strategies. The major 
effort to import human rights into domestic racial justice practice has 
been around racial bias in the criminal justice system. The 
administration of the death penalty, in particular, has been subject to 
systematic efforts to bring human rights to bear, reflecting both the 
strong anti–death penalty orientation of international treaties545 and 
the distinct historical trajectory of U.S. death penalty litigation, which 
was marked by early failure in the Supreme Court to invalidate the 
 
 545. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 1999 U.N.T.S. 171 (declaring every person’s right to life); see also 
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 537, art. 4; Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S. T.S. No. 73. 
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death penalty on the ground of racial discrimination.546 The limit on 
domestic redress, coupled with the building international movement 
to restrict the death penalty,547 spurred U.S. advocates, including those 
in the NAACP LDF’s Capital Defense Project, to create networks 
with international human rights groups and European abolitionists.548 
Beginning in the 1980s, advocates mounted a campaign to challenge 
the juvenile death penalty that combined human rights advocacy, 
organizing, and traditional litigation. At the Inter-American 
Commission, lawyers brought a series of petitions challenging U.S. 
juvenile death penalty practice,549 all of which resulted in findings that 
the United States violated the right to life set forth in the American 
Declaration.550 This Commission litigation complemented human 
rights organizing against the juvenile death penalty, coordinated 
primarily by the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,551 
which worked to build political support at the UN level by providing 
testimony and materials to UN monitoring bodies.552 In the United 
 
 546. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that a study showing racial 
disparity in Georgia’s capital sentencing system was insufficient to prove that a black 
defendant’s death sentence violated the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments in the absence of 
evidence of arbitrariness or discriminatory purpose). 
 547. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death 
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1130 (2002). 
 548. Telephone Interview with Steven Hawkins, Former Dir. of the Nat’l Coal. to Abolish 
the Death Penalty, Program Officer, JEHT Found. (Dec. 1–2, 2005). 
 549. The first such case was in 1985, brought by the ACLU, International Human Rights 
Law Group, and Amnesty International on behalf of death row inmates in South Carolina and 
Texas. See Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 3/87, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (filed Dec. 4, 1985). On the evolution of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights’s death penalty jurisprudence, see generally Brian D. 
Tittemore, The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Inter-
American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development and Implementation of 
International Human Rights Protections, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 445 (2004). 
 550. Napoleon Beazley v. United States, Case 12.412, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 101/03, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003) (filed Feb. 19, 2002); Douglas Christopher Thomas v. 
United States, Case 12.240, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 100/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 
rev. 2 (2003) (filed Jan. 4, 2000); Gary T. Graham v. United States, Case 11.193, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., Rep. No. 97/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003) (filed Apr. 26, 1993); Michael 
Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 62/02, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002) (filed May 1, 2000). 
 551. The Coalition was led by Steven Hawkins, who came from the NAACP LDF’s Capital 
Defense Project. See Telephone Interview with Steven Hawkins, supra note 548. 
 552. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. On Human Rights, Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights: Written Statement Submitted by the National Coalition to Abolish 
the Death Penalty to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/NGO/275 (Mar. 
8, 2005). 
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States, the legal campaign culminated in Roper v. Simmons,553 in 
which the Supreme Court struck down the juvenile death penalty, 
referencing an amicus brief condemning the practice on international 
law grounds filed by Human Rights Advocates.554 
Current racial justice–human rights collaborations continue to 
target the death penalty, while asserting broader challenges to 
discrimination within the criminal justice system. For instance, 
American’s International Human Rights Clinic has provided trainings 
for the NAACP LDF and other groups on the application of human 
rights to the death penalty,555 while American clinic director Richard 
Wilson has worked with the NAACP LDF to expand its human rights 
advocacy in the criminal context, drafting a report on the use of 
human rights to combat racial profiling and counteract jury 
discrimination.556 The NAACP LDF and Human Rights Watch have 
asserted human rights strategies to improve prison conditions,557 while 
the ACLU Criminal Punishment Project and Amnesty International 
have both issued reports detailing the racially discriminatory 
administration of the U.S. death penalty.558 In addition, Global Rights 
has a new project on racial discrimination in the United States 
focused in part on “[f]ighting racism in the [U.S.] criminal justice 
system,” which has provided human rights trainings and sponsored 
conferences on antiracism advocacy.559 
 
 553. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 501 (2005). 
 554. Id. at 575–78. The NAACP LDF, with the ACLU and other groups, also submitted an 
amicus brief that focused on the domestic law issues. See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, id. (No. 03-633). 
 555. See Richard Wilson, International Law: A Breakthrough Year, NAACP Legal Defense 
& Education Fund Annual Training Conference, July 19–22, 2001 (on file with author). See 
generally Richard J. Wilson, Defending a Criminal Case with International Human Rights Law, 
24 CHAMPION 28 (2000). 
 556. See Telephone Interview with Richard Wilson, supra note 447. 
 557. In particular, the NAACP LDF and Human Rights Watch have protested the 
treatment of prisoners evacuated after Hurricane Katrina. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
News, Louisiana Detainee Abuse Requires Federal Probe/Prisoners Evacuated After Hurricane 
Describe Beatings by Officers, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=696. 
 558. See ACLU, Race and the Death Penalty, Feb. 26, 2003, http://www.aclu.org/capital/ 
unequal/10389pub20030226.html; Amnesty International, United States of America: Death by 
Discrimination—The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Apr. 24, 2003, http://web. 
amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510462003. 
 559. See Brochure, Global Rights, United States: Racial Discrimination in the U.S., 
available at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/GR_Fact_Sheet_US.pdf?docID=2604. 
Global Rights has also taken an international approach to supporting affirmative action. See 
GLOBAL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/AffirmativeAction_GlobalPerspective.pdf?docID=2
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Whereas racial justice advocates have struggled to define the 
appropriate relationship between civil rights and human rights, 
lawyers within the immigrant rights field have more readily embraced 
the human rights framework.560 This is a function of the distinctive 
features of immigrant rights advocacy: significant aspects of U.S. 
immigration law are based on international principles; the American 
doctrine of plenary power, which grants the U.S. government broad 
authority to exclude and deport immigrants, has erected high barriers 
to domestic legal challenges to U.S. immigration policy;561 and the 
growth of undocumented immigrants deprived of domestic political 
rights has pushed lawyers to look to alternative sources of law. The 
international foundations of immigration law have shaped advocacy 
around refugee issues,562 framed by the 1980 Refugee Act, which was 
drafted to align U.S. law with the UN Convention on the Status of 
Refugees.563 Major refugee cases since the 1980s have been litigated in 
part around the question of U.S. compliance with the UN 
Convention.564 
 
623; AMERICANS FOR A FAIR CHANCE & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, 
CALIFORNIA SHADOW REPORT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 25, 27 (2001), 
available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/pubs/CERD%20Shadow%20Reporting%20Final.pdf. 
 560. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The 
Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
589 (1995); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision: An 
International Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). 
 561. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Mark R. von 
Sternberg, The Plenary Power in a Human Rights Perspective, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 65, 68 
(2004) (describing the “reduced level of constitutional control” over immigration). 
 562. See Kevin Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for 
Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 654 (2004); see also Jacqueline Bhabba, 
Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 157–58 (2002); Inna Nazarova, Comment, Alienating “Human” from 
“Right”: U.S. and UK Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations Under International Human 
Rights Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1335, 1411–12 (2002). 
 563. Compare United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (amending the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees), with Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (conforming 
with 1967 UN Protocol). INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421–22, 427–28 (1984), discusses the 
conformity between 1980 Refugee Act and 1967 UN Protocol. 
 564. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187–88 (1993) (rejecting 
the argument that the UN Convention barred the president from interdicting and returning 
Haitian refugees); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–
41 (1987) (referencing the Convention in affirming the application of the asylum standard in the 
deportation context); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (referencing objection to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
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Barriers to domestic redress imposed by the breadth of 
governmental power over immigration have also led immigrant rights 
advocates to participate actively in international venues. The Inter-
American Commission has been the site of cases challenging Haitian 
and Cuban detention at Guantánamo,565 the deprivation of consular 
assistance to Mexican nationals on death row,566 and federal law 
mandating removal for criminal aliens.567 The legal vulnerability of 
migrant workers has also sparked efforts to bring human rights to 
bear, with groups like the National Network for Immigrant and 
Refugee Rights working at the UN level to report on the abuses of 
undocumented workers in the United States and promote efforts to 
gain ratification of the UN convention on migrant workers.568 
Border enforcement has become a central front in the battle over 
illegal immigration, with heightened barriers to entry measured by an 
increase in migrant deaths and smuggling.569 Because enforcement, 
 
Act‘s summary removal procedures on the ground that it violated international protections for 
refugees); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 551–54 (9th Cir. 1990) (referencing 
the United States’s obligations under the Convention in affirming a permanent injunction 
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service practice of requiring Salvadoran asylum 
seekers to sign voluntary departure agreements). See generally Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate 
of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2335 (1991). 
 565. Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States, Case 9903, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 51/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 (2001) (filed Apr. 10, 1987); Haitian Centre for Human 
Rights et al. v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997) (filed Oct. 1, 1990). 
 566. See Roberto Moreno Ramos v. United States, Case 12.430, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 1/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 (2005) (filed Nov. 4, 2002); Javier Suarez Medina v. 
United States, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 
(2005) (filed July 23, 2002); Cesar Fierro v. United States, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 99/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003) (filed July 21, 1994); Ramon 
Martinez Villareal v. United States, Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/02, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002) (filed May 16, 1997). Sandra Babcock, who filed 
Suarez Medina’s petition, played an important role in Mexican death penalty cases as the 
director of the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program, a group funded in 2000 by the 
Mexican government to defend Mexican nationals on death row. See Beth Hawkins, Blows 
Against the Death Penalty, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN), June 9, 2004, available at 
http://citypages.com/databank/25/1227/article12185.asp. 
 567. Mario Lares-Reyes et al. v. United States, Petition 12.379, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep, No. 
19/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002) (filed Nov. 21, 2000) (holding that the case was 
inadmissible because petitioners failed to exhaust domestic remedies). 
 568. See Telephone Interview with Eunice Cho, Educ. Program Coordinator / BRIDGE 
Project Coordinator, Nat’l Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (Nov. 15, 2005). 
 569. See MASSEY, DURAND & MALONE, supra note 37, at 113–14; Kevin R. Johnson, Open 
Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 221 (2003); Guillermo Alonso Meneses, Human Rights and 
Undocumented Migration Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 UCLA L. REV. 267, 268 (2003). 
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which involves a core exercise of the government’s plenary power, is 
not susceptible to domestic legal challenge,570 lawyers have turned to 
the human rights system in an effort to bring international attention 
to the border crisis. At the supranational level, there have been two 
Inter-American petitions: one by the ACLU and California Rural 
Legal Assistance that challenged the implementation of Operation 
Gatekeeper on the ground that it diverted immigration to dangerous 
passageways and thus increased migrant deaths,571 and a more recent 
petition by the Border Action Network condemning the United 
States for not prosecuting Minutemen vigilantes.572 The ACLU has 
also reported to the UN on the human costs of enforcement,573 while 
Amnesty International has engaged in efforts to document the 
“humanitarian crisis” at the border.574 In addition, at the grassroots 
level, a trio of programs has been launched—the Border Action 
Network in Arizona,575 the U.S.-México Border Program of the 
American Friends Service Committee in San Diego,576 and the Border 
Network for Human Rights in Texas and New Mexico577—that focus 
on human rights documentation,578 reporting,579 and organizing to 
reform border practices. 
 
 570. There are, however, efforts by organizations to seek legal redress of immigrant abuse 
by Border Patrol officers. See Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc., Border Issues, 
http://www.trla.org/teams/border.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); Brennan Ctr. Legal Servs.  
E-lert, U.S. Citizen Represented by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid Settles Civil Assault Suit 
Against U.S. Border Patrol Officer Based on Incident While Crossing U.S.–Mexico Border, 
Sept. 8, 2006 (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 571. See Victor Nicolas Sanchez et al. v. United States, Petition 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Rep. No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 (2005). The ACLU and California Rural Legal 
Assistance also raised the issue to the UN Commission on Human Rights. See Press Release, 
ACLU, Rights Group Ask United Nations Panel to Investigate Migrant Deaths at U.S. Border 
(Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/temp/pr1999/13560prs19990414.html. 
 572. See Border Action Network, News: Human Rights Petition Calling for End to Vigilante 
Activities Proceeds, http://www.borderaction.org/news2.php?articleID=49 (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 573. See ACLU, DIMMING THE BEACON OF FREEDOM: U.S. VIOLATIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 8 (2006). 
 574. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONCERNS IN THE BORDER REGION WITH MEXICO (1998), available at http://web.amnesty. 
org/library/Index/engAMR510031998. 
 575. See Border Action Network, Campaigns: Border Militarization Project, http://www. 
borderaction.org/campaigns2.php?articleID=5 (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
 576. See Telephone Interview with Pedro Rios, Project Voice Program Coordinator, Am. 
Friends Serv. Comm. (July 25, 2006). 
 577. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 64. 
 578. In one example, the U.S.-México Border Program collaborated with the ACLU in 
producing a video documenting vigilantism on the border. See WITNESS, Video: Rights on the 
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Within the fields of Native American and women’s advocacy, 
human rights efforts have similarly advanced against the backdrop of 
domestic constraints and international opportunities. Native 
American legal groups have responded to the steep barriers to 
challenging U.S. power over native lands under federal law580 by 
pragmatically pursuing international efforts to protect land and 
promote self-determination.581 The Indian Law Resource Center, for 
example, has defended land rights before the UN and Inter-American 
Commission,582 and provided human rights training to indigenous 
leaders in the United States.583 The Indian Law Resource Center and 
the Native American Rights Fund have also entered coalitions with 
indigenous groups around the globe to promote international 
agreements that would provide stronger indigenous rights to ancestral 
lands; affirm a broad sphere of political, cultural, and economic 
autonomy; and promote greater indigenous political participation.584 
 
Line: Vigilantes at the Border, http://www.witness.org/index.php?option=com_rightsalert& 
Itemid=178&task=view&alert_id=43 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 579. The Border Network for Human Rights filed a shadow report with the Human Rights 
Committee on U.S. compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
See BORDER NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, “BEHIND EVERY ABUSE IS A COMMUNITY”: 
U.S./MEXICO BORDER REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
REGARDING THE UNITED STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1 (2006) [hereinafter BORDER NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS], 
available at http://www.borderaction.org/PDFs/BNHR_Report_to_HRC.pdf. 
 580. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2003) (examining doctrines of discovery, plenary power, and 
trusteeship). 
 581. See ROBERT T. COULTER, USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS TO 
PROMOTE AND PROTECT RIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIONS AND TRIBES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2002). 
 582. See Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002) (filed Apr. 2, 1993) (holding, in a case 
brought by the Indian Law Resource Center on behalf of Western Shoshone in Nevada, that the 
United States had denied the petitioners’ rights to ancestral property through unfair procedures 
in the Indian Claims Commission); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Subcomm. on the 
Promotion & Prot. of Hum. Rts., Written Statement Submitted by the Indian Law Resource 
Centre, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/21 (Aug. 7, 2000). 
 583. See Indian Law Resource Center, Human Rights Training for Indian Leaders in the 
United States, http://www.indianlaw.org/main/projects/ihr/hrt/northamerica (last visited Feb. 29, 
2008). 
 584. See Organization of American States, Draft American Declaration of the Indigenous 
Peoples, Sept. 18, 1995, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 pmbl. (1995); U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Draft 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994); see also Indian Law Resource Center, American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.indianlaw.org/main/projects/ 
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Within the women’s rights field, frustration with the 
incrementalism of domestic antidiscrimination litigation and the 
defensive posture of reproductive rights,585 combined with a sense of 
excitement about the dynamism of international activity (culminating 
in the 1995 UN World Conference in Beijing) to spur efforts to bring 
human rights home.586 In the late 1990s, NOW LDF took the lead in 
championing domestic human rights, drafting human rights amicus 
briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court in support of affirmative action and 
the Violence Against Women Act,587 while advocating for local 
CEDAW implementation. Other women’s rights organizations have 
become actively involved in the domestic human rights movement, 
testifying before governmental bodies on the value of human rights,588 
advocating for the expansion of reproductive rights in the UN 
system,589 and challenging U.S. domestic violence laws in the Inter-
American Commission.590 
 
ihr/oas (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (discussing progress in negotiating the declaration); Native 
American Rights Fund, Current Cases & Projects: OAS Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.narf.org/cases/oas.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2007); Native 
American Rights Fund, Current Cases & Projects: U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.narf.org/cases/un.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2007). The UN 
Declaration was passed in 2006 by the Human Rights Council after more than a decade of 
advocacy. See Valerie Taliman, U.N. Human Rights Council Adopts Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 5, 2006. 
 585. See Schneider, supra note 359, at 704–06. 
 586. See Rhonda Copeland, Introduction: Bringing Beijing Home, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
599, 600 (1996). 
 587. See Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) 
(raising human rights arguments in support of affirmative action); Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf 
of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (raising human rights standards in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in support of the Violence Against Women 
Act). Martha Davis, who was the main lawyer at NOW LDF behind the human rights campaign, 
joined at the faculty at Northeastern University School of Law, where she continues to work on 
domestic human rights issues. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State 
Constitutions and International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 359 
(2006). 
 588. See Schneider, supra note 359, at 711 (noting the work of CUNY’s International 
Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic). 
 589. See THE CTR. FOR REPROD. L. & POLICY & U. OF TORONTO INT’L PROGRAMME ON 
REPROD. & SEXUAL HEALTH L., BRINGING RIGHTS TO BEAR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORK OF 
UN TREATY MONITORING BODIES ON REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS 17 (2002), 
available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub_bo_tmb_full.pdf. 
 590. See Press Release, Mother of Slain Children Takes Case to International Tribunal 
(Dec. 27, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/23228prs20051227.html 
(describing an ACLU petition with the Inter-American Commission challenging the Supreme 
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In the civil liberties arena, it was 9/11 that provided the catalyst 
for the surging interest in human rights.591 CCR and the ACLU have 
been the main players in this domain, coordinating domestic litigation 
and international advocacy around two dimensions of U.S. War on 
Terror policy: detention and torture. With respect to detention, U.S. 
groups have deployed human rights in diverse venues as a way of 
generating multiple points of pressure on U.S. decisionmakers. CCR’s 
strategy on the Guantánamo detentions, for instance, has included 
filing a petition to the Inter-American Commission to determine the 
legal status of the detainees,592 representing petitioners in the two 
major Supreme Court cases on the detainees’ right to habeas 
corpus,593 and filing an amicus brief in support of the Supreme Court’s 
decision to strike down military commissions in part based on their 
inconsistency with U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions.594 
On the detention issue, the ACLU has pushed human rights in 
several venues: it submitted Supreme Court amicus briefs raising 
human rights issues that challenged the application of enemy 
combatant status to U.S. citizens,595 filed a federal lawsuit with 
international claims contesting secret renditions,596 and called for 
 
Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), which refused to 
recognize a domestic violence victim’s civil rights claim against a local town for failing to 
enforce a restraining order). 
 591. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005); 
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: HOW CHANGES TO U.S. 
LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2003). 
 592. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 16. In 2007, CCR, in 
conjunction with American’s International Human Rights Clinic, also filed a submission to the 
Inter-American Commission “condemning the U.S. government’s appalling response to the 
deaths of three Guantánamo detainees” in 2006. See Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR 
Files Submission to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Condemning US 
Government Response to 3 Deaths at Guantanamo, http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-
releases/ccr-files-submission-inter-american-commission-human-rights-condemning-us-go (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 593. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Al Odah v. United States, Synopsis, http://ccrjustice.org/ 
ourcases/current-cases/al-odah-v.-united-states (last visited Feb. 24 2008) (discussing CCR’s role 
in Rasul v. Bush, which in 2004 upheld federal court jurisdiction to review detainees’ habeas 
petitions, and Al Odah v. United States, which in 2007 challenged the subsequent legislative 
repeal of judicial review of detainee habeas claims under the Military Commissions Act of 
2006). 
 594. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (amicus), http://ccrjustice.org/ 
ourcases/past-cases/hamdan-v.-rumsfeld-(amicus) (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
 595. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 
(2004). 
 596. See US Civil Rights Group to Sue CIA, BBC NEWS, Dec. 3, 2005, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/americas/4494246.stm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
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international action on post-9/11 detentions and secret renditions 
through appearances before the UN.597 The ACLU has also brought 
human rights to bear in challenging torture, partnering with Human 
Rights First in a lawsuit against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for 
his alleged role in authorizing torture as an interrogation tactic in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.598 
b. Economic and Social Rights.  While the security context 
highlights the deployment of human rights strategies to restrain the 
expansion of federal power into the sphere of individual liberty, 
advocates have also used human rights as a tool to resist the 
diminution of federal power in the areas of social welfare and 
economic regulation. Yet, in contrast to the civil and political rights 
domain, advocacy efforts to promote economic and social rights have 
been more limited in scope, reflecting their weaker tradition within 
U.S. law,599 as well as the funding preferences of major foundations. 
Human rights advocacy around social welfare issues has centered 
on welfare reform and housing.600 The major welfare reform effort 
was spearheaded by a coalition of groups that included CCR, 
CUNY’s International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights,601 which came together in 
support of the grassroots Poor People’s Economic Human Rights 
 
 597. See Ann Beeson & Paul Hoffman, supra note 469, at 1; Letter from Steven Watt & Ben 
Wizner, ACLU, to Stephen J. Toope, Chairman-Rapporteur, Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances, Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights (Mar. 30, 2006) (on 
file with author) (arguing that the U.S. practice of rendition violates international human rights 
law); see also ACLU & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 1–5 (2005), available 
at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf (arguing that the United States’s use of the 
material witness law to indefinitely detain terror suspects violates international human rights 
law and domestic constitutional law). 
 598. See Press Release, ACLU and Human Rights First Sue Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
over U.S. Torture Policies (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/ 
17594prs20050301.html. 
 599. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
699, 711–12 (1969); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 1–5 (2004). 
 600. Human rights strategies are also being explored in the education context. See Janet M. 
Hostetler, Testing Human Rights: The Impact of High-Stakes Tests on English Language 
Learners’ Right to Education in New York City, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 483 (2006). 
 601. In 2004, the National Economic and Social Rights Initiative was spun off from the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights and has since focused on network building and domestic 
human rights trainings. See Telephone Interview with Catherine Albisa, Executive Dir., Nat’l 
Econ. and Social Rights Initiative (Nov. 9, 2005). 
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Campaign to file a petition in the Inter-American Commission 
challenging the termination of benefits under welfare reform.602 In the 
area of housing, the National Law Center on Homelessness & 
Poverty has led a coalition of homelessness groups into the 
international arena, where it has been actively involved in crafting 
UN declarations on the right to housing, building networks around 
human rights issues, conducting research on human rights litigation 
strategies,603 advocating local right-to-housing ordinances, and 
sponsoring a number of symposia.604 
The application of international human rights in the 
environmental context has been used to advance the dual goals of 
traditional environmentalism, focused on conserving natural 
resources, and environmental justice, which emphasizes the 
discriminatory impact of locating environmental hazards in 
communities of color.605 With respect to conservation, environmental 
groups have promoted the human right to a healthy environment at 
the supranational level, primarily through advocacy in the UN and 
Inter-American systems. Earthjustice has been the leading group in 
the UN effort, documenting cases that stress environmental abuse, 
submitting annual reports to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights,606 and spearheading efforts to pass a Declaration of Human 
 
 602. The petition is under revision for resubmission. See Ctr. for Soc. and Econ. Rights, 
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, http://cesr.org/node/361? 
PHPSESSID=d14496f981b2d559e03e763b1c6186c2 (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). On the Poor 
People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign, see FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 54–56 
(describing the Campaign’s additional human rights work, which included submitting a proposal 
to the state assembly on how human rights could be incorporated into Pennsylvania law and 
organizing marches and “Freedom Bus Tours” to highlight human rights abuses among those 
cut off welfare). 
 603. See generally NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, U.S. FEDERAL AND 
STATE CASE LAW ASSERTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (2005), 
available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/US%20Case%20Law.pdf. 
 604. For a description of the human rights efforts of housing advocates, see Foscarinis, supra 
note 412, at 450–54; Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated 
Strategy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 342–54 (2000); Maria Foscarinis, Brad Paul, Bruce 
Porter & Andrew Scherer, The Human Right to Housing: Making the Case in U.S. Advocacy, 38 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97 (2004); Telephone Interview with Maria Foscarinis, Executive Dir., 
Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty (Oct. 27, 2005). 
 605. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 16 (2001). 
 606. See EARTHJUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 1 (2005), available at http://www.edo.org.au/edoact/submissions/Earthjustice_ 
2005EnvironmentalRightsReport.pdf; Telephone Interview with Martin Wagner, supra note 
299. 
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Rights and the Environment.607 The Center on International 
Environmental Law, in turn, has pressed for the passage of a similar 
Inter-American resolution.608 
At the grassroots level, environmental justice advocates have 
made limited use of the human rights framework to advance specific 
domestic campaigns, with Earthjustice again playing a key role. In 
one high-profile example, Earthjustice successfully applied 
international strategies in the wake of a failed domestic lawsuit 
against Shell requesting that it relocate Louisiana “Cancer Alley” 
residents next to a Shell Oil refinery and chemical plant.609 After a 
U.S. court ruled that the chemical plant posed no health risk, 
Earthjustice lawyers took the case to international venues: they 
testified in front of the UN Commission on Human Rights and met 
with the UN Special Rapporteur investigating illegal dumping of toxic 
materials, generating international attention that influenced Shell to 
settle the case on favorable terms in 2002.610 This human rights victory 
prompted one Earthjustice attorney involved in the Cancer Alley 
campaign to spin off a new organization, Advocates for 
Environmental Human Rights, which filed a 2005 Inter-American 
Commission petition on behalf of an African-American community in 
New Orleans challenging the approval of nearby toxic industrial 
operations on human rights grounds.611 
 
 607. For the Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, see U.N. Econ. & 
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the 
Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment, 74, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994) (prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini). 
 608. See CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, supra note 312, at 28. Earthjustice has also been 
active in the Inter-American Commission, where it has brought a petition against the United 
States protesting its failure to take effective steps against greenhouse gas emissions. See Press 
Release, Earthjustice, Inuit Human Rights Petition Filed over Climate Change (Dec. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/005/inuit-human-rights-petition-filed-over-
climate-change.html. 
 609. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 92–94. 
 610. See id. at 95–97. 
 611. See Press Release, Common Dreams, African Americans Sue U.S. for Environmental 
Human Rights Abuses (Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/ 
0303-02.htm. Advocates for Environmental Human Rights also participated in a special session 
on Hurricane Katrina in connection with the UN Human Rights Committee’s hearings on U.S. 
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See E-mail from 
Monique Harden, Co-Dir. and Attorney, Advocates for Envtl. Human Rights, to Scott L. 
Cummings (July 16, 2006). 
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On the labor front, there have been a number of efforts to 
advance the notion that “workers’ rights are human rights,”612 
primarily by raising the issue of immigrant labor abuse in 
international venues.613 Within the UN, for instance, groups have 
raised concerns about the U.S. treatment of migrant workers to the 
Commission on Human Rights.614 In response to a broad-based 
campaign on immigrant labor rights after Hoffman Plastics, the Inter-
American Commission held a general interest hearing to examine the 
United States’s ongoing noncompliance with human rights laws.615 
The hearing, which took place in 2005, was designed as part of a 
general strategy to exert continuing public pressure on the United 
States to revisit its treatment of undocumented workers. The hearing 
was also used to advance a prominent grassroots labor campaign by 
the Coalition of Immokalee Workers in Florida, which had launched 
a boycott of Taco Bell for its practice of negotiating bulk discounts 
from suppliers, which the Coalition charged caused the suppliers to 
commit labor abuses against immigrant workers.616 Within two weeks 
 
 612. See American Rights at Work, Human Rights Scholars and Advocates Support Human 
Rights for Workers in the United States, http://www.rightsatwork.org/humanrights/signon. 
cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); see also Rebecca Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights 
as an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker Communities, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 285 (2007). 
 613. There have also been limited efforts by U.S. lawyers to advance worker claims in the 
UN’s International Labour Organization through its procedure for submitting complaints on the 
infringement of the right to freedom of association by member states. In one example, 
American’s International Human Rights Clinic filed a 2004 International Labour Organization 
complaint on behalf of workers in an Alcoa subsidiary in Piedras Negras, which elicited a strong 
rebuke of the Mexican government for deficiencies in its system of labor certification. See 
COMM. ON FREEDOM OF ASS’N, INT’L LABOUR ORG., CASE NO. 2393, REPORT NO. 340, at 
paras. 1033, 1056 (July 29, 2004). 
 614. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Specific 
Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers, ¶¶ 4–6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/NGO/87 (Feb. 28, 
2006) (submitted by Human Rights Advocates); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Specific 
Human Rights Issues: Contemporary Forms of Slavery, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/ 
NGO/23 (July 15, 2005) (submitted by the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human 
Rights). 
 615. The American International Human Rights Clinic coordinated this campaign on behalf 
of a long list of human rights and immigrant rights groups. See EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ARE 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 450, at 5–10. 
 616. See Coal. of Immokalee Workers, About CIW, http://www.ciw-online.org/about.html 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
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of the Coalition’s testimony in front of the Commission,617 Taco Bell’s 
parent company settled the boycott, agreeing to increase payment for 
tomatoes—to be passed on as a wage increase for workers—and to 
impose a supplier code of conduct respecting labor rights.618 
As these campaigns reach for international authority to achieve 
domestic results, they highlight the gap that separates the 
contemporary domestic human rights movement from public interest 
law in its initial phase. Whereas early public interest law sought to 
enlist the federal government as a liberal ally in combating 
discriminatory state practice and regulating private business, domestic 
human rights has emerged as a vehicle for contesting the now 
conservative centers of federal power by turning to human rights 
institutions as a potentially progressive alternative. In this sense, the 
field of domestic human rights is an expression of public interest law’s 
resilience—a reinterpretation of goals and strategies in the face of 
political realignment. But by the same token, it is also a reflection of 
the relative weakness of public interest law, unable to fully achieve its 
aims through the domestic channels that it pioneered four decades 
ago. 
III.  AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF TRANSNATIONAL 
JUSTICE: AN INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
The dominant account of public interest law in the United States 
has depicted lawyers for the disenfranchised as part of an elite 
vanguard who use domestic courts to redefine the legal foundations 
of American democracy to promote a liberal conception of individual 
rights and equality.619 Though this account of public interest lawyering 
has always been a partial one, it has nonetheless shaped debates 
about the appropriate objectives of legal advocacy in a democratic 
society, the desirability of litigation strategies versus political 
mobilization, and the role of legal professionals as social change 
actors. Globalization alters the terrain of these fundamental debates 
by enlarging the scale of advocacy in ways that present a mixed 
picture for public interest lawyers: exposing the geographic scope of 
 
 617. See MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE COALITION OF IMMOKALEE 
WORKERS BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 1–14 (2005), available at http://www. 
rfkmemorial.org/human_rights/2003_CIW/OASSubmissionBackCIW.pdf. 
 618. See Eric Schlosser, A Side Order of Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A23. 
 619. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and 
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 949–50 (2007). 
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social injustice but also the potential for transnational social change, 
revealing the limits of the domestic legal system but also the 
possibilities for transnational legal mobilization, and highlighting the 
risks of professional engagement in global social struggle but also 
suggesting its transformative power. This Part provides a preliminary 
framework for understanding the role of public interest lawyers as 
agents of transnational justice, examining the goals they pursue, the 
tactics they deploy, and the professional roles they assume in the 
contemporary global context. 
A. Goals 
Because the quest to influence governmental power has been the 
core mission of American public interest law, the impact of 
globalization on public interest goals can be understood in relation to 
the reconfiguration of governmental authority.620 On the one hand, 
global change has weakened the federal government’s role in 
domestic regulation by empowering transnational corporate actors 
and authorizing international financial institutions to dictate rules 
from above. In the face of declining federal authority, public interest 
law seeks to activate alternative sources of power, reinforcing systems 
of market regulation while promoting the mobilization of activist 
networks to widen the scope of citizen participation in global 
governance. Yet globalization does not simply siphon power away 
from the central government. To the contrary, in a global 
environment where the United States is the sole superpower, 
increasing interdependence serves to magnify the importance of 
federal decisionmaking, particularly with respect to core foreign 
policy issues: defining immigrant eligibility, policing territorial 
borders, and protecting against security threats. In this context, the 
federal government remains an important target of public interest 
advocacy, though the goal becomes mounting legal resistance to its 
abuses. 
1. Regulation.  Market integration has pulled the regulatory 
project of public interest law into the international domain, where it 
seeks to set the economic rules of the game for economically mobile 
capital and labor. Outside of U.S. borders, advocacy has been 
directed toward the extension of transnational regulatory regimes to 
 
 620. See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 10, at 4. 
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govern market transactions that escape federal control. Thus, public 
interest lawyers have become involved in the design and 
implementation of regulatory mechanisms that radiate into the global 
marketplace in pursuit of transnational corporations. Because of the 
heterogeneity of legal hooks for transnational regulation, this 
objective has been pursued within multiple arenas:621 U.S. courts 
(ATS corporate litigation), international trade venues (the WTO 
dispute resolution and NAFTA side agreement systems), developing 
countries (rule-of-law reform efforts), the human rights system (the 
International Labour Organization and UN), and the media (codes of 
conduct). 
Inside the United States, the influence of free market policies on 
the domestic economy has also impacted how public interest lawyers 
articulate and advance the cause of market regulation at home. In the 
face of the movement toward greater labor flexibility, especially in 
the service sector, public interest lawyers have focused on promoting 
the enforcement of basic employment rights for low-wage workers, 
particularly immigrants, who often labor under contingent 
arrangements or in the underground economy where the risk of 
economic exploitation is significant. The rise of the immigrant 
workers’ rights movement signals the growing importance of this 
domestic regulatory agenda, which combines traditional litigation 
with worker center–led grassroots organizing and the strategic use of 
international mechanisms, such as NAFTA’s side labor process, to 
advance systematic labor rights enforcement campaigns. 
The impulse to “re-regulate” can also be seen in efforts to apply 
an economic and social rights framework to respond to the needs of 
low-income people outside the workforce—visible in the human 
rights challenges to welfare reform and homelessness—and in the 
movement to internationalize environmental justice advocacy to 
block corporations from concentrating environmental harms in poor 
communities of color. Economic and social rights strategies around 
safety net and environmental issues highlight how global engagement 
can operate both to complement and redefine domestic public 
interest objectives by articulating the market-based harms of 
deregulation in the language of human rights as a way to bring 
international pressure to bear. 
 
 621. Cf. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global 
Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 104–26 (1999) (describing the range of 
efforts to promote transnational regulation to protect labor standards). 
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2. Participation.  The classical objective of public interest law is 
to remedy the deficiencies of majoritarian democracy by opening 
political institutions to participation by “underrepresented” social 
groups.622 Globalization reframes the goal of participation by 
channeling it into attempts to correct the “democracy deficit” in 
international institutions.623 
Within international financial institutions and multilateral trade 
systems, while the stakes of participation are high, the processes are 
difficult to penetrate. The best opportunity for political intervention 
is at the stage of formulating international agreements, when U.S. 
advocates can attempt to influence domestic decisionmakers 
designing the basic terms of the deal. Once the agreements are 
finalized, the options for intervention are diminished. Overall, public 
interest groups have been hampered in the negotiation phase by their 
relative political weakness, while legal intervention to open trade 
negotiations to public participation has produced limited results: 
while Earthjustice is still challenging the exclusion of public interest 
groups from USTR trade policy discussions, the ILRF failed in its 
earlier effort to enforce labor conditionality, while Public Citizen lost 
its bid to force the environmental review of trade agreements.624 
Against this backdrop, public interest groups have pressed for 
greater participation within already established international trade 
and finance systems, but the record thus far suggests that the 
achievement of formal participation rights within international bodies 
has not been matched by significant power to influence substantive 
policy. At the regional level, public interest organizations won a 
notable victory in the creation of quasi-legal review processes under 
NAFTA; after a decade of using the side agreements to promote 
labor and environmental rights on both sides of the U.S.-México 
border, however, advocates have discounted the system as a means to 
advance systemic reform.625 A parallel NGO-led movement to open 
the World Bank procedures for administering development assistance 
in the 1990s succeeded in creating an independent review system; yet 
 
 622. See HANDLER, supra note 29, at 192. 
 623. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION 
THROUGH LAW REFORM 75 (2004). 
 624. See Jose A. Egurbide, Stop Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: Safeguarding Sustainable 
Development Through the Application of NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement to 
International Trade Agreements, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1089, 1137–41 (1995) (describing the failure of 
Public Citizen’s lawsuit to force environmental review of NAFTA). 
 625. See supra Part II.B.1.a–b. 
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political pressure and the absence of legal enforcement powers has 
meant that the Inspection Panel’s role has been largely confined to 
raising the public visibility of community displacement and 
environmental harm caused by Bank-sponsored projects.626 Similarly, 
though a campaign at the WTO in the late 1990s won the right to file 
public interest amicus briefs before dispute resolutions panels, panel 
discretion to consider the briefs has emptied the right of meaningful 
political content. A handful of domestic groups have nonetheless 
consistently monitored WTO proceedings in an effort to demand 
greater citizen participation and public accountability, but their 
presence only highlights their marginal status: although legal groups 
like Public Citizen and the Center for International Environmental 
Law offer hard-hitting critiques of the WTO’s lack of transparency, 
they can do nothing to engage in rulemaking directly.627 
Lawyers have had greater success penetrating international 
human rights institutions, which are specifically designed as a check 
on governmental abuse and thus rely on active NGO participation for 
legitimacy. U.S.-based public interest groups have become 
increasingly involved in the UN system since the mid-1990s, with 
more organizations gaining consultative status, actively attending UN 
meetings, providing testimony, and submitting shadow reports.628 In 
addition, U.S. groups have turned to the Inter-American system with 
greater frequency, not just to file petitions,629 but also to participate in 
discussions on human rights standard setting, as seen in the wide 
participation by public interest groups in the Inter-American 
Commission hearing on workplace abuse after Hoffman Plastics.630 
The relatively strong public interest engagement in the UN and Inter-
American human rights systems underscores the asymmetrical 
opportunities for participation within international bodies: NGOs are 
able to operate with greater authority under the progressive mandate 
of international political governance, but are still marginalized by the 
free market imperative of international economic governance. 
3. Resistance.  While international institutions have become 
targets in the movement to expand citizen participation in global 
 
 626. See supra notes 366–74 and accompanying text. 
 627. See supra notes 305–11 and accompanying text. 
 628. See supra notes 515–18 and accompanying text. 
 629. See supra notes 524–37 and accompanying text. 
 630. See EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 450, at 5–10. 
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governance, they have also become sites for engaging in domestic 
political struggles over the meaning of legal rights for less powerful 
groups at home. Though public interest lawyers have long used law to 
check federal power, and continue to turn to federal courts to 
advance their causes, the shift toward conservative control of the 
federal government has realigned political incentives, increasing the 
threat of federal decisionmaking to liberal causes and reducing the 
benefits of federal advocacy for liberal lawyers. From the perspective 
of liberal public interest groups, the federal government has thus 
been transformed over the past twenty-five years from ally to 
opponent, operating to unravel basic legal protections—while the 
human rights system has emerged as the new standard bearer of legal 
progressivism. In response to this new configuration of power, the 
U.S. public interest law movement has shifted emphasis in the post-
civil rights era: moving away from enlisting federal power to protect 
domestic rights toward resisting federal power through the application 
of international human rights. One can view this effort to constrain 
federal power through human rights spatially as a project of applying 
vertical pressure, invoking the power of supranational institutions 
from above and the energy of grassroots action from below. 
The goal of constraining federal power has placed public interest 
lawyers in different advocacy positions with respect to domestic and 
foreign policy. On the domestic social policy front, the aim has been 
to deploy human rights to reinforce what liberal lawyers view as the 
crumbling edifice of federal civil rights and social welfare protection. 
This has involved both the defensive application of human rights in 
an attempt to preserve protections associated with the high water 
marks of the Civil Rights Movement and New Deal, as well as the 
offensive use of human rights to promote liberal causes with a weaker 
foundation in American law. In response to civil rights and social 
welfare retrenchment, lawyers have thus promoted countervailing 
human rights strategies in U.S. courts, the UN, and the Inter-
American Commission to fortify defendant rights in the criminal 
justice system, provide a bulwark for affirmative action, resist the 
erosion of reproductive rights, and contest the enactment of welfare 
reform. At the local level, women’s rights and racial justice groups 
have attempted to implement human rights treaties from the bottom 
up, championing the passage of human rights ordinances that require 
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municipal governments to review employment practices and take 
affirmative measures to prevent racial and gender discrimination.631 
In addition to stemming domestic legal backsliding, lawyers have 
in limited cases deployed human rights to proactively build support 
for historically disfavored domestic causes. The movement against the 
juvenile death penalty, which combined domestic litigation with 
advocacy in the UN and Inter-American Commission, was able to 
leverage international pressure by highlighting the wide distance 
between U.S. practice and international norms on the administration 
of justice.632 Other efforts have proven less successful, such as the 
campaign to strengthen the right to indigenous control over ancestral 
lands waged by Native American organizations, which have been 
unable to translate support for international resolutions on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples into political power at home.633 Moving into the 
domain of economic and social rights, lawyers have—more 
tentatively—used human rights strategies to promote the extension of 
U.S. law well beyond historical baselines, advocating for the 
establishment of a human right to housing and a healthy environment 
at the UN, while using human rights norms to support right-to-
housing and environmental justice campaigns at the local level.634 
Although support for human rights strategies as a way to 
influence domestic social policy is building, there are conflicting views 
about its political desirability and little evidence of its political 
effectiveness. While the optimistic version of the movement to bring 
human rights home emphasizes the dynamic potential of integrating 
international human rights and domestic public interest law 
strategies, the pessimistic view sees the progressive turn toward 
human rights as the capstone achievement of domestic political 
conservatism, punctuating the demise of U.S. law as a progressive 
force for social change. The domestic human rights movement can 
claim important accomplishments: supportive human rights 
references in Supreme Court opinions, pronouncements from the UN 
and the Inter-American Commission on U.S. violations, and human 
rights ordinances adopted in progressive cities. But beyond this 
record, domestic human rights advocates at this stage have to be 
satisfied with nascent efforts at movement building, as well as 
 
 631. See supra notes 541–44 and accompanying text. 
 632. See supra notes 549–54 and accompanying text. 
 633. See supra notes 582–84 and accompanying text. 
 634. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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documentation and reporting strategies that have worked to generate 
pressure on politically weaker nations but have uncertain application 
to the United States, whose power can more easily allow it to deflect 
criticisms, opt out of human rights obligations, or attempt to 
restructure human rights institutions to its advantage. From this 
vantage point, investments in human rights strategies may be seen by 
liberal critics as a diversion from the more difficult long-term project 
of domestic political restructuring. 
The picture looks slightly different when the lens is trained on 
human rights advocacy around U.S. foreign policy, in which the goal 
is to impose standards on the exercise of executive power over 
noncitizens. Here, distinct patterns emerge with respect to the two 
main areas of concern: the regulation of immigration and the 
administration of national security. With respect to immigration, the 
story appears to be one of the increasing use—but declining 
effectiveness—of international law strategies. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
immigrant rights lawyers won important court victories in impact 
cases that sought to align domestic refugee law with international 
human rights standards. However, while advocates have increasingly 
turned to human rights as a resource for undocumented immigrants—
using the UN and Inter-American systems to dramatize abuses 
stemming from U.S. labor law and border enforcement practices—
there have been no policy achievements to match the human rights 
rhetoric. 
In contrast, public interest lawyers have been more successful in 
using the moral authority of human rights to mobilize international 
opposition to U.S. antiterrorism policies. Public interest groups have 
been able to effectively use human rights arguments to generate 
international censure of the harsh interrogation and indefinite 
detention of “enemy combatants” in the War on Terror precisely 
because such conduct is seen as contravening fundamental civil and 
political rights that enjoy strong international support—freedom from 
torture, access to counsel, and access to courts. To maximize 
international pressure, CCR and the ACLU have deftly combined 
international and domestic strategies, bringing human rights 
violations to the UN and Inter-American systems, but also relying 
heavily on domestic litigation strategies to raise human rights claims 
against executive branch actors.635 
 
 635. See supra notes 591–98 and accompanying text. 
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The successful litigation efforts in the Guantánamo cases, in 
particular, have raised hopes for domestic human rights. They also 
suggest that the effectiveness of human rights strategies depends on 
the substantive area of their application and the venue through which 
they are interpreted. Whereas the application of human rights to 
affect social policy issues of purely domestic concern suffers from an 
inability to enlist strong international sympathy, the lever of human 
rights has greater potential when foreign policy issues are at stake, as 
these issues directly implicate the interests of the international 
community and are more likely to elicit stronger condemnations of 
U.S. practice. Traditional human rights methods of “naming and 
shaming” have more resonance when the question is one that either 
directly affects foreign nationals (immigration) or arouses 
international outrage in a way that complicates U.S. foreign policy 
objectives (the War on Terror). The experience of post-9/11 advocacy 
also indicates that human rights may have more impact when 
mediated through domestic bodies with institutional legitimacy. The 
Bush administration defied requests by the Inter-American 
Commission to revise the operation of the military tribunal system at 
Guantánamo, but promptly suspended the system in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision,636 suggesting that the 
power of human rights is contingent on the authority of the body 
invoking them. In the end, Hamdan did not guarantee human rights 
compliance by U.S. officials, who responded by gaining congressional 
authorization for the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which 
continued to allow the use of evidence obtained by torture and the 
exclusion of classified exculpatory evidence, while suspending federal 
jurisdiction to hear detainee habeas petitions.637 Nonetheless, the 
power of court orders to force governmental action—albeit 
deficient—suggests that resistance through human rights is 
strengthened through its association with traditional venues of legal 
authority. 
B. Tactics 
As the movement between litigation and nontraditional 
advocacy in the domestic human rights arena highlights, public 
 
 636. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 637. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Neil A. Lewis, President Signs New Rules to Prosecute 
Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A20. 
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interest law in the global age operates along a tactical continuum that 
ranges from traditional forms of adversarial legalism to more open-
ended and nontraditional methods, such as public relations campaigns 
and grassroots organizing. While public interest lawyers have long 
struggled with where to situate themselves along this continuum, 
globalization presents distinct trade-offs, altering the strategic value 
and applicability of different tactical options, multiplying the venues 
for legal engagement, and creating possibilities for new professional 
alliances. 
1. Pluralism.  The conventional critique of public interest law 
rests on two central claims. The first holds that, as a methodological 
matter, public interest law wrongly gives primacy to litigation as a 
social change tool, diverting resources from more effective forms of 
political action.638 The second holds that, as an ideological matter, 
public interest law is built on the false promise of legal rights, which 
operate both to legitimate the status quo and promote individualism 
at the expense of collective action.639 What emerges from a review of 
public interest lawyering in the international arena, however, is a 
portrait of practice in many ways at odds with these two critiques. 
First, this lawyering is not defined by a litigation-centric perspective; 
instead, litigation is generally viewed as part of a broader repertoire 
of advocacy techniques that lawyers bring to bear, often in 
complementary and politically sophisticated ways, to solve problems. 
Second, rights are viewed not as ends in themselves, but as a means to 
advance defined political objectives, deployed pragmatically to spur 
collective mobilization. 
In contrast to the traditional focus on litigation, lawyering in the 
international sphere readily incorporates nonlegal techniques—
organizing, policy advocacy, and publicity—to advance goals. The 
emphasis on multifaceted advocacy over narrow legal representation 
is a product of both strategic necessity and tactical innovation. To the 
degree that public interest lawyers find domestic courts inhospitable, 
alternative strategies are a must: as lawyers move into what they view 
 
 638. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 339 (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 6 (2d ed. 2004); Lobel, supra note 619, at 939. 
 639. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 LAW & POL’Y 5, 8–9 (1985); 
Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 413, 418 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on 
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1382–83 (1984). 
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as more receptive fora, such as the human rights system, traditional 
strategies do not apply with the same force, and nontraditional 
techniques, such as lobbying and reporting, are required. And even in 
contexts in which domestic courts are technically available, the 
perception of their limited effectiveness prompts lawyers to 
supplement legal with nonlegal strategies.640 An important example of 
this within the immigrant rights field is the emergence of worker 
centers that combine legal, organizing, and policy advocacy to 
respond to immigrant labor abuse, which advocates see as resistant to 
conventional rights enforcement strategies.641 The complex nature of 
transnational problems, which cut across multiple jurisdictional 
boundaries, also invites flexible responses. In the environmental 
context, in particular, the transnational scope of environmental harm 
causes lawyers to approach problems from the perspective of an 
advocacy campaign rather than a legal case. For instance, the 
NRDC’s international program reports that it operates in a 
“campaign mode” with lawyers taking on a particular cross-boundary 
environmental issue and pursuing it in different domestic and 
international venues with the goal of bringing multiple pressures to 
bear to achieve an outcome.642 
The current wave of international practice also challenges the 
claim that the pursuit of legal rights necessarily co-opts 
transformative political action. As the domestic human rights and 
immigrant rights movements highlight, lawyers are both sensitive to 
the potential political risks of rights strategies and skillful in 
deploying rights in flexible and pragmatic ways to leverage short-term 
policy gains and stimulate long-term political mobilization. Thus, 
rights are not simply viewed as claims to be invoked in court, but are 
also seen as resources to help frame policy demands and motivate 
grassroots action.643 
 
 640. Cf. FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 7 (stating that a changing domestic political 
environment “has made for increasingly layered advocacy strategies that simultaneously involve 
education, organizing, policy, legal and scholarly work at both the local and national level”). 
 641. See GORDON, supra note 11, at 202 (noting that “the combination of legal pressure and 
protest was often more effective than a lawsuit alone in settling cases”). 
 642. Telephone Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, supra note 361. 
 643. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (2004) (describing the evolution of an 
approach to public law litigation in which court intervention destabilizes the parties’ pre-existing 
litigation expectations in a way that opens up possibilities for new experimentalist collaboration 
to resolve difficult institutional problems). 
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At the international level, labor and environmental advocates 
have leveraged the influence of human rights venues to publicize 
grassroots demands and strengthen local organizing campaigns: the 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers won a favorable settlement of its 
forced labor claim against Taco Bell after testifying in front of the 
Inter-American Commission, and Earthjustice’s UN advocacy was 
credited with pressuring Shell to settle its long-standing dispute over 
relocating “Cancer Alley” residents in Louisiana.644 These efforts 
suggest that, although systemic human rights reform may be far off, 
the strategic use of international levers, when combined with 
sophisticated political campaigns, can produce concrete benefits. 
When lawyers are able to claim rights in U.S. courts, they do—
but not without an assessment of the political trade-offs. The use of 
the ATS provides one example. For CCR and the ACLU, litigation 
under the ATS has been part of a conscious strategy to expand the 
scope of human rights in U.S. courts on the theory that it offers an 
additional entry point for contesting governmental misconduct, 
particularly in the War on Terror, where government policy has been 
resistant to change through legislative channels. Lawyers have also 
used the ATS as part of broader strategies to contest corporate abuse 
that bring together legal and political action. For instance, 
Earthrights’ involvement in the Unocal case grew out of its founders’ 
deep engagement in local Burmese organizing against Unocal and 
was planned to strengthen local resistance.645 The use of the ATS in 
cases by undocumented domestic workers against their employers has 
also proceeded as part of a broader plan of political organizing. 
Particularly because domestic worker cases typically use the ATS to 
invoke human rights violations as an addendum to state and federal 
wage-and-hour claims, the goal is not necessarily to win on the merits, 
but to frame the problem of domestic work in terms that will generate 
public attention and mobilize political action.646 Along these lines, 
ATS advocates suggest that even when litigation does not create 
binding human rights precedent or produce clear monetary wins, it is 
still useful as a means to educate the public, mobilize grassroots 
campaigns, and forge human rights activist networks.647 
 
 644. See supra notes 609–10, 616–18 and accompanying text. 
 645. See Telephone Interview with Marco Simons, supra note 323. 
 646. See Wishnie, supra note 238, at 541. 
 647. See Van Schaack, supra note 329, at 2338–39. 
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This view resonates more broadly within the domestic human 
rights field, as advocates seek to deploy rights in ways that support 
direct and indirect political goals. For instance, the director of 
Columbia’s Bringing Human Rights Home project emphasizes the 
benefit of human rights to frame organizing campaigns, noting that 
human rights are useful to “change the dialogue about an issue or to 
create public pressure” and that it is often fruitful to think of human 
rights not as a trump card, but rather as “another arrow in the 
domestic quiver” and a “moral force for political organization.”648 
Similarly, the National Economic and Social Rights Initiative has 
been a leader in the use of human rights as an organizing tool, 
stressing the solidarity-building nature of human rights rhetoric, 
which it suggests cuts across more narrow identity categories and can 
therefore promote the formation of diverse coalitions.649 
Immigrant rights lawyers emphasize the potential of asserting 
rights in different venues for drawing publicity to their cause and 
stimulating grassroots activism among client groups. At the 
supranational level, advocates suggest that the ability of clients to 
enter into international venues like NAFTA to raise rights violations 
lends legitimacy to their causes that is psychologically satisfying and 
may provide a springboard for future activism.650 The human rights 
system, in general, is viewed as a useful framework for publicizing the 
gap between official rhetoric and action, compelling official 
justification for governmental conduct and raising the political costs 
of violations.651 At the grassroots level, immigrant worker advocates 
cite the rhetorical power of rights as a means of promoting group 
solidarity and cultivating worker consciousness of labor abuse.652 
Yet, while the pragmatic use of rights can complement political 
action and promote solidarity, it also has the potential to reinforce 
existing fault lines. Some proponents see human rights universality as 
a means of transcending the divisions and responding to the failures 
of U.S. “identity politics”—and thus opening a path toward building a 
 
 648. Telephone Interview with Cynthia Soohoo, supra note 478. 
 649. See National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, NESRI Commentary, http://www. 
nesri.org/human_rights_us/nesri_commentary.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007) (“The simple use 
of the term human rights instead of women’s or workers or prisoners or immigrant or sexuality 
rights, for example, elicits an understanding of rights as inherently the same for all people rather 
than as defined by this or that particular status.”). 
 650. See Telephone Interview with Michael Wishnie, supra note 240. 
 651. See id. 
 652. See GORDON, supra note 11, at 183–84. 
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politically viable progressive movement.653 This embrace of 
universality, however, raises familiar concerns of ethnocentrism: 
Whose universality is being proclaimed? And does universality 
suggest a retreat from a deep engagement with the persistent and 
differential experience of discrimination? Accordingly, those groups 
that have moved most forcefully into the human rights arenas—CCR 
and the ACLU—are ones that have never been identity-based. 
Lawyers at identity-based organizations, in contrast, have struggled 
more deeply over the importation of human rights, with the standard-
bearers of the U.S. civil rights movement, particularly the NAACP 
LDF, stepping with greater circumspection into the human rights 
domain. The reluctance to engage human rights is a matter of strategy 
as well as principle, with some advocates for identity-based groups 
fearful that the move toward human rights signals retreat from the 
cause of building strong domestic laws. And finally, despite attempts 
to merge the different strands of advocacy, the universality of human 
rights remains in tension with the particularity of immigrant rights, 
which calls for a recognition of difference rather than its submersion. 
Despite the innovative use of rights to activate mobilization, 
rights strategies continue to present their own political dilemmas. 
Human rights claims, like their domestic counterparts, remain 
vulnerable to the risk of state co-optation identified by rights critics. 
For instance, commentators have noted that although the United 
States promotes human rights as a core principle of its foreign policy 
abroad, it has vigorously resisted the application of human rights 
norms to governmental action in the War on Terror.654 Though this 
discrepancy has given activists room to pressure domestic human 
rights compliance through charges of hypocrisy, it also suggests that 
skillful use of the rhetoric of human rights can obscure 
inconsistencies. It is also the case that human rights, like domestic 
rights, are subject to political backlash. This can be seen in the 
growing hostility to the use of human rights in domestic courts and 
efforts at the supranational level to restructure aspects of the human 
rights system, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights, which 
have been sources of embarrassment to the United States.655 
 
 653. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 7. 
 654. See Hajjar, supra note 30, at 600. 
 655. See Warren Hoge, Officials at U.N. Seek Fast Action on Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES,  
Jan. 1, 2006, at A1, A10. 
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In addition, although efforts to use human rights to stimulate 
grassroots mobilization provide useful examples of marrying 
international strategies with local struggles, their scale may limit the 
challenge to global systems. One goal, to be sure, is to knit together 
the pieces of local mobilization into a broader tapestry of political 
resistance.656 Despite the increased attention that they have received, 
however, these efforts on the whole have been loosely coordinated 
and inadequately resourced, making them outmatched in their battles 
against corporate adversaries and government policymakers. At this 
stage, therefore, though transnational lawyering strategies seem less 
associated with litigation and more integrated into broader political 
struggle, they nevertheless face a set of globalized political constraints 
parallel to the domestic ones that challenged civil rights efforts to use 
law to bring about social change. 
2. Polycentrism.  Tactical decisions—how to advocate—are 
framed by locational decisions—where to advocate. It is often the case 
that a lack of alternative options dictates the locus of advocacy. Yet 
the move into different venues is not simply a matter of lawyers being 
pushed out of domestic fora. Instead, groups may choose to enter 
international venues out of an effort to influence international 
decisionmaking processes that impact client constituencies. In 
addition, international venues offer alternative platforms from which 
to assert political pressure for domestic gain. This polycentrism 
invites lawyers to move into multiple arenas, where they are required 
to calculate strategic costs and benefits, weighing which venues offer 
the greatest possibilities for politically meaningful intervention. 
In undertaking this calculus, lawyers balance aims of 
enforceability, legitimacy, and publicity. The question of 
enforceability implicates debates about “hard” versus “soft” law 
strategies and their relative merits. Do lawyers turn to venues that 
have the capacity to issue directives that are binding on state and 
private actors and have clearly defined methods of enforcement 
(“hard” law)? Or do they opt for venues that lack mechanisms for 
directly constraining action, but nonetheless establish norms and offer 
 
 656. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social 
Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM 
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY, supra note 340, at 29, 48–58. 
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opportunities for participation that promote negotiation and flexible 
compliance standards (“soft” law)?657 
Public interest lawyers operating on the global stage resist this 
either-or dichotomy, looking instead for ways to enlist both hard and 
soft law systems in mutually reinforcing ways. Advocacy around 
workers’ rights offers one perspective on this dynamic. Where venues 
offer the potential for legal enforceability, lawyers take advantage of 
them to bring workers’ rights claims. Domestically, lawyers have 
therefore invested heavily in wage-and-hour enforcement actions for 
immigrant workers, while the potential for enforceability has also 
drawn lawyers to use the ATS in federal courts to pursue 
transnational labor claims against offending corporations. Outside of 
U.S. courts, however, opportunities for hard enforcement are sharply 
curtailed. Engagement in soft law regimes is therefore increasingly 
common. But even when advocates enter soft law venues, it is not 
always the case that they do so simply with an eye toward leveraging 
political pressure. Rather, some groups have also sought to “harden” 
soft law systems by expanding the possibilities for legal enforcement 
from within. Engagement in soft law venues may therefore reflect not 
just a commitment to flexibility, but also an effort to transform the 
venues themselves. 
Advocacy within the NAFTA side labor agreement, which 
provides a soft monitoring and reporting system, suggests this type of 
effort. Though labor advocates have used the NAFTA process as a 
venue to raise public awareness about labor abuse, their early efforts 
were also designed as test cases to push the system in the direction of 
greater enforceability. In particular, the early maquiladora labor cases 
on health and safety issues saw advocates pushing to see how far the 
United States would go in pressing for outside expert review and 
arbitration, which are technically available under the agreement. This 
effort failed, in part because of the transition from the Clinton to 
Bush administration, but it reflected an effort to promote greater 
enforcement within the system, rather than simply a commitment to 
its soft law orientation.658 A different example of the interaction of 
hard and soft law regimes occurs in the context of corporate codes of 
conduct promoted by domestic NGOs and voluntarily adopted by 
corporations, which then agree to be monitored for compliance. Here, 
 
 657. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 388–95 (2004). 
 658. See supra notes 231–37 and accompanying text. 
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too, the division between hard and soft is blurry, with advocates 
attempting to “harden” the codes by funneling them into more 
traditional legal venues. The Wal-Mart case brought by the ILRF on 
behalf of sweatshop workers in developing countries is one example 
of this: its hard law theory, holding Wal-Mart contractually 
responsible for supplier labor violations, was premised on Wal-Mart’s 
adoption of a soft law code of corporate conduct governing its 
standards for engaging suppliers.659 In this sense, the Wal-Mart case 
reflects an effort to bootstrap soft law into hard though conventional 
litigation. From this point of view, enforceability can be seen as both 
a criterion influencing the selection of a particular venue and an end 
goal of advocacy. 
Enforceability, however, is not the only metric for evaluating 
engagement with international venues. To the degree that the choice 
of venue is made to advance a political cause, a central question is 
how venue selection may impact the audience advocates seek to 
influence. At times, that audience may be a group’s own constituency, 
which the group seeks to mobilize by using an international decision 
to publicize a cause and galvanize grassroots action. For example, 
when the Center for Economic and Social Rights filed its 2003 Inter-
American petition challenging the international legality of welfare 
reform, it was timed to coincide with a march planned to 
commemorate Martin Luther King Jr.’s Poor People’s Campaign.660 
Thus, the goal was partly to use the media attention generated by the 
petition to draw people to the march. In addition, the petition sought 
to reframe the issue of welfare reform in human rights terms as part 
of a coordinated effort to promote grassroots education about human 
rights among the welfare population and raise awareness about the 
antipoverty organizing efforts of the Philadelphia-based Kensingston 
Welfare Rights Union and the Poor People’s Economic Human 
Rights Campaign that it led.661 Again, the aim was to produce 
publicity that would bring community members into the campaign’s 
organizing fold. 
In other contexts, venue selection is designed to put pressure on 
an identified set of corporate or political decisionmakers. There, the 
strategy is to use a venue’s authority to spotlight wrongdoing and 
legitimate grievances, bringing negative publicity to bear in an effort 
 
 659. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 660. See FORD FOUND., supra note 12, at 11. 
 661. Id. at 31. 
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to force decisionmakers to take remedial action. In the case of 
corporate wrongdoing, the choice of venue is often designed to elicit a 
negative reaction from consumers or investors: Earthjustice’s use of 
the UN system in the Shell “Cancer Alley” case and the Coalition for 
Immokalee Workers’ testimony in front of the Inter-American 
Commission in its dispute with Taco Bell are leading examples. 
Foreign officials are also important audiences for advocates. For 
instance, Mexican officials have become a key audience for U.S. 
immigrant worker advocates, who attempt to enlist Mexican official 
concern over the treatment of expatriate workers as a way to leverage 
domestic policy change. Thus, the NAFTA side labor claims filed on 
behalf of H-2A agricultural workers alleging discrimination and H-2B 
nonagricultural workers excluded from federal legal services 
representation were both filed to mobilize Mexican governmental 
officials to lobby for specific legislative reform in the context of the 
political debate over U.S. guest worker proposals.662 
3. Alliance.  The pattern of public interest alliance building that 
has emerged in the global era reflects the border-crossing logic of 
globalization, with lawyers engaged in collaborations that traverse 
geographic, organizational, and professional divides. At the most 
basic level, alliances provide more resources to undertake advocacy 
and implement victories. Strategic alliances also have the potential to 
increase the visibility of particular campaigns, while providing public 
interest lawyers with greater credibility in front of decisionmakers 
and community members. In the global era, the transnational scale of 
advocacy makes alliance formation more complex, with lawyers 
required to navigate greater distances and foreign cultural terrains. 
But globalization also diversifies and improves channels of 
communication in ways that help to facilitate new cross-border 
relationships. The ability to quickly communicate across time zones 
and send large documents via e-mail allows lawyers to overcome the 
logistical concerns attending to cross-border advocacy. In addition, 
the relative ease of international travel is key for lawyers seeking to 
establish linkages with groups abroad. Online listservs have also 
facilitated alliance building, with sites like E-LAW in the 
 
 662. Telephone Interview with D. Michael Dale, supra note 122. 
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environmental field and U.S. Human Rights Online promoting 
information exchange among international groups.663 
Against this technological backdrop, cross-border alliance 
building is driven by clients, cases, and causes. Lawyers for 
internationally mobile clients form alliances to better address client 
problems. Within the migrant farmworker arena, for instance, 
alliances have developed to facilitate the representation of clients 
who cross the border for seasonal jobs: domestic legal services groups 
have established linkages with newly formed organizations like the 
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante in México to stay in contact 
with transient farmworker clients and access case-relevant home-
country information.664 Transnational alliances are also forged around 
specific cases or campaigns. For example, in Doe v. Unocal, it was the 
labor and environmental activist alliance between U.S. groups (ILRF 
and EarthRights International) and Burmese organizations that both 
generated the case in the first instance and facilitated the ongoing 
coordination of the litigation, media, and organizing campaigns.665 
Alliances are also built around commitment to larger causes: 
indigenous rights activism has connected U.S. Native American rights 
groups with counterparts around the region to advocate for UN and 
Organization of American States–level policies, environmental 
groups like Environmental Defense have established links with 
Mexican allies to redress transborder pollution, and domestic human 
rights advocates have become closely networked to international 
groups in the quest to advance universal legal standards. Yet while 
these transnational alliances permit dispersed groups to coordinate 
advocacy campaigns, they also generate their own internal power 
dynamics that can reinforce pre-existing cleavages. To the extent that 
U.S.-based lawyers have more resources, they can influence agendas 
and dictate strategy in a way that magnifies their authority. This is an 
acute concern within the web of alliances formed to help promote 
public interest law models abroad: despite conscientious efforts to 
avoid the imposition of U.S. ideas in developing countries, critics still 
 
 663. E-LAW: Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, http://www.elaw.org (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2008); probono.net, http://www.ushumanrightsonline.net/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 664. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 665. See supra notes 321–27 and accompanying text. 
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view the current wave of rule-of-law reform as an imperialistic 
attempt to Westernize local culture.666 
Another dynamic in alliance formation is collaboration between 
nonprofit organizations and for-profit law firms. These types of 
alliances are not limited to the international arena, but some have 
emerged in response to the particular demands of internationally 
oriented practice. In the corporate ATS cases, in particular, for-profit 
public interest firms have been crucial players, fronting the costs and 
shouldering the risks of resource-intensive projects that require 
coordination across significant geographic and cultural distances. 
Although these private actors help to sustain high-cost litigation, they 
also draw criticism from those who emphasize the potential for self-
interested attorneys to use the ATS as a vehicle to generate large 
fees, rather than pursue transnational justice.667 
Law firms have also become increasingly interested in 
international pro bono representation. Big-firm pro bono lawyers 
have been important allies in domestic human rights cases, providing 
attorney resources for human rights amicus briefs in cases challenging 
antisodomy laws668 and the juvenile death penalty,669 while also 
assisting on the Hamdan case.670 U.S.-based law firm lawyers are also 
increasingly investing in rule-of-law projects abroad,671 as exemplified 
by DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary’s New Perimeter program, which 
is a nonprofit affiliate set up to conduct pro bono on international 
development projects for the firm.672 Such international pro bono 
programs provide law firm attorneys cosmopolitan travel experiences, 
link up domestic offices and foreign branches, and expose lawyers to 
transnational practice relevant to commercial clients. Like their 
domestic counterparts, however, these pro bono ventures are also 
 
 666. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of 
Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2280–86 (2003). 
 667. See Johnson, supra note 562, at 658. 
 668. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
509. 
 669. See Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 509. 
 670. See Press Release, Perkins Coie LLP, Perkins Coie Hamdan Team Honored by King 
County Bar Association (Mar. 26, 2007). 
 671. See Koppel, supra note 389, at 92. 
 672. See Press Release, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, DLA Piper’s International 
Pro Bono Initiative Completes Projects and Establishes New Priorities in Its Second Year (May 
22, 2006), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/global/media/detail.aspx?news=2184. 
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constrained by law firm business considerations:673 their main focus is 
on civil and political rights in domestic courts, and rule-of-law and 
economic development projects abroad. And within the domain of 
civil and political rights, some cases are more palatable than others: 
for instance, though big law firms signed on to challenge the validity 
of Guantánamo military commissions674—which raise a classic 
question of access to justice—they have been reluctant to take on 
more controversial War on Terror cases alleging government-
authorized torture. 
Global interdependence has also shaped the formation of 
alliances that cut across conventional professional lines. Lawyer-
nonlawyer collaborations develop in response to the distinctive needs 
of specific advocacy projects. In the immigrant worker context, for 
example, lawyers collaborate with organizers in boycotting employers 
to pressure settlements in labor cases. Alliances also coalesce around 
campaigns to reform policy, in which lawyers gain grassroots 
credibility from community-based partners—a dynamic evident in the 
collaboration between the ACLU and Legal Momentum with 
organizing groups, such as New York’s Urban Justice Center, to pass 
CEDAW legislation in New York. 
Lawyers also seek out nonlawyers to make up for resource 
deficits. Thus, lawyers turn to university-based programs for support 
in pursuing more experimental international test cases: students in 
law school clinical programs have accordingly played important roles 
in NAFTA labor and environmental cases, as well as a number of 
significant human rights cases, including recent challenges on behalf 
of Guantánamo detainees.675 Foreign governmental officials have 
proven to be important supporters on immigrant worker issues, 
sponsoring trainings provided by México-based farmworker projects, 
like the Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, and providing some 
funding for U.S. immigrant worker programs, such as the Northwest 
Workers’ Justice Project.676 Organized labor has recently made efforts 
to support immigrant workers: the AFL-CIO’s Immigrant Worker 
 
 673. See Cummings, supra note 393, at 116–35. 
 674. See Neha S. Gohil & Shams S. Mitha, Representing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 35 
A.B.A. SEC. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. SEC. REP. 68, 68 (2005). 
 675. See Craig Whitlock, U.S. Frees Longtime Detainee: Court Had Ruled in Favor of Turk, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2006, at A9 (detailing the work of the Seton Hall Law School clinic in 
securing the release of a Turkish citizen). 
 676. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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Program now provides technical assistance to workers’ rights 
organizations and helps to coordinate immigrant worker advocacy. In 
addition, progressive unions and AFL-CIO sponsored groups such as 
the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras have been critical 
players in the NAFTA side labor cases. 
Advocacy around international issues has also blurred 
conventional programmatic distinctions and produced coalitions that 
traverse professional categories. The concept of human rights, in 
particular, has infused multiple disciplines, with groups like the U.S. 
Human Rights Network helping to disseminate human rights methods 
and goals across traditional civil rights, civil liberties, and poverty law 
areas. 
The issue of immigration has similarly cut across advocacy 
domains, generating new configurations of lawyers working to solve 
immigrant problems. One example of this is in the criminal defense 
arena, where public defenders faced with increasing numbers of 
immigrant clients have joined up with immigrant rights attorneys in 
alliances such as the Defending Immigrants Project to coordinate 
strategy so that immigrant criminal defendants can minimize the 
immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Immigration has 
also influenced the organization of traditional civil rights and poverty 
law practice, with civil rights groups (MALDEF) moving more 
heavily into immigrant issues, general impact groups (ACLU) 
focusing on immigrant rights, employment law reform organizations 
(NELP) establishing immigrant projects, and immigration groups 
(NILC) setting up employment programs. Some of these groups, in 
turn, have come together in different configurations to collaborate on 
immigrant worker advocacy through alliances such as the Low-Wage 
Immigrant Worker Coalition and collective projects such as the Inter-
American Commission hearings on Hoffman Plastics. Particularly 
after 9/11, coalitions have formed around immigrant civil liberties 
issues, with an important example being the coalition of clinical 
programs, civil rights groups, and immigration attorneys that worked 
to represent the Arab and South Asian immigrants detained in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11. 
C. Roles 
A central tension of public interest law is how lawyers balance 
professional obligations to clients with personal commitments to 
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causes.677 Lawyering in the international sphere reproduces these 
tensions on a wider stage, raising distinct challenges to the norm of 
client accountability and influencing professional motivations for 
pursuing global causes. 
1. Representation.  The conventional view of the lawyer’s 
professional role emphasizes the obligation to place the client’s 
interests above the lawyer’s political or personal aspirations. Public 
interest practice tests this view by substituting moral neutrality with 
moral commitment as the defining feature of legal advocacy.678 
Commitment to cause, however, does not mean that public interest 
lawyers reject professional norms; rather, public interest practice 
operates along a spectrum of client-centeredness,679 with legal services 
lawyers who privilege access to individual client services at one end 
and law reformers who care chiefly about the political ends of 
representation at the other. From the perspective of client 
accountability, the central concern across the spectrum is lawyer 
power. At the client service end, the main issue is private 
accountability:680 How do lawyers exercise their power to choose poor 
clients and make decisions on their behalf? At the law reform end, 
the question is one of public accountability:681 Who defines the cause 
and resolves conflicts over how to pursue it? Public interest lawyers 
operating in global arenas face challenges across both dimensions of 
accountability. 
At frontline legal services offices, where priority is given to client 
service over systemwide reform, globalization has meant responding 
to the legal needs of the expanding base of immigrant clients. This has 
generated a dilemma of access. Lawyers faced with expanding 
immigrant demand for services confront difficult questions of triage: 
 
 677. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: 
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 7–9 (2004). 
 678. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 30, 31 (1978). 
 679. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, 
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). 
 680. The poverty law literature emphasizes the risk of lawyers coercing and disempowering 
vulnerable clients. See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 67, at 495–98. 
 681. The public interest law literature focuses on the conflicts lawyers face both in terms of 
defining social change goals, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals 
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), and reconciling 
competing interests within the client constituency, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We 
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 
106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997). 
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which immigrants get served and in what types of cases? The answer 
to this question depends in part on lawyer location. Within federally 
funded legal services programs, LSC policy mandates the triage 
decision, with lawyers limited to the representation of legal 
immigrants or those whose undocumented status is connected to 
morally sympathetic circumstances (for instance, victims of trafficking 
and family abuse). Lawyers committed to less constrained advocacy 
for undocumented immigrants look for more supportive 
organizational locales, but outside of LSC programs, triage decisions 
are often driven as much by the availability of funding as by an 
assessment of client needs. Advocates complain that resources for 
assistance with workplace abuse, the defining injustice of the 
undocumented immigrant experience, are limited, while funders are 
attracted to support “victimization” projects—asylum, trafficking, 
domestic violence, and juvenile neglect.682 In the face of resource 
constraints, lawyers committed to workers’ rights formulate other 
triage strategies, such as taking on cases based on their potential to 
achieve systemwide impacts or conditioning representation on client 
agreements to help run workers’ rights organizations. 
Language access also defines the boundaries of legal services 
provision.683 Organizations that lack bilingual lawyers or staff 
members in languages relevant to immigrant client communities 
impose significant barriers to access for monolingual clients. Legal 
services groups have attempted to respond to this problem by actively 
recruiting bilingual staff and conducting targeted outreach to 
immigrant communities. The multiplicity of Asian languages is a 
particular concern. In response, legal aid groups like Greater Boston 
Legal Services and the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles have 
established Asian outreach projects in which lawyers who speak 
Cantonese, Mandarin, and Vietnamese provide community education 
and direct services to clients.684 There are also fledgling efforts to use 
technology to extend bilingual services: the LSC-funded Legal 
Services for New York City, in conjunction with the New York State 
 
 682. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 683. See, e.g., Symposium, The Effect of Globalization on Domestic Legal Services, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S277, S296 (2001) (comments of Lucie White, Professor of Law, Harvard 
Law School); see also Patricia Hanrahan, Serving Clients with Limited English Proficiency: 
Resources and Responses, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 276, 277 (2004). 
 684. Greater Boston Legal Services, Asian Outreach Unit, http://www.gbls.org/asian/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008); Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Asian and Pacific 
Islander, http://lafla.org/clientservices/api/index.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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Bar and probono.net, launched a free on-line referral and 
information service in Spanish.685 Yet as limited English proficient 
immigrants grow in number and diversity, while fanning out to 
nontraditional settlement states, legal services programs continue to 
struggle to meet the goal of equal access.686 Once immigrant clients 
are accepted for representation, language difference compromises 
communication about case strategies and goals, which renders poor 
clients more vulnerable to lawyer influence over the basic terms of 
representation. Though legal services programs have made efforts to 
address language access by setting guidelines for translation,687 
commentators note that in practice translation services are frequently 
unavailable and—when they are available—often involve 
nonprofessionals who inject third party viewpoints into the lawyer-
client relationship, thus challenging the aims of client-centered 
service.688 
At the other end of the public interest spectrum are those 
lawyers who view representation as a means to the end of legal and 
political reform. Domestic reform lawyers have been the subject of 
two basic criticisms. The first questions the systemic legitimacy of 
small groups of lawyers pursuing their own version of social change 
without significant political checks. On the one hand, this concern is 
heightened in the global context to the degree that U.S. lawyers are 
seen intervening as legal crusaders in countries around the world. 
Why should U.S. lawyers be involved in setting human rights 
standards in Burma and Nigeria, policing labor and environmental 
practices in México, protesting World Bank projects in India, or 
asserting reproductive rights on behalf of women in Africa? In this 
spirit, critics assail the use of the ATS to advance human rights 
claims, emphasizing the undemocratic nature of U.S. lawyers asking 
judges to adjudicate international norms.689 On the other hand, 
 
 685. See Brennan Ctr. Legal Servs. E-lert, Spanish Speakers in New York Facing Civil Legal 
Problems Gain New, Free Online Legal Assistance Service: LawHelp.org/NY, Mar. 3, 2006 (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal); see also LawHelp.org/NY, http://www.lawhelp.org/NY/ 
index.cfm/language/1/state/NY (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (providing information in Spanish on 
legal services, legal rights, and court procedures in New York). 
 686. See Hanrahan, supra note 683, at 281. 
 687. See Program Letter from Helaine M. Barnett, President, Legal Servs. Corp., to All LSC 
Program Directors 04-2 (Dec. 6, 2004) (on file with author). 
 688. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language 
Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007). 
 689. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 361–63 (1998). 
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however, public interest lawyering in the international arena can be 
seen as promoting democracy to the extent that it challenges the 
exclusion of less powerful groups from bodies of international 
decisionmaking and counteracts the negative impact of U.S. policy 
abroad in cases where domestic channels of redress are blocked. 
Reform lawyering can also be seen as advancing the democratically 
formulated goals of the international community to the extent that 
lawyers attempt to enforce universal human rights in countries where 
egregious abuse cannot be remedied by the political process.690 
The second major criticism of reform lawyering centers not on 
democratic legitimacy, but rather on client group accountability. 
Here, reform lawyers are faulted for pursuing causes in a top-down 
fashion, generating advocacy agendas without input from affected 
communities.691 Reform lawyering in the international arena 
reproduces, and in some situations heightens, this concern. The 
nature of human rights lawyering, in particular, raises challenges for 
client accountability. In terms of agenda setting, the project of human 
rights tends to be top-down, with lawyers seeking to build 
international law either out of a normative commitment to 
universality or as a pragmatic alternative to domestic 
constitutionalism. The execution of human rights advocacy also raises 
issues of client accountability: human rights lawyers chart test cases to 
push the boundaries of international law and exert control over 
questions of goals, strategy, and venues. In addition, the transnational 
nature of human rights litigation tends to increase complexity, which 
operates in favor of greater lawyer control. Particularly with respect 
to ATS cases, questions of jurisdiction, immunity, and enforcement 
are highly arcane,692 requiring deference to lawyer expertise. There 
are also logistical barriers that make client input more difficult. At 
one extreme are the Guantánamo cases, in which lawyers are limited 
in the ability to communicate with clients by government fiat; but 
even in less unique situations, the transnational scope of litigation 
makes coordination with clients more complex, particularly when 
access to technology is not readily available. 
There are countervailing international dynamics that operate to 
ground lawyering more firmly in grassroots activity. As seen in the 
 
 690. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1234 (2005). 
 691. See Bell, supra note 681, at 512. 
 692. See Eric Gruzen, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights Litigation: Is This the 
Best Solution?, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. 207, 241 (2001). 
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labor context, the development of sophisticated and cohesive 
transnational activist networks around maquiladora and sweatshop 
issues offers a counterweight to lawyer power in the design and 
execution of reform campaigns. As transnational human rights, 
environmental, and other networks continue to grow and develop 
mechanisms for coordination,693 they can more effectively demand 
lawyer responsiveness to network-defined decisions. Yet the rise of 
transnational networks also magnifies the accountability problems 
inherent in group representation, with lawyers placed in the position 
of navigating conflicts among network members and having to discern 
the collective will from fluid and informal decisionmaking 
processes.694 
2. Motivation.  Motivation is a central component of 
professional identity, distinguishing the work of public interest 
lawyers, who are moved by a calling to pursue some version of social 
justice.695 In the pursuit of justice, however, there are multiple routes 
to take, not all of which involve global engagement. What factors 
shape the decisions of public interest lawyers to pursue international 
advocacy? 
At the ideological level, the increasing salience of global 
interconnections may influence how lawyers perceive their advocacy 
role, injecting new explanations of injustice and presenting new 
prescriptions for reform. In this sense, “globalization” becomes a way 
of both understanding abuse and motivating efforts to fight it: 
workers’ rights advocates thus describe the need to fight globally 
linked garment sweatshops with global activism,696 while 
environmentalists emphasize the global struggle to combat 
transborder pollution.697 From an advocacy perspective, exposure to 
international human rights further reframes the way lawyers view 
possibilities for reform, legitimizing the notion that the United States 
 
 693. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 31, at 121–63, 165–98. 
 694. For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges of balancing ideals of community and 
individual autonomy in group representation, see Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness 
Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ 
Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1992). 
 695. Cf. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 677, at 3 (“At its core, cause lawyering is about 
using legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service—be those ideals, social, 
cultural, political, economic or, indeed, legal.”). 
 696. Telephone Interview with Julie Su, supra note 344. 
 697. Telephone Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, supra note 361. 
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must adhere to its international obligations,698 and reviving efforts to 
stimulate more proactive economic and social rights agendas.699 
Motivation is also shaped by organizational context.700 For 
frontline legal services attorneys, global engagement is largely 
reactive, driven by the logic of individual case representation. For 
instance, lawyers at legal services groups on the border, like Texas 
RioGrande Legal Aid, report entering México to pursue cases 
involving transnational kidnapping,701 while lawyers representing 
migrant farmworkers follow their clients to their home countries in 
the conduct of wage-and-hour cases. Yet organizational norms can 
influence how far legal services lawyers are willing to travel in the 
pursuit of client service. In the economic development context, some 
legal services groups are eager to help promote investment projects 
by HTAs to benefit communities in México, while others view their 
missions in strictly domestic terms and therefore limit their services to 
HTAs that focus their work primarily on helping immigrants in the 
United States. 
For law reform groups, global engagement is largely a matter of 
deliberate strategic choice, with international advocacy guided by an 
impulse to press new claims and test new venues. Here, too, 
organizational norms are an important factor in lawyer receptivity to 
international opportunities. Lawyers in reform organizations like 
CCR and the ACLU, with organizational histories of international 
work and funding commitments to promote human rights, have 
moved most aggressively. Lawyers in civil rights groups like the 
NAACP LDF, in contrast, have entered the international domain 
more slowly out of concern for reneging on the fight for domestic 
legal justice. 
Although public interest lawyers are influenced by ideological 
and organizational factors, their decisions to engage globally are also 
 
 698. Telephone Interview with Laura Abel, Deputy Dir., Poverty Program, Brennan Ctr. for 
Justice (June 15, 2006). 
 699. Telephone Interview with Maria Foscarinis, supra note 604. 
 700. See Robert Nelson & David Trubek, Introduction: New Problems and New Paradigms 
in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 1, 15 (1992). 
 701. See Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Bi-National Project on Family Violence (BPFV), 
http://www.trla.org/teams/binational.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (discussing a project 
providing representation to clients on domestic violence claims that has helped women to regain 
custody of children kidnapped and taken across the border). 
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shaped by personal and professional motives.702 International 
advocacy harbors the promise of adventure and the exotic. 
Particularly for public interest lawyers whose lower salaries make 
foreign travel more difficult, opportunities to travel abroad in 
connection with work are coveted. The chance to connect with 
foreign counterparts, share domestic experiences, and see new locales 
is a powerful draw. To the extent that advocacy in the global arena is 
seen as the vanguard of new social movements,703 lawyers are 
attracted out of a desire to be a part of something that gives larger 
meaning to individual efforts. Moreover, there is professional prestige 
associated with the international sphere and opportunities to parlay 
international experiences into better jobs at home. Lawyers who 
forge new international paths by using human rights laws, bringing 
cases in international venues, or creating connections with 
transnational groups receive professional attention in the form of 
conference invitations, media opportunities, fellowships, and 
academic jobs. From these platforms, lawyers tout accomplishments 
and legitimize global strategies—adding further momentum to public 
interest law’s internationalization. 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of a strong international theme within U.S. 
public interest law highlights the reversals of fortune, strategic 
adaptations, and deep tensions that characterize the movement in the 
contemporary era. The international turn is a product of domestic 
political realignment: inside the United States, the public interest law 
movement, built upon a symbiotic relationship with the federal 
government, now finds itself in opposition to the main levers of 
federal power. It has, therefore, looked outside U.S. borders—not 
just for legal resources, but also for connections with international 
struggles to infuse it with a renewed sense of movement energy and 
political mission. And it is there that U.S. lawyers have found new 
political allies, as well as opportunities to engage in large-scale 
 
 702. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an 
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 
380, at 31. 
 703. See, e.g., della Porta & Tarrow, supra note 214, at 10 (describing how transnational 
changes have facilitated “the spread of movements targeting international institutions, practices, 
and relationships, producing a growing concern with global issues”). 
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reforms that seem only a dim possibility at home.704 Particularly on 
issues of labor rights and environmental justice, U.S. lawyers have 
found global partners eager to assert social standards within the 
regime of free trade. U.S. lawyers have similarly invested in rule-of-
law reforms in developing countries, not out of an impulse to remake 
the world in the American image, but rather drawn by the lure of 
enormous possibilities for profound legal and political change. Back 
at home, lawyers have also tapped into international movements to 
promote domestic reforms, taking up the banner of immigrant rights 
and enlisting the legal and rhetorical power of human rights in the 
service of domestic causes. In contrast to the self-confident insularity 
of public interest law during the civil rights era, these movements 
suggest that U.S. lawyers now perceive that the rest of world has 
political lessons to teach and legal models to emulate. 
Whether this global receptivity will translate into enduring 
change, however, is less clear. Though public interest lawyers have 
tried to deploy human rights to counteract the erosion of regulatory 
and social welfare systems at home and abroad, the effort has been 
largely limited to using international venues to publicize U.S. actions. 
To the extent that legal enforcement against corporations has been 
sought through domestic human rights litigation, the result has been 
individual recovery, but also political backlash, evident in efforts by 
business groups to lobby for the repeal of the Alien Tort Statute.705 
The immigrant rights movement has provoked similar political 
opposition, focused on increased border enforcement, and though 
there has been discussion of comprehensive immigration reform, its 
central feature—a guest worker program—risks perpetuating labor 
abuse to the extent that it makes immigrants dependent on their 
employers to remain in the country. These developments raise 
questions about whether rights-based advocacy can effectively stem 
abuses in the marketplace. In the political arena, human rights has 
gained more traction post-9/11, but even here, the potential for 
political reversal is strong, as was evident in the post-Hamdan 
legislation reestablishing military commissions, stripping 
 
 704. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 8, at 129–33. 
 705. See, e.g., John E. Howard, Op-Ed, Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok 
Going Global?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Oct. 2002, http://www.uschamber.com/press/ 
opeds/0210howarditigation.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). 
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Guantánamo detainees of habeas corpus rights, and precluding 
judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions.706 
The fragility of international advocacy should not be read, 
however, as an indictment of the broader effort. Rather, it 
underscores a consistent historical lesson of the public interest law 
movement: legal victories are not etched in stone and must be 
monitored and protected from counterattack to be sustained. This 
was true as much in the civil rights era as it is now. In this sense, the 
story of internationalization can be viewed as but the most recent 
chapter in the ongoing struggle to use law to reform politics—a 
struggle in which public interest lawyers are always operating from a 
politically weak position. To be sure, the turn to the international 
sphere underscores the extent to which liberal rights advocacy has 
fallen out of political favor, particularly when compared to the 
increased legal rights activity by conservative public interest groups.707 
However, it is also a measure of the resilience of the public interest 
law movement, which has embraced the strategic incorporation of 
international advocacy as a pragmatic adaptation to a hostile 
domestic environment—with the ultimate goal of using 
internationalism to reclaim the domestic arena once again as a site of 
progressive change. 
 
 706. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The habeas stripping provisions were challenged 
in the Supreme Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Ready to Answer Detainee Rights 
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A32. 
 707. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of 
“Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1263–73 (2005). 
